



## **2012 CENTER FOR ARMY LEADERSHIP ANNUAL SURVEY OF ARMY LEADERSHIP (CASAL): MAIN FINDINGS**

**TECHNICAL REPORT 2013-1**

**Ryan Riley  
Josh Hatfield  
Art Paddock  
ICF International**

**Jon J. Fallesen  
Center for Army Leadership**

**April 2013**

**The Center for Army Leadership**  
An Organization of Leader Development and Education, U.S. Army  
Combined Arms Center

---

Thomas P. Guthrie  
COL, IN  
Director

Leadership Research, Assessment and Doctrine Division  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2314  
Jon J. Fallesen, Chief

Distribution: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<p>Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b></p>					
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 25-04-2013	<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Technical Report	<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> August 2012 – April 2013			
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  2012 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b> W911S0-11-D-0011	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Ryan Riley, Josh Hatfield, Art Paddock (ICF International) and Jon J. Fallesen (CAL)				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b> DO 0006	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> ICF International 9300 Lee Highway Fairfax, VA				<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
Cubic Applications, Inc. 426 Delaware, Suite C-3 Leavenworth, KS				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b> CAL	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b> 2013-1	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> A separate report from the Center for Army Leadership provides findings from this survey on Army civilian leaders.					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> CASAL is an annual survey sponsored by the Combined Arms Center to assess the quality of Army leadership and leader development. 2012 findings are based on responses from over 27,000 Army leaders, including 20,192 sergeants through colonels from the Active component, US Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. The 2012 study has additional coverage on mission command, unit trust, strategic leadership, and the Army Profession. Getting results, preparing one self, and stewardship are the most favorably rated doctrinal competencies. The Army Values, confidence and composure, and professional bearing are the highest rated attributes. Develops others continues to be the competency most needing improvement. Over three fourths of leaders are rated effective at exercising mission command. Trust among unit members is moderate with most concern among junior NCOs. Leaders who are effective at building trust also tend to achieve higher levels of morale, commitment, and work quality. The percentage of Army leaders demonstrating negative leadership behaviors to the degree they would be deemed toxic continues to be low. Operational experience continues to be the most favored leader development practice. Army courses are seen as effective by a majority of graduates at improving leadership, but average ratings did decrease. Assignment and performance evaluation practices are seen as effective for leader development by half or fewer of Army leaders. Most leaders agree that it is important for the Army to be a profession, and they consider it to be a profession. Study recommendations include increasing instruction on the development of leadership as a skill, increasing emphasis on leaders developing subordinates, using advanced learning principles to increase the challenge of Army courses, and using position and duty assignments more intentionally to develop individuals.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Leadership; Leader Development; Education; Training; Performance Assessment; Trust; Mission Command; Strategic Leadership; Army Profession; Recommendations					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b> Jon J. Fallesen
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	Unlimited	138	<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b> 913-758-3160

## Foreword

How well leaders are developed and the associated quality of leadership are of the highest concern to the U.S. Army as leadership is of utmost importance in maintaining a fully capable military ground force and achieving consistent mission success. The U.S. Army, as other successful professions, has a long tradition of “looking” at itself and determining ways to address problems and to identify opportunities to improve. From 2000 to 2004 the Training and Doctrine Command undertook a massive study to enhance Army training and leader development. That study called the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) collected some 23 million observations from approximately 95,000 Soldiers, Army spouses, and Army civilians and resulted in over 250 recommendations for changes for officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, and Army civilian cohorts. Most of the resources dedicated to leader development programs that exist today originated from the thorough understanding of issues and solutions that began with the ATLDP.

As an alternative to the episodic review of Army leader development, in 2005 the Center for Army Leadership approached the assessment of leadership and leader development as a regular, ongoing requirement. A survey of Army leadership and leader development, now called the CAL Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), has occurred each year with the main purpose of informing Army senior leaders about the state and trends in leadership quality and the effectiveness of its leader development practices. CASAL provides a statistically reliable assessment of the attitudes and ratings of uniformed and civilian leaders. From year to year standard questions are assessed and each year special topics are added. This year’s CASAL addressed the usual items derived from AR 350-1, *Army Leader Development*, and ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, along with special issues on trust in units, Mission Command, Strategic Leadership, and the Army Profession.

I recommend a careful reading of this report as it will give you better situational awareness of the perceptions held by our Army’s leaders at and below the rank of Colonel and across the active, reserve, guard, and Army civilian cohorts. While many findings will confirm your understanding, there will be new information as well. This effort is of major importance to the Army’s continued emphasis on sustaining world-class leader development programs.



DAVID G. PERKINS

Lieutenant General

Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth

# **2012 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Main Findings Executive Summary**

## **Purpose**

Since 2005, the Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) has been an established effort by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), Combined Arms Center (CAC), to assess the quality of leadership performed by Army leaders and the effectiveness of Army leader development. The 2012 CASAL additionally assessed leader attitudes on concepts related to the Army Profession. CASAL is the authoritative source for how current uniformed and civilian personnel assess the state of Army leadership and leader development. A rigorous scientific approach is used for survey development, sampling, data collection, and data analysis. Survey items are chosen based on past usage, input from stake-holders, and development of new issues. Data are collected from thousands of randomly sampled officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and Army civilians. These leaders are picked from the Army's entire personnel database. The globally dispersed respondents accurately represent the broader population which is confirmed through analysis of respondents' demographics. Data analysis includes assessment of proportions by ranks and cohort, analysis of trends, comparisons across experience and demographic factors, computation of statistics, and qualitative analysis of short-answer responses.

CASAL results provide valuable information for senior Army leaders to use for policy decision making. The survey captures Army leader attitudes on the quality of the institutional, operational, and self-development domains of leader development. Data are collected from a range of military and civilian leaders serving in a variety of situations (e.g., deployed, redeployed, in garrison, in TOE and TDA assignments, at the schoolhouse). Consequently, CASAL is comprehensive in its identification of leader development strengths and gaps. Senior leaders can thus leverage this information to build on the Army's strengths and take action to close the gaps.

Over 20,100 active duty and reserve component leaders, along with 7,277 Army civilians, participated in the 2012 CASAL.

## **Survey Development and Administration**

Each year, survey development begins with the identification of issues of importance to leadership and leader development. As one purpose of CASAL is to adequately track trends and

identify patterns over time, many survey items from past years are used without change during each administration of the survey. Other items are dropped, added, or modified in order to balance coverage on leadership topics with survey size, time to respond and respondent fatigue. In part, this is done to ensure that the survey assesses contemporary issues in the Army that change from year to year. Data have been collected through both quantitative (e.g., select a response) and qualitative (e.g., type a brief answer) means. Item skip patterns and branching are employed to tailor sections of the survey to specific ranks or to leaders with relevant experiences, a method that also helps to minimize survey length and respondent fatigue. Over 100 items covered topics on the quality of leadership and leader development:

#### Quality of Leadership

- What is the overall quality of Army leaders?
- How effectively do Army leaders demonstrate core leader competencies and attributes?
- How effectively do Army leaders conduct or support Decisive Action and Mission Command?
- What capabilities and potential do leaders show for strategic leadership?
- How do climate and situational factors affect leadership?
- How are leaders affecting trust?
- How common are indicators of negative leadership?

#### Leader Development

- How effective are Army leader development practices?
- How supportive are superiors of leader development for their subordinates?
- How effective are personnel management practices for leader development?
- How effective is institutional education for leader development?
- How effective is unit training for leadership development?

The 2012 CASAL was administered online in October 2012 and was accessible for three weeks. Over 20,100 uniformed leaders in the active and reserve components, along with 7,277 Army civilians, responded to the survey. This strong participation in the CASAL provides an overall sampling error of approximately +/- 0.7%. This sampling error, together with the stratified random sampling method used, means that the CASAL respondents are representative of the Army population. Accumulated data from eight years increase the clarity of interpretation. Thus, a high degree of confidence can be placed in the findings.

## **Summary of Main Findings**

Conducting the CASAL annually since 2005 provides the Army several things: It allows an introspective look at the health of the Army's leadership and leader development processes; it provides a baseline of data from which to compare and identify upward and downward trends; it informs the Army's senior leadership and affords them the opportunity to make course corrections and apply resources as needed; and finally, the CASAL has served as a leadership "weather vane."

The 2012 CASAL results explained in this report show that the quality of Army leadership remains high and that Army leaders effectively demonstrate leadership during operations of Decisive Action including *Offensive Operations, Defensive Operations, Stability Operations, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* while exercising *Mission Command*.

The trend of performing well continues in many required leader competencies: *Getting Results, Preparing Oneself, and Stewards the Profession*. Army leaders are rated favorably in demonstrating all leader attributes, especially *the Army Values, Confidence & Composure, and Military & Professional Bearing*. The data also indicate that leaders evaluate their immediate supervisor's performance more so on their leader competencies (the Do part of leadership) than on the leader attributes (the Be and Know parts). This is not surprising as competencies are more easily observable and distinguishable than are attributes, but it suggests further that many leaders possess high levels of the attributes while there is greater range in the performance of leadership competencies.

Nearly all Army leaders report high levels of personal loyalty and commitment to their team or immediate work group, and believe their individual contributions impact their unit's mission success. While leaders' commitment to the Army is at an all time high, perceived reciprocal commitment from the Army has degraded to the point that almost 50% of leaders do not believe the Army is as committed to them. This is not unexpected given the level of uncertainty surrounding the future of the Army end strength reflected in downsizing, reduced promotion rates, qualitative service program (QSP), and selective early retirement boards (SERB). Satisfaction indicators like quality of Army life and Captains' intent to stay until eligible for retirement remain positive. Tracking reciprocal commitment provides early warning to senior leaders of the potential cascading effects of uncertainty on lower morale, loss of quality leaders, and lack of unit cohesion.

Nearly all leaders agree that the Army is a profession. Also Army leaders agree in high percentages that their immediate superior puts the needs of the unit and mission ahead of self,

and agree their superior enforces ethical standards, looks out for subordinate welfare, has the ‘know how’ to guide subordinates through risk or danger safely, and effectively or very effectively *Builds Trust* with others. The 2012 CASAL contains an entire section on *Trust*, but the data indicate that ratings of trust within units are higher at more senior levels than they are at lower leadership levels (Junior NCOs).

Operational experience continues to be the most favored leader development practice followed by self development and then institutional education. Deployments, on-the-job training, opportunities to lead others, and learning from peers have consistently been rated by leaders over the years as having the largest positive impact on their development. Developmental counseling, formal unit-based leader development activities, nonresident education (Distributed Learning), and 360-degree assessment feedback are rated as having less of a positive impact on development. In the case of developmental counseling, the low ratings may be in part because of a lack of commitment by some leaders to actually do counseling.

The Army always takes a critical look at itself and there are areas to improve that deserve attention. While Army leaders receive high marks for executing and accomplishing the mission, *Developing Others* is the core leader competency most in need of improvement. This is a trend that continues across all levels. Leaders lead their subordinates well, but more attention is needed on developing them to be the leaders of the future (coaching, counseling, mentoring, listening, sharing).

A quarter of leaders report only receiving formal counseling at rating time and another quarter indicate they never or almost never receive counseling. This frequency and quality of performance counseling shows a slight decline over the past five years.

At a time where the Army is faced with downsizing and expected reduced budgets, more than half of its leaders report that stress from a high workload is a moderate to serious problem in their current organization.

Over the past couple of years, CASAL has looked at “toxic” leadership behaviors. The 2012 CASAL provided much more specific questions regarding negative leadership behaviors than in previous years and was done so in order to attain more fidelity on the topic. Smaller percentages of leaders indicate their superior engages in negative behaviors such as blaming others to save themselves from personal embarrassment, berating subordinates for small mistakes, or setting misplaced priorities that interfere with accomplishing goals. Individual negative behaviors are reported in low frequency at brigade, battalion and company command levels; Junior NCOs more frequently report their immediate superior demonstrates negative

leadership behaviors. Continued use of 360° assessments and other assessment tools all help to identify and correct leadership gaps. More emphasis on leadership education and training for junior leaders may be required.

The Army's personnel management processes continue to receive criticism. Leaders point to needing adequate time in key assignments as well as desiring a more purposeful mix of assignments. The majority of leaders do not believe that duty assignments effectively balance force needs with individual Soldier needs and capabilities. These trending data point to potentially missed developmental opportunities and a lack of coincidental talent management at the individual level. Ongoing initiatives such as Army Career Tracker, Green Pages and Talent Management in general, aim to help improve this perception.

Although a significant majority of recent PME graduates rate course instructors and the quality of the education they received favorably, smaller percentages of them agree course activities and assessments were sufficiently challenging to distinguish high performers from low performing students and that the courses were not as effective at improving their leadership capabilities as they could be. The quality of education was rated favorably by 85% of field grade officer graduates, while only 65% of other ranks groups rated quality favorably. The recently concluded Warrant Officer Continuum of Learning Study (WOCLS) of 2012 will address some of those PME concerns within that cohort.

The CASAL is the Army's annual "After Action Review" (AAR) on leadership and leader development and like any AAR, there are acknowledged strengths as well as areas to improve. As a self-critical profession, the Army typically gives quick and temporal praise to the identified strengths and then quickly focuses most of the attention, effort and resources on the areas where it needs to get better. With eight years of findings, the Army continues to reinforce its strengths in leadership and leader development, address identified weaknesses, and look to leverage other opportunities to improve its potential.



## Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
<b>Organization of Findings .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1. Quality of Leadership.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1.1 Perceptions of Leader Quality.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1.2 Indicators of Leadership Performance.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1.2.1 The Leadership Requirements Model.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1.2.2 Characteristics of Leader Effectiveness .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>1.2.3 Decisive Action and Mission Command.....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>1.2.4 Strategic-Level Leader Capabilities.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>1.3 The Effects of Climate and Situational Factors on Leadership .....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>1.3.1 Deployed and Garrison Settings.....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>1.3.2 Morale, Commitment, Career Satisfaction and Career Intentions .....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>1.3.3 Characteristics of the Working Environment .....</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>1.3.4 Trust .....</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>1.3.5 Negative Leadership .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>2. Quality of Leader Development.....</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>2.1 Army Leader Development.....</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>2.2. Subordinate Development .....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>2.3 Leader Development Practices and Initiatives.....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>2.4 The Personnel Management System.....</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>2.5 Institutional Education .....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>2.5.1 Quality of Army Education.....</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>2.5.2 Course-Specific Findings .....</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>2.6 Unit-Based Training.....</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>3. The Army Profession .....</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>Conclusions and Recommendations.....</b>	<b>114</b>
<b>References .....</b>	<b>123</b>



## **2012 CENTER FOR ARMY LEADERSHIP ANNUAL SURVEY OF ARMY LEADERSHIP (CASAL): FINAL REPORT**

### **Organization of Findings**

The CASAL was administered online to a representative sample of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officers (O-1 to O-6), warrant officers (W-1 to W-5), and noncommissioned officers (E-5 to E-9) who were globally dispersed. In addition to uniformed leaders, Army civilian leaders have participated in the CASAL since 2009 (findings for Army civilians are presented in a separate report). In October 2012, the survey invitation was sent via e-mail to a random sample of 140,857 Army leaders within the uniformed and civilian cohorts, of whom 27,469 participated, for a response rate of 19.5%. The online survey was accessible to participants for three weeks and closed the first week of November 2012.

The level of sampling precision was adequate for each of five rank groups for the active component (AC) and reserve components (RC) (i.e., within sampling error of +/- 1.9% to +/- 2.4%, and sampling error for entire survey across components and cohorts is +/- 0.7%). Essentially this means that 95 times out of 100 the observed percentage will be within 1% of the true percentage. The level of response to the 2012 CASAL represents the lowest sampling error attained by the CASAL since its inception.

The respondent sample closely approximated the population of the Army in distribution of component and gender. The sample was also representative of deployed Army leaders; 61% active and 41% reserve had recent deployment experience (in the past 36 months). Further, 9.7% of active and reserve component respondents were serving on a deployment at the time of the survey. The population, sample, response rate, and sampling error for each uniformed rank group are presented in Table 1.

This report is presented in three parts:

- The first part, *Quality of Leadership*, discusses the current leader quality in the Army, leader effectiveness in meeting leadership requirements, and climate and situational factors affecting leadership.
- The second part, *Quality of Leader Development*, discusses the current quality of Army leader development practices, programs and activities, including leader effectiveness in developing subordinate leaders, and the contribution of operational experience, self development, and institutional education to leader development.

- The third part, *The Army profession*, discusses leader attitudes about the Army as a profession, awareness of the initiative, and usage of practices, procedures and programs integrating Army profession concepts in units and organizations.

**Table 1. Population, Sample, Response Rates and Sampling Error by Rank Group and Component for Uniformed Personnel.**

Population Strata	Population	Planned Sample (Invitations)	Returned		Sampling Error
			N	Response Rate	
<b>Active Component</b>					
Field Grade Officer	31,637	6,308	2,092	33.2%	2.1
Company Grade Officer	50,336	14,380	2,560	17.8%	1.9
Warrant Officer	15,722	7,374	1,647	22.3%	2.3
Sr NCO	55,354	8,345	2,077	24.9%	2.1
Jr NCO	146,784	19,277	2,722	14.1%	1.9
Total AC	299,833	55,684	11,098	19.9%	0.9
<b>Reserve Component</b>					
Field Grade Officer	24,997	7,402	1,858	25.1%	2.2
Company Grade Officer	40,566	15,265	1,911	12.5%	2.2
Warrant Officer	11,206	6,341	1,417	22.3%	2.4
Sr NCO	53,428	8,566	1,905	22.2%	2.2
Jr NCO	144,060	19,124	2,003	10.5%	2.2
Total RC	274,257	56,698	9,094	16.0%	1.0
<b>Total Uniformed Personnel</b>	<b>574,090</b>	<b>112,382</b>	<b>20,192</b>	<b>18.0%</b>	<b>0.7</b>

Within each sub-section, key findings are highlighted in text and summarized in call-out boxes. Trends are reported for items that have been asked in previous years of survey administration. Where applicable, CASAL findings are supplemented with results from secondary data sources (i.e., results from Army or DOD surveys that have assessed similar topic areas). Each major section ends with a short summary that provides a recap of the most important findings. For accuracy and simplicity, percentages are emphasized for active duty Army leaders. In many cases, findings are comparable between the active and reserve components, though exceptions are noted.

## **1. Quality of Leadership**

This section examines several perspectives of leadership performance and quality. CASAL captured perceptions of leader quality through broad assessments of the effectiveness of superiors, peers and subordinates as leaders. Leadership performance was also assessed through existing doctrinal frameworks such as the Army core leader competency model and the leader attributes, as well as assessment of leader effectiveness in other leadership behaviors. Assessment of leader effectiveness in operations of decisive action and mission command are also discussed, as well as the capabilities of future strategic-level leaders.

The current status and trends in levels of leader morale, commitment and career satisfaction are examined, as well as intentions to remain in the Army. Various characteristics of the working environment affect leadership and both organizational and Soldier outcomes. Two areas that impact the climate of Army organizations are trust and negative leadership. The 2012 CASAL assessed the levels of trust among Army units and organizations, factors that contribute to or hinder trust among members, and the effectiveness of leaders in building trust. Finally, trends in the prevalence and impact of negative leadership behaviors are discussed.

### **1.1 Perceptions of Leader Quality**


The quality of Army leadership continues to be strong. On average, a majority of Army leaders hold favorable views of their superiors (72%) and peers (77%) as effective leaders. Additionally, a high percentage of leaders (85%) with direct supervisory responsibilities rate their subordinates as effective leaders (see Figure 1). Less than one-tenth of leaders consider their peers (8%) or subordinates (4%) as ineffective. Thirteen percent of Army leaders across the ranks of SGT through COL perceive their superiors to be ineffective as leaders.

- Since 2007, favorable ratings of superior, peer, and subordinate leader effectiveness have shown slight fluctuation but remain fairly steady.
- As previously identified in CASAL findings, ratings of subordinate leader effectiveness are more favorable than ratings of superiors or peers, differences that can be attributed to the proximal relationship between the superior (survey participant) and their subordinates (a defined group) compared to collective ratings of groups of less defined peers and superiors.

At a more specific level, most Army leaders hold favorable views toward the effectiveness of their immediate superior as a leader. This is evidenced through ratings of superior effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies, the leader attributes, and various other leader behaviors. Further discussion on leader performance across the competencies and attributes

and the effect these behaviors have on followers and organizational outcomes are presented in the next section.

**Figure 1. Effectiveness Ratings of Superiors, Peers, and Subordinates as Leaders.**



The 2012 CASAL sought to uncover new insights into how Army leaders view the quality of leadership in their units and organizations, specifically in the leadership performance of those with whom they work and interact. In past years, CASAL findings have shown that on average, Army leaders view about 61% of the leaders in their unit or organization as effective leaders. However, this difficult-to-interpret average score provides little insight into what leaders are thinking about when they make a single percentage rating.

To better understand the variance in leader quality that Army leaders perceive, the 2012 CASAL first asked participants to identify the approximate number of leaders in their unit or organization, specifically those with whom they interact with on a regular basis (i.e., leaders whom they know and whose leadership they could reasonably assess). Findings show that most leaders considered a moderate to small-sized group of leaders as their frame of reference. Seventy-seven percent considered a group of 20 or fewer leaders, though 62% actually considered 10 or fewer leaders. These findings are important for interpreting perceptions of

leader quality using percentages. For example, as most leaders considered 10 or fewer leaders in their unit as their reference, an average of 12% ineffective leaders equates to about 1 person (in that person's view of their unit).

Second, for the purpose of assessing leadership quality, CASAL presented participants with a five category continuum of leader quality and operationalized the terms with the descriptions shown in Table 2. Participants were asked to classify the percentage of leaders in their unit or organization (the approximate number that they had previously identified) that fit into each category. Leaders were instructed that they did not have to use all five categories, but the sum of their percentage allocations must equal 100%.

**Table 2. Categories and Descriptions of Leadership Performance Levels.**

<b>Exceptional leaders</b>	Demonstrate excellence in leadership
<b>High-performing leaders</b>	Demonstrate very effective leadership; generally exceed basic expectations
<b>Proficient leaders</b>	Demonstrate sound leadership; generally meet basic expectations
<b>Low-performing leaders</b>	Have potential for improvement; strive toward basic expectations, but are still learning
<b>Non-performing leaders</b>	Have questionable potential for improvement; failing to meet most basic expectations

Results show that perceptions of leadership quality are generally favorable<sup>1</sup>, though estimates vary across the five categories (see Figure 2).


- Averages for each category show that 17% of leaders within participants' frame of reference are classified as 'Exceptional,' 22% are classified as 'High-performing,' 31% are classified as 'Proficient,' 17% are classified as 'Low-performing,' and 13% are classified as 'Non-performing.'
- Leader ratings for the quality of leadership generally fit a normal distribution, as CASAL participants view a smaller percentage of leaders falling into either the high or low end of the performance continuum, with larger percentages in the middle (i.e., Proficient).
- Ratings by field grade officers show more positivity; on average, they classify a higher percentage of leaders as 'High-performing' or 'Proficient' compared to the other cohorts.
- Jr NCOs tend to classify a higher percentage of leaders as 'Low-performing' or 'Non-performing' compared to the other cohorts.

---

<sup>1</sup> The values reported in Figure 2 represent averages across the percentages given by leaders for each category.

An important take away from the results presented in Figure 2 is the shape of the distribution. The distribution represents, on average, how leaders view the current quality of leadership in their unit and the aggregate suggests what it is for the Army.

**Figure 2. Distribution of Leadership Quality Based on Averaged Classifications.**



These findings are positive and suggest that most leaders are perceived to be meeting and exceeding leadership expectations. On average, there is a relatively large percentage of high performing, if not exceptional, leaders in the Army. Also encouraging is that the largest allocation of leaders is classified as being proficient. The results would have been difficult to accept had a majority of participants allocated all 100% in the exceptional or the high performing categories. This shows that in general, participants perceive many leaders they work with as being effective, doing their jobs, and demonstrating sound leadership.

The smaller relative average percentage of low-performing leaders is also encouraging. These averages show that leadership potential exists, that this is positively recognized by leaders (in others), and that there is a need for focused leader development to improve these leaders. It also shows the importance of getting leader development right, to grow these leaders into proficient, high performing, and exceptional leaders.

The average percentage of leaders identified as non-performing leaders make up the smallest average percentages across the five categories. By the description, these are the leaders that have questionable potential for improvement and/or are failing to meet most basic expectations.

## **1.2 Indicators of Leadership Performance**

CASAL assessed various indicators of Army leadership performance through the following areas:

- The Leadership Requirements Model
- Characteristics of Leader Effectiveness
- Decisive Action and Mission Command
- Strategic-Level Leader Capabilities

These areas focus on assessing and tracking how effectively Army leaders are performing, to include demonstration of the core leader competencies, leader attributes, and various other leadership behaviors. Leader effectiveness in performing tasks of decisive action and exercising mission command are also examined, along with a brief look at the current capabilities of colonels in meeting future strategic-level leader requirements, as rated by their subordinates.

### **1.2.1 The Leadership Requirements Model**

For the past several years, CASAL has assessed Army leader effectiveness through the Leadership Requirements Model, a framework that was recently enhanced in the newly released Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Department of the Army, 2012c). CASAL findings show that Army leaders continue to reflect a basic profile of strengths and developmental areas relative to the core leader competencies and leader attributes. Additionally, leaders are consistently rated more favorably across the leader attributes than on the competencies.

In the 2011 survey, CASAL expanded the assessment of the core leader competencies to include two new areas: *Builds Trust* and *Stewards the Profession*. Leader assessment in the 2012 CASAL included the framework of the ten competencies and expanded assessment of the leader attributes, which were captured in fifteen items.

#### Core Leader Competencies


A majority of Army leaders (62% to 81%) rate their immediate superior as effective or very effective in demonstrating the core leader competencies. An established pattern in the relative

*Gets Results, Prepares Self, and Stewards the Profession* are the highest rated competencies. *Develops Others* is the lowest competency and continues to show room for improvement.

positioning of the highest, lowest, and ‘middle ground’ competencies remains largely unchanged (identified as a “3-tier competency trend” in past CASAL years). Within this trend, *Gets Results, Prepares Self, and Stewards the Profession* are the highest rated competencies, as three-fourths or more of Army leaders rate their immediate superior effective or very effective, while about 7% to 11%

rate them ineffective (see Figure 3). Ratings were made on a five point scale where 1 is very ineffective and 5 is very effective. The mean score of ratings for the most favorably rated competencies ranges from 3.97 to 4.11.

**Figure 3. Ratings of Immediate Superior Effectiveness on the Core Leader Competencies by Active Duty Leaders.**




Six competencies constitute ‘middle ground’ across the profile of ratings: *Leads by Example, Leads Others, Creates a Positive Environment, Communicates, Extends Influence beyond the Chain of Command, and Builds Trust*. In 2012, favorable ratings of immediate superior effectiveness within this middle tier of competencies include 71% to 73% of leaders, while 13% to 15% are rated ineffective. Mean scores for these six competencies range from 3.86 to 3.94.

Army leader effectiveness in the competency *Develops Others* continues to be the lowest rated, and the most in need of attention. Despite a slight increase in favorable ratings from 2011 to 2012 (59% to 62% effective or very effective), one in five Army leaders (19%) is rated ineffective or very ineffective at developing their subordinates. The mean score for leader effectiveness in this competency is 3.62. A more in-depth discussion of Army leader behaviors, activities, and practices related to developing subordinate leaders (*Subordinate Development*) is presented in a later section of this report.

As depicted in Figure 4, perceptions of leader effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies are fairly stable since 2008. The percentage of leaders rated as effective or very effective at *Prepares Self* shows the largest increase in recent years. The change in percentage of effective leaders in *Creates a Positive Environment* between 2008 and 2009 presents an anomaly, though the survey methodology<sup>2</sup> differed slightly in 2008 compared to later years.

**Figure 4. Comparison of Leader Effectiveness in demonstrating the Core Leader Competencies from 2008 to 2012.**



<sup>2</sup> The 2008 Leadership Assessment Survey (LAS) asked participants to rate their ‘superiors’ on the competencies and attributes. From 2009 to 2012, participants were asked to rate their ‘immediate superior.’ Thus, comparisons to 2008 results should be made cautiously, as the reference changed from rating a less specific group (superiors in general) to a specific individual (immediate superior).

## Leader Attributes

Large percentages of Army leaders rate their immediate superiors as effective or very effective in demonstrating all leader attributes (75% to 85% effective or very effective). This follows a consistent trend observed in past CASAL results. Overall, findings do not indicate there are widespread deficiencies in the effectiveness of Army leader demonstration of the attributes.

The 2012 CASAL captured ratings for Army leaders on an expanded list of leader attributes (i.e., 15 items) aligned with ADP 6-22 that provide new insights on leader effectiveness. Previously, the CASAL had not assessed Army leader effectiveness in demonstrating *Self-Discipline*, *Total Fitness*, and *Expertise in Primary Duties*. Doctrinal descriptions of these attributes are as follows:

- Self-Discipline – control over one's own behavior that expresses what the Army Values require (willingly doing what is right).
- Total Fitness – having sound health, strength, and endurance, which sustain emotional health and conceptual abilities under prolonged stress.
- Expertise in Primary Duties<sup>3</sup> – a reflection of a leader's special knowledge and skill developed from experience, training, and education.

Notably, slight wording changes were made to a few other survey items to better reflect the underlying attribute being assessed.


The most favorably rated leader attributes are demonstrating the *Army Values*, *Confidence & Composure*, *Military & Professional Bearing*, *Self-Discipline*, *Warrior Ethos/Service Ethos*, and *Technical Knowledge* (see Figure 5). The mean score of ratings for each of the most favorably rated attributes is 4.20 or higher.

There were two attributes rated effective by the lowest percentage of respondents: *Interpersonal Tact* and *Innovation*. In 2012, the mean scores of ratings for these attributes were 3.95 and 3.98, respectively. These two attributes are consistently at the bottom of the list of attributes in terms of favorable ratings (see Figure 6). However, it is important to reiterate that Army leaders are generally rated favorably in demonstrating all of the attributes (75% to 85% effective or very effective), so the low relative positioning of *Interpersonal Tact* and *Innovation* is not cause for alarm. Results do not indicate these are areas in need of widespread improvement across Army leaders.


---

<sup>3</sup> Expertise in primary duties encompasses all knowledge attributes, and replaces the term domain knowledge (e.g., technical, tactical, geopolitical) used in previous doctrine (FM 6-22).

**Figure 5. Ratings of Immediate Superior Effectiveness in demonstrating the Leader Attributes by Active Duty Leaders.**



**Figure 6. Comparison of Leader Effectiveness in demonstrating the Leader Attributes from 2008 to 2012.**




### 1.2.2 Characteristics of Leader Effectiveness

The 2012 CASAL provides a more comprehensive assessment of leader effectiveness than in prior years. Effective leaders must be able to positively influence various facets within their unit or organization to successfully accomplish the mission. Some of these include managing resources and personnel, influencing climate, and adapting to requirements and issues that potentially impact mission accomplishment. CASAL findings show varied levels of effectiveness associated with these facets (see Figure 7).

Effective leaders accomplish the mission both by influencing others and managing resources. More than three-fourths of AC leaders (78%) rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at making good decisions about the resources he/she uses or manages. This behavior relates to the core leader competency *Demonstrates Stewardship*, an area where a large percentage of leaders (75%) are rated effective or very effective. Further, nearly three-fourths of leaders (74%) also rate their immediate superior effective in balancing subordinate needs

**Figure 7. Ratings on Various Aspects of Leader Effectiveness.**



with mission requirements, a level more favorable than results observed from 2007 to 2011 (68% to 70% effective). Finally, results regarding an additional aspect of leader influence and interpersonal tact are only moderately favorable, as two-thirds of AC leaders (67%) rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at reading people to understand how best to lead them.

Effective leaders create environments that are conducive to Soldier and team performance to enable mission accomplishment. As discussed earlier, leader effectiveness in demonstrating the competency *Creates a Positive Environment* falls in the “middle-tier” of the three-tier model (72% effective or very effective). Leaders are also rated favorably in demonstrating behaviors related to creating and fostering a positive work environment for others:

- 77% of leaders are rated effective at encouraging candid and respectful discussion.
- 72% of leaders are rated effective at creating a climate that supports learning.
- 70% of leaders are rated effective at building effective teams. CASAL ratings for leader effectiveness in building teams have increased over the past six years (64% effective in 2007-08 and 65-67% in 2009-11).

- Additionally, large percentages of leaders agree or strongly agree their immediate superior enforces ethical standards (81%), and promotes good communication among team members (72%).

CASAL findings have consistently demonstrated that large percentages of leaders are rated effective at the competency *Gets Results* (81% in 2012). Corollary to these findings are leaders' perceptions about their immediate superior's effectiveness in operating in complex, unfamiliar situations. Seventy-eight percent of AC leaders rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at developing a quick understanding of complex situations; compared to effective ratings for 74% to 79% of leaders in past CASAL surveys. Additionally, three-fourths of leaders (75%) rate their superior effective at dealing with unfamiliar situations. Since 2007, ratings for leader effectiveness in dealing with unfamiliar situations have fluctuated between 70% and 75%, while ineffective ratings have ranged from 10% to 14%.

#### Relationship between the Leadership Requirements Model and Leader Effectiveness

The 2012 CASAL collected two additional indicators of immediate superior leadership effectiveness. Implicit leadership theory (Yukl, 2002) indicates that followers' perceptions of their leaders can be impacted by follower's own cognitions of what effective leadership is and how closely their leader's behaviors and characteristics align to this definition. CASAL assessed a single judgment rating from Army leaders on the relative ranking of their immediate superior's leadership abilities compared to leaders at the same rank or in a similar position. The characterizations of one's immediate superior included:

- 'Best or among the best' or 'A high performer' – 65%
- 'Middle of the road' – 22%
- 'Worst or among the worst' or 'A marginal performer' – 13%

These ratings are very consistent with results observed by 2010 and 2011 CASAL (each response option within 1%), and are also consistent with ratings by RC leaders. Notably, these are positive findings, as nearly two-thirds of leaders rate their immediate superior as performing at a high level.

Secondly, nearly three-fourths of AC leaders (74%) agree or strongly agree with the statement 'My immediate superior is an effective leader.' Fourteen percent of leaders neither agree nor disagree, while 12% disagree or strongly disagree. Results of RC leaders show no notably differences. Consistent with other ratings on leader effectiveness, smaller percentages of Jr NCOs (66%) agree their immediate superior is an effective leader compared to other cohorts. Overall, these results corroborate prior findings that reflect a high percentage of leaders who view their immediate superiors as effective leaders.

These more holistic perceptions of effective leadership were examined against specific ratings for leader performance, namely the competencies and attributes in the Leadership Requirements Model.

- One in eight leaders is perceived to be ‘worst, among the worst, or a marginal performer’ compared to others in their rank or position. Of these leaders, only small percentages (3% to 24%) are viewed as effective in demonstrating the core leader competencies.
- In comparison, the ‘worst leaders’ are rated slightly more favorably in demonstrating the leader attributes (7% to 41%). This is an indication that ‘bad leadership’ relates to ineffective performance of the competencies more so than the attributes. Deficiencies in effectively demonstrating leader attributes may lead to early career exits.
- Similarly, leaders who disagree or strongly disagree their immediate superior is an effective leader rarely perceives him or her as effectively demonstrating the competencies (4% to 27%) or attributes (9% to 44%).
- These findings are consistent with results observed in past CASAL studies.

Analysis through stepwise multiple regressions<sup>4</sup> indicate that four competencies and one attribute significantly account for 74% of factors related to ratings of effective leadership. Ratings for one’s immediate superior as effectively *Leading Others, Building Trust, demonstrating Sound Judgment, Leading by Example, and Developing Others* are strongly associated with agreement that the superior is an effective leader. However, these findings do not discount the importance of the other competencies and leader attributes. Rather, ratings for leader effectiveness in demonstrating the other competencies and attributes, while favorable, show less variance; the five previously mentioned factors better differentiate levels of effective leadership.

Further, these findings are supported by the results of multiple regressions that utilized composite scores<sup>5</sup> to examine the impact of the competencies and attributes on the indices of effective leadership (see Table 3).

---

<sup>4</sup> A stepwise multiple regression is an exploratory statistical approach to identify which predictors provide the largest, singular contribution to the prediction of a dependent variable (i.e., ratings of leader effectiveness).

<sup>5</sup> The ten items that reflect behaviors associated with immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies were combined into a single scale composite variable. Values across these ten items were summed and then divided by ten to produce a single score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of ‘5’ indicate a respondent’s average rating across all ten items = 5 (highest rating that immediate superior demonstrates the competencies). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all ten competency items. This same process was used to develop a single scale composite variable for the 15 items that assess the leader attributes.

**Table 3. Multiple Regression Results Examining Impact of Leader Competencies and Attributes on Indices of Effective Leadership.**

	Agreement Immediate Superior is an Effective Leader	Relative to others, how do you rate the leadership abilities of your Immediate Superior
Core Leader Competency Composite Score	.69**	.68**
Leader Attribute Composite Score	.18**	.16**
Model Summary	R <sup>2</sup> = .74**	R <sup>2</sup> = .69**

Results indicate the core leader competencies have a stronger impact on ratings of effective leadership compared to the impact of the leader attributes. This finding is consistent with

The core leader competencies have a stronger impact on ratings of effective leadership than do the leader attributes.

previous examinations comparing the impact of competencies and attributes on leadership outcomes, and supports the notion that leader traits will have less impact on leadership outcomes than leader behaviors and thus are less vital to identify (Horey et al., 2007).

#### Impact of Leadership on Unit and Soldier Outcomes

There are significant relationships between effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies and attributes with unit and Soldier outcomes that impact mission success (see Tables 4 and 5). Notably, the strength of the relationships between both the competencies and attributes with unit and Soldier outcomes are uniformly high. Effective demonstration of the competencies and the attributes is associated with positive effects on unit or team cohesion and discipline; positive effects on subordinate motivation, work quality, commitment to the Army; and confidence following one's immediate superior into life-or-death situations.

**Table 4. Correlations between Effectively Demonstrating the Leadership Competencies and Attributes on Organizational Outcomes.**

Relationship Between Demonstrating Leadership Competencies & Attributes Effect on Unit/Organizational Outcomes (AC, N = 6,036)	Core Leader Competencies	Leader Attributes
Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion	.809**	.756**
Effect on Unit or Team Discipline	.797**	.763**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Table 5. Correlations between Effectively Demonstrating the Leadership Competencies and Attributes on Soldier Outcomes.**

Relationship Between Demonstrating Leadership Competencies & Attributes Effect on Leader/Soldier Outcomes (AC, N = 5,828)	Core Leader Competencies	Leader Attributes
Effect on Leader's Motivation	.793**	.739**
Effect on Leader's Quality of Work Completed	.752**	.715**
Effect on Leader's Commitment to the Army	.721**	.674**
"I feel confident following my immediate superior into life-or-death situations"	.793**	.765**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

### 1.2.3 Decisive Action and Mission Command

Unified Action consists of the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. The Army's contribution to unified action is outlined in its basic warfighting doctrine, ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Department of the Army, 2012a).


Unified Land Operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Unified Land Operations are executed through Decisive Action, which includes offensive, defensive, and stability operations, and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) (see Figure 8), by means of combined arms maneuver and wide area security.

**Figure 8. Tasks of Decisive Action**

Offense	Defense
<b>Tasks:</b>	<b>Tasks:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Movement to contact</li> <li>• Attack</li> <li>• Exploitation</li> <li>• Pursuit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mobile defense</li> <li>• Area defense</li> <li>• Retrograde</li> </ul>
Stability	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
<b>Tasks:</b>	<b>Tasks:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish civil security (including security force assistance)</li> <li>• Establish civil control</li> <li>• Restore essential services</li> <li>• Support to governance</li> <li>• Support to economic and infrastructure dev.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide support for domestic disasters</li> <li>• Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents</li> <li>• Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies</li> <li>• Provide other designated support</li> </ul>

Overall findings indicate more than three-fourths of Army leaders rate their immediate superior favorably (77% to 78% effective or very effective) in demonstrating leadership during each of the operations of decisive action. Slight differences are observed between ratings of leader effectiveness by unit types. Ratings for leaders serving in Maneuver, Fires & Effects (MFE) assignments (78% to 83%) show more favorability than those in Operations Support (OS) and Force Sustainment (FS) assignments (69% to 77%). Overall, only 6% to 8% of Army leaders rate their superior ineffective in demonstrating leadership during any of these operation types (see Figure 9).

**Figure 9. Active Duty Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating Leadership during Operations of Decisive Action.**




These findings are more favorable than results observed in past years, though notably the methodology and phrasing of these items changed in 2012. Past CASAL assessment of leader effectiveness in conducting full spectrum operations (FSO) in a deployed context found that leaders were generally effective across operations, though as observed in the results of the 2011 CASAL, smaller percentages of leaders rated their immediate superior effective or very effective in each area:

- Stability operations – 71%
- Civil support – 68%
- Defensive operations – 68%
- Offensive operations – 65%

Prior years of CASAL (2009 and 2010) found that three-fourths of leaders (75%) rated their immediate superior effective in demonstrating leadership during stability operations; about two-thirds rated their superior effective in leading during civil support. Though as noted previously, changes to item wording and methodologies prohibit direct comparisons of these results to those observed in 2012.

Further examination of 2012 findings on leader effectiveness during these operations shows that brigade and battalion commanders are rated more favorably than the overall rating of all leaders, while company commanders are rated at or near the overall leader level in terms of effectiveness (see Figure 10).

**Figure 10. Active Duty Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating Leadership during Operations of Decisive Action by Command Level.**



Unified Land Operations are guided by the *mission command* philosophy, which is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (Department of the Army, 2012b). This philosophy of command

emphasizes broad mission-type orders, individual initiative within the commander's intent, and leaders who can anticipate and adapt quickly to changing conditions. Mission command is a type of leadership exercised by commanders to direct and align operations of all staff, subordinate leaders and unit members.

Overall, more than three-fourths of Army leaders (77%) rate their immediate superior as effective or very effective at exercising mission command (8% rate them ineffective). As with the operations of decisive action, brigade and battalion commanders are rated more favorably in exercising mission command than are company commanders (see Figure 10). Capability levels across the four types of decisive action operations are remarkably similar.


The tenets of mission command are nested within Army leadership requirements. Successful exercise of mission command requires Army leaders to effectively demonstrate an array of knowledge, skills, behaviors and attributes. CASAL findings provide indications of leader effectiveness in various areas that relate to the six principles of mission command: *Build Cohesive Teams, Create Shared Understanding, Provide a Clear Commander's Intent, Exercise Disciplined Initiative, Use Mission Orders, and Accept Prudent Risk*. Figure 11 displays connections between these six principles and various knowledge, skills, behaviors and attributes assessed in the 2012 CASAL.

**Figure 11. The Six Principles of Mission Command and Related CASAL Indicators of Leader Effectiveness.**

Six Principles of Mission Command	2012 CASAL Indicators of Leader Effectiveness
<b>Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Builds Trust</li> <li>• Creates a Positive Environment</li> <li>• Builds Effective Teams</li> <li>• Balances Subordinate Needs with Mission Requirements</li> <li>• Extends Influence beyond the Chain of Command</li> <li>• Demonstrates Army Values</li> </ul>
<b>Create Shared Understanding</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communicates</li> <li>• Leads Others</li> <li>• Creates a Climate that Supports Learning</li> <li>• Builds Trust</li> <li>• Gets Results</li> <li>• Demonstrates Interpersonal Tact (interaction with others)</li> </ul>
<b>Provide a Clear Commander's Intent</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leads Others</li> <li>• Communicates</li> </ul>
<b>Exercise Disciplined Initiative</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates Self-Discipline</li> <li>• Demonstrates the Army Values (Duty)</li> <li>• Demonstrates Mental Agility</li> <li>• Leads Others</li> <li>• Gets Results</li> <li>• Develops a Quick Understanding of Complex Situations</li> </ul>
<b>Use Mission Orders</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leads Others</li> <li>• Develops Others</li> </ul>
<b>Accept Prudent Risk</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gets Results</li> <li>• Makes Good Decisions about Resources</li> </ul>

Figure 12 presents AC leader ratings for immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating various leadership indicators linked to the principles of mission command. As expected, ratings for brigade and battalion commanders are consistently more favorable across these indicators than are ratings for company commanders. (Note that for clarity in displaying the data points, the chart's scale ranges from the mid-point of 50% up to the maximum of 100%.)

**Figure 12. Mean Ratings of Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating Principles of Mission Command.**




#### 1.2.4 Strategic-Level Leader Capabilities

Strategic leadership requires a finely balanced combination of high-level thinking, warfighting expertise, and geopolitical military expertise. Strategic leaders, both military and civilian, are responsible for large organizations and influence several thousand to hundreds of thousands of people. Strategic leaders establish force structure, allocate resources, communicate strategic vision, and prepare their commands and the Army for future roles. Strategic leaders accomplish this by applying all core leader competencies they acquired during their tenure as direct and organizational leaders, while further adapting the competencies to the complex realities of their often uncertain strategic environments (Department of the Army, 2012c).

Based on subordinate ratings, there is strong agreement that current AC colonels are prepared to fulfill the five capabilities presented in Figure 13. More than 80% of leaders who report

directly to colonels ( $n = 895$ ) rate their immediate superiors favorably across several considerations for future strategic-level leader requirements, including applying conceptual skills to assess and resolve complex problems, using strategic means of influence, and leading complex organizations. More than three-fourths of AC leaders agree or strongly agree their superior is capable of positively influencing others using little or no formal authority and leading change at Army, national or international levels. These projections are limited by the fact that they come from subordinates who have less direct knowledge of the requirements for strategic level leadership than current or former strategic leaders.

**Figure 13. Ratings for Army Colonel Preparedness for Strategic-Level Leadership.**



Additionally, other CASAL findings provide indicators for AC colonel preparedness and effectiveness as strategic-level leaders:

- Sixty-seven to 88% of subordinates rate colonels as effective or very effective at demonstrating the core leader competencies.
- Eighty-seven percent of colonels are rated effective in developing a quick understanding of complex situations; 82% are rated effective at dealing with unfamiliar situations.
- Eighty-five percent of colonels are rated effective at making good decisions about the resources they use and manage.

Taken together, these findings show strong indication that subordinates view a good many of their superior AC colonels as prepared to fulfill strategic-level leadership requirements. Performance evaluation, developmental counseling, and command selection policies obviously need to identify those with the most potential to assume these roles.

### **1.3 The Effects of Climate and Situational Factors on Leadership**

The quality of leadership is influenced by many factors. CASAL assesses and tracks trends on situational factors such as deployment setting, leader morale, commitment, career satisfaction, and career intentions, and examines the interrelationships between these factors.

Additionally, leader attitudes about the characteristics of the working environment provide context on factors that can affect leadership, job performance, and mission outcomes. Specifically, CASAL assesses leader attitudes about job latitude and information flow; unit performance indicators such as overall efficacy, adherence to standards, and problems with unit discipline; and the severity and impact of stress from high workload.

The impact of unit climate on leadership quality and unit outcomes is also examined. Two areas of focus related to unit climate are trust within Army units and organizations, and continued examination of the prevalence and impact of negative leadership behaviors.

#### **1.3.1 Deployed and Garrison Settings**

CASAL findings show that perceptions of leader quality are affected by operational setting. A consistent trend is that smaller percentages of leaders in deployed environments rate the effectiveness of their superiors and to a lesser extent, their peers, favorably compared to leaders in non-deployed environments (see Figure 14 for 2012 results). Notably, perceptions of subordinate leader quality remain high regardless of operational setting (deployed or non-deployed). The ‘gap’ between ratings for superior and peer effectiveness for deployed conditions versus non-deployed conditions has remained fairly stable.

The demands and challenges of deployed settings provide an environment that requires leaders to demonstrate sound leadership where more is ‘on the line.’ In such conditions, expectations for effective leadership increase, which can lead to less favorable ratings of peers and superiors as leaders. It is reasonable to infer that due to the complexity of deployed operating environments, with potentially life-threatening outcomes, leaders are expected to meet a higher standard of leadership compared to environments with a lower threat.

**Figure 14. Ratings of Effectiveness for Superiors, Peers, and Subordinates as Leaders by Deployed Condition.**



### 1.3.2 Morale, Commitment, Career Satisfaction and Career Intentions

#### Morale


Overall levels of morale in the Army remain largely unchanged since 2010. The 2012 CASAL found that 56% of AC leaders and 62% of RC leaders report high or very high morale. Situational factors such as rank, component, and current location are known to affect leaders' level of morale. A consistent trend observed in CASAL results is that a larger percentage of RC leaders report high morale compared to AC leaders. Also consistent is the variation in the percentages of high or very high morale by rank group (see Figure 15).

- Larger percentages of leaders with higher rank and tenure report high morale compared to leaders with less tenure and lower rank.
- Jr NCOs report the lowest level of 'high or very high' morale and the highest levels of 'low or very low' morale.

Examining morale by location:

- At CONUS locations, 57% of AC leaders and 62% of RC leaders report high or very high morale; 17% of AC and 13% of RC rate morale low or very low. This is consistent with the levels of high or very high morale reported by CASAL since 2010 (55% to 57% for AC leaders; 61% to 63% for RC leaders).

**Figure 15. Current Levels of Morale Reported by Army Leaders.**



- In Afghanistan, 49% of AC leaders (58% RC) report high or very high morale while 18-22% report low or very low morale. Findings for AC leaders are consistent with the past three years, and show an increase in the level of high/very high morale among RC leaders (+10% compared to last two years) currently serving in Afghanistan.
  - Increase in morale among RC leaders can be attributed to the troop draw down in Afghanistan. The number of RC leaders currently serving in country has steadily decreased over the last couple of years, and at a faster rate than AC leaders.
  - Additionally, the number of combat related deaths in Afghanistan is currently at a four year low (Navy Times, 2013).

CASAL results on levels of morale are comparable to findings reported in other recent Army-wide surveys:

- The 2011 Survey of Officer Careers (U.S. Army Research Institute, 2011) found similar levels of morale across officers. About one-half (47%) of active duty officers reported their morale as either ‘high’ or ‘very high’ with 15% rating their morale as ‘very low’ or ‘low.’
- The Spring 2011 Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP) (Army Personnel Survey Office, 2011) reported comparable levels of morale among Army leaders. In that survey, 83% of officers and 67% of enlisted Soldiers reported their own morale as Moderate, High, or Very High. Despite the slight difference in assessment of morale (CASAL mid-


point is ‘neither high nor low’ rather than ‘moderate’) and cohort groups reported, findings on current levels of low morale are comparable between the surveys.

### Commitment

Army leaders report very strong levels of commitment to their teams or immediate work groups because of a sense of personal loyalty. Nearly all leaders in the AC (96%) and RC (97%) indicate agreement, with little variation between rank groups. These results are the strongest observed by CASAL since commitment to teams was first assessed in 2009 (87% agreement), and show an increase each year since 2009. These findings are supported by results of previous CASAL surveys that demonstrated Army leaders rate high on affective commitment, which is defined as having an emotional bond or attachment to the Army (Riley, Conrad, Hatfield, Keller-Glaze, & Fallesen, 2012).

Despite an increase in the percentage of leaders reporting commitment due to personal loyalty, smaller percentages of Army leaders view the reciprocal commitment from the Army as favorable (see Figure 16). This is evidenced by 47% of AC leaders (42% RC) that agree or strongly agree ‘the Army no longer demonstrates that it is committed to me as much as it expects me to be committed.’ Overall, agreement in both components has increased by 6% since 2010. Jr NCOs continue to show the highest levels of agreement (58% AC; 48% RC) that unequal commitment between themselves and the Army is being demonstrated.


**Figure 16. Current Levels of Reciprocal Commitment for Active Duty Leaders.**



## Career Satisfaction

There is a positive relationship between leaders' level of morale and career satisfaction in the Army ( $r = .62$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Though positively related, morale and career satisfaction differ. Morale represents leaders' current affective reaction to the environment or job in which they operate. Career satisfaction represents a compilation of affective and other attitudes regarding characteristics spanning a leader's career (Locke, 1976; Pinder, 1998). Slightly more than three-fourths of leaders (75% AC; 80% RC) are satisfied or very satisfied with their Army career up to this point, though overall, satisfaction levels show a gradual decline for both AC and RC leaders since 2009 (82% and 84%, respectively). A consistent (and expected) trend in these results is that leaders at higher ranks, and thus longer tenure (i.e. field grade officers, warrant officers, Sr NCOs) show higher levels of satisfaction with their Army careers than do leaders at lower levels. Sixty-four percent of AC company grade officers and 59% of Jr NCOs report satisfaction with their careers thus far, though 18% of leaders in these rank groups are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (see Figure 17). Notably, one in four AC Jr NCOs is dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their Army career up to this point. In comparison, two-thirds or more of RC leaders in all rank groups report satisfaction with their Army careers, including 67% of Jr NCOs and 72% of company grade officers.

**Figure 17. Current Levels of Career Satisfaction for Active Duty Leaders.**



CASAL data provide indications of the relative contribution of various situational factors to leader career satisfaction. The results of multiple regressions confirm findings from past CASAL

surveys. Findings indicate leaders who are dissatisfied with their career in the Army also report lower levels of morale, are dissatisfied with the level of freedom or latitude they have in their job and with the amount of feedback they receive in their job. Leaders who are dissatisfied with their career thus far also rate their operational experiences, self development experiences and institutional education as ineffective in preparing them for leadership; report lower levels of affective commitment; and report high levels of disagreement that they are able to maintain work/family balance.

Table 6 displays CASAL results for the relative impact various factors have on leaders' level of career satisfaction. These results were derived through stepwise multiple regression analyses. This analytical approach examines an assortment of factors to identify which significantly contribute to an outcome (i.e., career satisfaction). Factors evaluated<sup>6</sup> in these analyses were selected based on past CASAL findings and include new survey items added in 2012. The model explored a range of factors that would be expected to impact career satisfaction. Overall, the model (factors reported in Table 6) accounted for a significant portion of leader ratings of career satisfaction. This is reported by the  $R^2$  value, which indicates 47% of the variation in ratings is accounted for by the model. In other words, of all measured and unmeasured factors that influence the career satisfaction of Army leaders, this model explains nearly one half of the variability in career satisfaction.

**Table 6. Predictors of Career Satisfaction for Army Leaders.**

Predictor Factor	Standardized Beta	
	AC Leaders (n=4,216)	RC Leaders (n=2,514)
Leader's current level of morale	.40**	.38**
Effectiveness of operational experiences for preparing leader	.17**	.12**
Job Characteristics (autonomy, informed of decisions affecting work)	.15**	.14**
Effectiveness of institutional education for preparing leader	.08**	.07**
Agreement leader is able to maintain work/family balance	.07**	.04*
Effectiveness of self-development for preparing leader	.07**	.07**
<b>Model Summary</b>	$R^2 = .47**$	$R^2 = .42**$

\*p < .05, \*\*p<.001

---

<sup>6</sup> Results of stepwise regression only report factors that significantly contribute to the model, not all variables examined. For these analyses, the following factors were examined: Job Characteristics; Unit Characteristics; Effectiveness of Operational Experiences; Agreement Immediate Superior shows concern for developing subordinates; Effectiveness of immediate superior identifying developmental opportunities; Effectiveness of self-development in preparing the leader; Effectiveness of institutional education in preparing leader; Relative to other leaders, how effective is immediate superior; Agreement immediate superior is an effective leader; Current level of morale; Leaders' level of commitment; Leaders' ability to maintain work/life balance in current job; Leaders' supervisory status; and Number of deployments in last 36 months.

A statistic called standardized beta weight provides information regarding the specific impact each factor within the model has on the outcome measure. Beta weights are similar to correlation coefficients in that they range from -1.0 to +1.0., with size of the weight indicating the extent of impact and the direction (+ or -) of the relationship. Results show that leaders' current morale ( $\beta = .40$ ) significantly contributes to their level of career satisfaction. Other factors were found to have less influence – but still some influence – on career satisfaction, including: perceived effectiveness of operational experiences in preparing for leadership ( $\beta = .17$ ); satisfaction with characteristics of current job ( $\beta = .15$ ); and the effectiveness of institutional education ( $\beta = .08$ ) and self-development ( $\beta = .07$ ) in preparing for leadership. None of the remaining factors examined were found to significantly predict ratings of career satisfaction.

### Career Intentions

The career intentions of Army leaders have been tracked by CASAL since 2005 and have been found to be generally steady and unchanged. The 2012 CASAL found that 33% of AC leaders and 43% in the RC are currently eligible for retirement but choose to remain in the Army. This alone is an indicator of commitment to service by many Army leaders.


- In the AC, this includes 56% of field grade officers, 56% of Sr NCOs, and 45% of warrant officers.
- In the RC, this includes about two-thirds of field grade officers and Sr NCOs (69% and 65%, respectively) and 58% of warrant officers.
- Of leaders in these cohorts who are not currently eligible to retire, 88% or more indicate they plan to stay until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years.

Intentions to remain in the Army continue to be strong among leaders with less tenure as well. Nearly two-thirds of AC Jr NCOs (64%) plan to stay until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years, while 22% indicate they are undecided (compared to 78% and 17% in the RC, respectively). AC company grade officers show the most indecision about their intentions to remain in the Army

Leader intentions to remain in the Army until retirement continue to be strong. Half of active duty Captains report they plan to stay until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years.

(42%), though an equal percentage intends to remain in the Army until retirement or beyond (42%). Two-thirds of RC company grade officers (67%) plan to stay in the Army, while only one-fourth (25%) indicate indecision at this point. These findings are very consistent with past CASAL studies, and show no notable change in recent years. Results of career intention by rank group are presented in Figure 18.

**Figure 18. Career Intentions of Active Duty Leaders Not Currently Eligible for Retirement.**




Army studies have found that AC captains show a large degree of uncertainty or indecision with regard to their Army career intentions. In 2000, the officer phase of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) found that 39% of AC captains planned to stay in the Army until retirement eligible, while 42% were undecided and 19% planned to leave (Fallesen, Keller-Glaze, Aude, Mitchell, Horey, Gramlich, & Morath, 2005). In comparison, 2012 CASAL findings indicate one-half of AC captains not currently eligible to retire (50%) plan to stay in the Army until retirement or beyond 20 years. This is an increase of 5% compared to results of the 2011 CASAL, and is the highest percentage observed in CASAL studies for this rank (see Figure 19).

### 1.3.3 Characteristics of the Working Environment

Results of the 2012 CASAL indicate Army leaders view several characteristics of their working environment favorably:

- 89% of Army leaders believe their contributions directly impact the success of their organization (only 3% disagree).
- Army leaders place high confidence (77% agreement) in the ability of their unit/organization to perform its mission (12% disagreement).
- 71% of leaders are satisfied with the freedom or latitude they have in their job (15% dissatisfied).

**Figure 19. Career Intentions of Active Duty Captains from 2005-2012.**




However, there are several aspects of the work environment that continue to show some room for improvement, including those related to unit discipline, organizational communication, and work/family balance. Army leader agreement or satisfaction with various characteristics of their working environment is presented in Figure 20.

A majority of Army leaders believe their contributions have a direct impact on the success of their unit or organization, are confident in the ability of their unit or organization to perform its mission, and are satisfied with the freedom or latitude they have in their current job.

- Most Army leaders (77% AC; 81% RC) are confident in the ability of their unit/organization to perform its mission, though smaller percentages of AC Jr NCOs (62%) indicate agreement compared to other rank groups (78% to 87%).
- Likewise, there is strong agreement among leaders (89% AC; 91% RC) that their contributions directly impact the success of their unit or organization's mission. Trends show that agreement has increased slightly in both components since 2010 (85% and 88%, respectively), and no more than 4% of leaders in any rank group indicate disagreement that their contributions have a direct benefit on mission success.
- At the individual job level, most leaders (71% AC; 77% RC) are satisfied or very satisfied with the amount of freedom or latitude they have in their job. Larger percentages of senior leaders indicate satisfaction than do leaders at lower levels. For example, smaller

percentages of AC company grade officers (66%) and Jr NCOs (58%) report satisfaction with the amount of freedom in their than do leaders at higher ranks (76% to 83%).

**Figure 20. Characteristics of the Current Working Environment in the Army.**



Organizational communication is an area that has been assessed by CASAL for several years. Overall, about two-thirds of leaders (66% AC; 69% RC) agree or strongly agree they feel informed of decisions that affect their work responsibilities. Effective organizational communication is important in the sense that informed leaders are better equipped to carry out their job responsibilities and effectively coordinate with other unit members.

- In 2012, larger percentages of senior leaders feel they are informed of decisions affecting their responsibilities than are junior leaders. Specifically, 79% of AC field grade officers and 74% of Sr NCOs indicate agreement, compared to smaller percentages of company grade officers (63%) and Jr NCOs (50%).

- Overall, 2012 results are more favorable than the levels of agreement observed in the past two years (AC leaders - 54% in 2010, and 51% in 2011; RC leaders – 54% in 2010; and 57% in 2011).
- Notably, there is a positive relationship between leaders who agree they feel informed of decisions affecting their work responsibilities and who agree their immediate superior takes time to talk with them about how they are doing in their work ( $r = .43, p < .001$ ), how they could improve job performance ( $r = .41, p < .001$ ) and what they should do to prepare for future assignments ( $r = .42, p < .001$ ). Thus, informal developmental interactions (between superior and subordinate) are positively associated with the quality of organizational communication. Further discussion on these types of developmental interactions is presented in a later section of this report.

The percentage of leaders agreeing that they are able to maintain balance between work and family responsibilities has increased slightly compared to three years ago. In 2012, 62% of AC leaders agree or strongly agree they are able to maintain this balance (compared to 56% in 2011, and 57% in 2010). Senior leaders in the AC report more success in maintaining work/family balance (67% to 69%) compared to smaller percentages of AC company grade officers (57%) and Jr NCOs (54%), of whom 26% and 28% (respectively) disagree they maintain this balance. One reason for the improvement in the number of leaders successfully balancing work and family responsibilities is the drawdown of deployments compared to past years.

Overall, larger percentages of RC leaders have consistently shown agreement that they are able to maintain work/family balance (66% in 2010; 65% in 2011; 69% in 2012) compared to AC leaders. This finding is not unexpected, as there are less frequent Army-related work demands on the traditional RC leader in an inactive duty status, making it easier for them to balance Army and family responsibilities. Again, a drawdown in deployments also affects RC leader ability to maintain work/family balance. There are no notable differences in agreement between RC rank groups, and no more than 17% of RC leaders indicate disagreement they are able to maintain balance between work and family responsibilities.

### Standards and Discipline

More than two-thirds of uniformed leaders (69% AC; 72% RC) agree or strongly agree that standards (e.g., professional bearing, adherence to regulations) are upheld in their unit or organization. These results show a slight improvement over those observed in 2011 (64% AC; 67% RC), though item wording varied slightly between years. Consistent with 2011 CASAL findings is that smaller percentages of Jr NCOs (53% AC; 61% RC) agree that standards are

upheld in their unit compared to other rank groups (70% to 83% in the AC; 71% to 83% in the RC).

Similarly, most Army leaders (58% AC; 64% RC) disagree or strongly disagree that their unit or organization has a discipline problem. More Jr NCOs (34% AC, 25% RC) identify a problem with discipline in their unit compared to other ranks because Jr NCOs are charged with leading and overseeing junior enlisted Soldiers. AC Jr NCO agreement that discipline problems exist shows slight improvement (-6%) since 2011. Overall, adherence to standards is a factor known to limit problems with discipline in units. CASAL results show a significant relationship between leader agreement that standards are upheld and disagreement that unit discipline problems exist ( $r = -.46, p < .001$ )

The 2011 CASAL also assessed leader perceptions of the factors that relate to discipline problems and found that low ratings by Jr NCOs are associated with their responsibilities in leading junior enlisted Soldiers (E-1 to E-4). It was also found that senior leaders are less likely to observe discipline problems directly or judge discipline to be a problem in their units. They have less frequent interaction with junior enlisted Soldiers, and they apparently consider these problems are handled sufficiently at the appropriate level (by Jr NCOs).

The 2011 CASAL closely examined the factors that influence unit discipline problems. The most common factors found to be associated with the low incidence of discipline problems included demonstration of sound leadership behaviors, leader engagement and involvement with subordinates, appropriate levels of manning in leadership positions, maturity and professionalism among unit members, unit member accountability, and a positive command climate/esprit de corps. Factors that correlate with the existence of discipline problems generally included the inverse of these factors, namely ineffective senior leadership; lower quality, poor attitude, or lack of values by younger Soldiers; inability for leaders to appropriately address discipline problems (leaders ‘hands are tied’); lack of attention paid to subordinates by leaders; and lack of support from the chain-of-command.

### Stress

About one-fifth of AC leaders (20%) report stress from a high workload as a serious problem. Trends show that the percentage of AC leaders reporting stress from high workload as a serious problem has remained the same since 2009 (18% to 21% of AC leaders). Smaller percentages of RC leaders (15%) report stress from high workload as a serious problem, also consistent with the past four years (13% to 16%).

- The important trend in these results is that more AC leaders now perceive stress from high workload to be a moderate problem. The shift is shown by a decline in the percentage of leaders indicating stress from a high workload is ‘not a problem’ (29% in 2009; 25% in 2010; 20% in 2011; 16% in 2012).
- Results of RC leaders also show a decline in the percentage indicating stress is ‘not a problem’ though it is less pronounced (32% in 2009; 31% in 2010; 26% in 2011; 22% in 2012).

The 2012 CASAL captured new insights on how the incidence of stress from high workload affects Army leader well-being, work motivation and quality of work. Of AC and RC leaders reporting stress from high workload as a moderate to serious problem:

- Nearly half of leaders (49% AC; 48% RC) indicate work stress has had a moderate, large or great negative impact on their well-being. This includes more than half of Jr NCOs in this subgroup (54% AC; 52% RC).
- Leader motivation is also affected. Just under half of leaders (48% AC; 43% RC) experiencing moderate to serious stress from a high workload indicate work stress has a moderate, large or great negative impact on their motivation. This subgroup includes more than half of Jr NCOs (58% AC; 51% RC).
- Less than one-third of AC and RC leaders (32% and 31%, respectively), report that stress from high workload has a negative impact on the quality of their work.

Overall, CASAL findings show that stress from high workload is perceived to be a serious problem by about one in five leaders. Further, many leaders who are experiencing moderate to serious stress indicate it has a negative impact on their well-being and motivation, but fewer perceive a negative impact on work quality.

Results also show there is a negative linear relationship between the severity of perceived stress from high workload and leader ability to maintain balance between work and family responsibilities ( $r = -.36, p < .01$ ). In other words, as stress from high workload increases, leader beliefs about maintaining work/family balance decrease.

Organizations can respond to a high OPTEMPO and stress among its members by fostering a climate in which seeking help for stress-related issues is accepted and encouraged. Nearly two-thirds of uniformed leaders (63% AC; 65% RC) agree or strongly agree that seeking help for stress related problems is accepted and encouraged in their unit or organization. Positively, the level of agreement in 2012 is more favorable than levels observed in the previous four years (55% to 59%). Notably, AC Sr NCOs have consistently shown the highest agreement (67% to 74%) that their unit accepts and encourages members to seek help for stress-related problems.

### **1.3.4 Trust**

The 2012 CASAL sought to provide new insights regarding the perceived levels of trust in Army units and organizations, the factors that contribute to or hinder trust within units, perceptions of leader effectiveness in demonstrating trust, and related outcomes.

The following points summarize the key findings related to trust in the Army:


- Seventy-one percent of leaders agree that unit members can be trusted to fully support the directives of their leaders.
- There are moderate levels of trust among members of Army units and organizations. Sixty-two percent of leaders agree that unit members trust one another. Senior leaders show much higher agreement than Jr NCOs that trust exists among unit members.
- Social cohesion, open lines of communication, cooperative performance and effective leadership are factors identified as contributing to trust among unit members. Trust is hindered in units where open communication, discipline, standards and cohesion are lacking, and where leaders show favoritism, unequal treatment, fail to demonstrate character or lead by example, and are overly self-concerned.
- Most Army leaders (67% to 82%) are viewed favorably in demonstrating trust-related behaviors, including benevolence, competence, and correcting unit conditions that hinder trust. Effective leaders are rated favorably in demonstrating behaviors that promote trust (e.g., leading by example, creating a positive environment, building effective teams).
- Sixty-two percent of AC Jr NCOs rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at building trust, though only 42% agree that unit members trust one another (29% neither agree nor disagree).
- Trust demonstrates a strong relationship with effective leadership, and leaders who demonstrate trust building behaviors positively impact unit outcomes (e.g., cohesion and mission accomplishment) and Soldier outcomes (e.g., morale, motivation, quality of work, commitment, and well-being).

#### Trust within Army Units and Organizations

At the unit or organization level, perceptions of trust are moderately favorable. A majority of AC leaders (71%) agree or strongly agree that members of their unit or organization can be trusted (i.e., relied upon) to fully support the directives of their leaders; though agreement varies by rank group (see Figure 21). AC field grade officers strongly affirm that unit members support their leaders' directives (84%). Agreement that this trust exists is also strong among AC company grade officers (72%), warrant officers (76%), and Sr NCOs (74%), though only about

half of Jr NCOs (54%) agree. Agreement by RC leaders (75%) is slightly more favorable than AC leaders, particularly among RC Jr NCOs (66% agree).

**Figure 21. Agreement that Unit Members Can Be Trusted to Support Leaders' Directives.**



Sixty-two percent of AC leaders agree that members of their unit or organization trust one another, while about one in five (21%) neither agree nor disagree. Seventeen percent of AC leaders indicate distrust exists in their unit or organization. These findings are aligned with those from a 2011 study of the Army profession, which found that 67% agreed with the

Sixty-two percent of leaders agree that unit members trust one another, while 17% disagree.


statement 'I trust members of this unit to fulfill their responsibilities' and 61% agreed 'members in my unit tell it like it is; we don't hide bad news' (Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2011). Only 14% to 16% of participants indicated disagreement with these statements, which is similar to the percentage of disagreement on unit trust issues found in CASAL.

2012 CASAL results show stark differences in the levels of agreement by rank (see Figure 22).

- AC field grade officers generally rate organizational trust favorably, and only 9% disagree that members of their unit or organization trust one another.
- Closer to two-thirds of AC company grade officers (65%), warrant officers (66%) and Sr NCOs (62%) agree unit members trust one another, though one in five neither agree nor disagree.

- Less than half of AC Jr NCOs (42%) agree this level of trust exists within their unit or organization, while almost one-third (29%) disagree.
- RC leaders report moderate levels of agreement that members of their unit or organization trust one another (67% agree or strongly agree); notably, more than half of RC Jr NCOs (56%) agree that unit members trust one another (20% disagree).

**Figure 22. Agreement that Trust Exists Among Members of Army Units and Organizations.**



The less favorable ratings by Jr NCOs reflect a pattern observed across many areas assessed by CASAL (e.g., unit discipline, adherence to standards, job satisfaction, and immediate superior effectiveness as a leader). Understandably, the attitudes of Jr NCOs are influenced by the nature of their position and the level of leadership at which they operate. Jr NCOs have less tenure and experience than Sr NCOs, hold a lower status than officers, and have primary responsibilities as the first line of direct level leadership over the most junior members of the Army (E-1 to E-4). Thus, it is not surprising that Jr NCO ratings for factors relating to organizational climate such as trust are less favorable than leaders at higher levels. However, this also means there is substantial room for improvement.

**Factors that contribute to trust.** Army leaders provided open-ended comments on factors they believe contribute to or hinder trust among members of their unit or organization. Leader comments cited both situational factors (i.e., dynamics within the unit) as well as leader behaviors or attributes that correlate with high or low levels of trust within units. Themes from these comments are presented in Tables 7 and 8, are listed in rank order from most prominent

to least prominent, and show the percentage of AC respondents that commented on each theme.

**Table 7. Rank Ordered Factors that Contribute to Trust within Units.**

Rank Ordered Factors that Contribute to Trust among Members of Army Units and Organizations	
Situational Factors (Team, Unit and Group Dynamics)	Leader Behaviors or Attributes
1. Social Cohesion – positive working and personal relationships among members of organization (25%)	1. Demonstrating Character and Leading by Example (14%)
2. Open Lines of Communication – between organizational levels and with members (information flow) (7%)	2. Care and Support for Others (11%)
3. Positive Working Environment and Unit Climate (7%)	3. Communication Quality and Clarity (6%)
4. Cooperative Performance – task-related teamwork and established helping relationships (6%)	4. Empower Others (5%)
5. Commonality - shared experiences among members (4%)	5. Accountability at All Levels (3%)
	6. Demonstrating Competence in Job Domain (4%)
	7. Fair Distribution of Rewards and Punishments (2%)
	8. Following through on actions / Making good on statements (2%)

**Table 8. Rank Ordered Factors that Hinder Trust within Units.**

Rank-Ordered Factors that Hinder Trust among Members of Army Units and Organizations	
Situational Factors (Team, Unit and Group Dynamics)	Leader Behaviors or Attributes
1. Lack of Communication (18%)	1. Favoritism, Unequal Treatment, Partiality (16%)
2. Lack of Discipline or Adherence to Standards (9%)	2. Demonstrating a Lack of Character (11%)
3. Lack of Cohesion or Loyalty (8%)	3. Self-interest/Self-concern (11%)
4. Inconsistent or Double Standards / Hypocrisy (6%)	4. Lack of Competence (8%)
5. Lack of Accountability (4%)	5. Lack of Benevolence/Support from Higher (7%)
	6. Negative Leadership Styles (6%)
	7. Micromanagement (5%)

Social cohesion among unit members emerged as the most frequently cited factor that contributes to trust. Specifically, trust exists among unit members who have built and sustained positive working and personal relationships with one another, forged through effective communication. Open lines of communication between organizational levels and with members was the second most prominent theme in the comments. Open communication helps to foster

trust by keeping everyone on the same page about day-to-day tasks and overall goals (Allert & Chatterjee, 1997; Balasvicius, 2008; Horn, 2008; Kile, 2008; Webber, 2002). Information flow through open lines of communication is also viewed as a key antecedent for mission and task clarity, which further develops climates of trust (Horn, 2008; Kile, 2008).

Cooperative performance also emerged as a theme and concerned behaviors such as task-related teamwork and established ‘helping relationships’ within units and their role in developing trust. Also prevalent were comments citing a positive working environment or unit climate in general, and commonality or shared experiences among unit members. Comments by RC leaders especially emphasized the contribution of shared experiences to trust within their organizations (13% of RC respondents), and also frequently mentioned the linkage between trust and having a clear definition of follower roles and responsibilities (6% of RC respondents). Given the traditional part-time role of leaders in the reserve component, it is not surprising that comments by RC leaders place more emphasis on the latter two factors and their contribution to trust among unit members.

Similarly, six leadership behaviors or attributes that contribute to trust in units and organizations emerged from the open-ended comments. Comments cited the importance of demonstrating character and leading by example, as these attributes have ‘trickle down’ effects originating from strong leaders who set a positive example for their subordinates to follow; these attributes are also extensively cited in literature as contributing to trust (Cianciolo, Evans, DeCostanza, & Pierce, 2011; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Sweeney, Thompson & Blanton, 2009). Showing care and genuine concern for Soldiers and others (i.e., demonstrating benevolence) was commonly cited as a prerequisite for followers’ ability to trust their leader. Other leadership factors that contribute to trust in organizations include empowering team members and giving them a voice during decision making; holding all team members accountable, to include setting and enforcing standards; and fair distribution of rewards and punishments. Finally, comments indicated that followers trust leaders who demonstrate competence in their duties and responsibilities, a factor also strongly supported by other research (Sweeney et al., 2009; Wildman, Fiore, Burke, Salas, & Garven, 2011).

**Factors that hinder trust.** Not surprisingly, leader comments on factors that hinder trust within Army units and organizations reflect the inverse of several factors already described as contributing to trust. Of the situational factors that hinder organizational trust, a lack of communication was the most prominent theme. Comments also indicated that trust is low in units where members lack discipline or where standards are not upheld. Similarly, trust is low in units where there is a lack of cohesion or loyalty among members, where standards are applied inconsistently across a formation, and where there is a general lack of accountability.

Of the leader behaviors or attributes that hinder trust in Army units, the most prominently mentioned theme in the comments was the use of favoritism, unequal treatment or partiality. Also frequently mentioned were leaders demonstrating a lack of character; demonstrating self-interest or self-concern (and less concern for others); demonstrating lack of competence; demonstrating a lack of benevolence or support; negative leadership in general (e.g., retribution, intimidation, ineffectual leadership); and micromanaging others.

As noted previously, the findings from comments on factors that contribute to or hinder trust align with current research on trust. Academic and military researchers (Covey, 2011; Sweeney et al., 2009) have identified behavioral antecedents – or actions that promote trust – within the military context. Their findings indicate that trust is facilitated by leaders who demonstrate open communication; demonstrate confidence in their subordinates; are fair and follow through on their commitments; and create a positive working environment.

Themes that emerged in leader comments are supported by results of other CASAL items. Table 9 displays the relationships between direct items regarding trust and characteristics of the working environment and leader attitudes. Within this set of items, adherence to standards has the strongest relationship to high levels of trust in units and organizations. It is also notable that leaders who agree they feel informed about decisions affecting their work responsibilities also

***Table 9. Correlations of Perceived Organizational Trust with Various Outcomes.***

Relationship between AC Leader Agreement about Trust in their Unit or Organization and Characteristics of the Working Environment		
	Members of my unit or organization trust one another	Members of my unit or organization can be trusted to fully support leaders' directives
In my unit or organization, standards are upheld (e.g. professional bearing, adherence to regulations) [Accountability]	.633**	.657**
I am confident in the ability of my unit/organization to perform its mission [Unit Efficacy]	.603**	.618**
I feel informed about decisions that affect my work responsibilities [Communication]	.545**	.512**
There is a discipline problem in my unit or organization [Accountability]	-.407**	-.409**
I am committed to my team or immediate work group because of my sense of personal loyalty [Cohesion, Loyalty]	.213**	.211**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


agree that unit members trust one another. This finding reflects the importance of communication, both having open lines of communication within the organization and the quality and clarity of communication between superiors and subordinates for the establishment and maintenance of trust in units.

### Trust in Leaders

The importance of trust as a component of Army leadership is evidenced by the addition of *Builds Trust* to the core leader competency model in the recent revision of ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership. Leaders build trust to mediate relationships and encourage commitment among followers. This starts with respect among people and grows from both common experiences and a shared understanding. Trust establishes conditions for effective influence and for creating a positive environment (Department of the Army, 2012c).

**Building Trust.** 2012 CASAL findings indicate that 71% of AC leaders (72% RC) rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at building trust, whereas only 15% rate them ineffective or very ineffective (14% RC). These findings are consistent with patterns observed in the 2011 CASAL. Larger percentages of senior-level leaders (i.e., field grade officers and Sr NCOs) rate their immediate superiors effective at building trust than do leaders at more junior levels (i.e., company grade officers and Jr NCOs); one in five Jr NCOs rate their immediate superior ineffective (See Figure 23). These differences are not unexpected; as noted previously, a consistent pattern in CASAL data is that smaller percentages of Jr NCOs tend to rate their immediate superiors effective across all leadership behaviors.

**Figure 23. Ratings of Immediate Superior Effectiveness for Builds Trust by Rank Group.**



Of note, ADRP 6-22 (Department of the Army, 2012c) outlines three components (and associated behaviors) within the competency *Builds Trust*. These components are:

1. Sets personal example for trust: Is firm, fair and respectful to gain trust; assesses degree of own trustworthiness.
2. Takes direct actions to build trust: fosters positive relationships with others; identifies areas of commonality; engages other members in activities and objectives; corrects team members who undermine trust with their attitudes or actions.
3. Sustains a climate of trust: assesses factors or conditions that promote or hinder trust; keeps people informed of goals, actions, and results; follows through on actions related to expectations of others.

Other trust-building leader behaviors assessed by CASAL provide confirmation for the doctrinal framework (see Table 10). Leader effectiveness in behaviors related to setting a personal example for trust, sustaining a climate of trust, and taking direct action to build trust are positively related to demonstrating the competency *Builds Trust*.


**Table 10. Correlations of Behavioral Components of Builds Trust.**

Relationship between AC Immediate Superiors' Effectiveness at Building Trust and Related Leadership Behaviors		Effectiveness of Immediate Superior at <i>Builds Trust</i>
<b>Sets a Personal Example</b>	Effectiveness of immediate superior at: Leading by example	.813**
	Effectiveness of immediate superior at: Demonstrating the Army Values	.720**
<b>Takes Direct Actions to Build Trust</b>	Effectiveness of immediate superior at: Building effective teams	.802**
	Effectiveness of immediate superior at: Communicating	.790**
	Agreement immediate superior corrects conditions in unit that hinder trust	.776**
	Agreement immediate superior enforces ethical standards	.641**
<b>Sustains a Climate of Trust</b>	Effectiveness of immediate superior at: Creating a positive environment	.860**
	Effectiveness of immediate superior at: Creating a climate that supports learning	.796**
	Effectiveness of immediate superior at: Reading people to understand how best to lead them	.787**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The 2012 CASAL also captured subordinate ratings for other indices of Army leader effectiveness in building and sustaining trust among followers. Again, these include varying levels of agreement that immediate superiors demonstrate benevolence, competence, and reciprocal trust; positively correct unit conditions that hinder trust; and look out for the professional well-being of subordinates. Levels of agreement that leaders demonstrate these trust behaviors are presented in Figure 24.

**Figure 24. Indicators of Trust in Immediate Superiors by Active Duty Leaders.**



Three-fourths of AC leaders (75%) agree or strongly agree with the statement “My immediate superior looks out for my welfare” (11% disagree or strongly disagree). Showing care and concern for others are ways leaders foster positive relationships with others. These findings relate closely to the open-ended comments indicating leaders who demonstrate care and other benevolent behaviors (toward subordinates) foster trust in their organizations. Comments also indicated the inverse is true, as leaders who are overly self-concerned and demonstrate self-interest hinder trust in their organizations, a finding also supported in the current literature on trust (Sweeney, et al., 2009).

Three-fourths of AC leaders (76%) agree or strongly agree their immediate superior has the ‘know how’ to guide them through risk or danger safely (11% disagree or strongly disagree). Comments also indicated that a superior’s demonstration of competence in their job domain is an important precursor for establishing trust with followers.

More than two-thirds of leaders (69%) agree or strongly agree that they trust their immediate superior to handle issues important to their professional well-being. Leaders who trust their superiors in this regard rely on their superiors for career-related actions that could include receiving coaching, counseling and mentoring, leader development, promotions, and fair evaluations. Results show that there is a positive relationship between agreement that leaders trust their immediate superior to handle issues important to their professional well-being and ratings for superior effectiveness in developing their subordinates ( $r = .77, p < .001$ ) and showing genuine concern for developing subordinates’ leadership skills ( $r = .71, p < .001$ ). Thus, improving leader effectiveness in developing others can strengthen this form of trust between superiors and their subordinates.

**Correcting Conditions that Hinder Trust.** Two-thirds of leaders (67%) agree or strongly their immediate superior corrects conditions in the unit that hinder trust, though 16% disagree or strongly disagree. ADRP 6-22 states that to build and sustain trust, Army leaders assess factors or conditions that promote or hinder trust, and correct team members who undermine trust with their attitudes or actions (Department of the Army, 2012c). Themes from open-ended comments provide an indication of the types of factors not being corrected and are hindering trust in organizations:

- Commonly cited situational factors were a lack of communication or poor communication, discipline problems, favoritism or inconsistent standards within units.
- Comments also indicated that effective leadership promotes trust; effective leaders build trust by demonstrating character and leading by example, showing care and concern for subordinates, and empowering others and holding them accountable.

Jr NCOs disagree most frequently that their immediate superior corrects conditions in the unit that hinder trust, though the comments provided by Jr NCOs on factors that hinder trust in units are consistent with the larger sampling of leaders at all levels.

Developmental materials offered through the Army’s Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) program identify ways that leaders can build and sustain trust, and were specifically designed to address the three components of trust outlined in ADRP 6-22 (i.e., sets personal example, takes direct action, sustains a climate of trust). First, the Leader Development Improvement Guide (LDIG) identifies developmental activities to help leaders improve themselves through feedback, study, and practice (Center for Army Leadership, 2012b). Figure

25 displays some of the organizational factors that hinder trust matched with a sampling of development activities designed to help leaders build trust, as suggested in the LDIG.

**Figure 25. Sample Activities from the LDIG to Improve Trust in Units.**

Factors that Hinder Trust in Units Identified in 2012 CASAL	Activities to Build Trust Suggested in the Leader Development Improvement Guide (LDIG)
<b>Lack of Communication or Poor Communication</b>	Speak precisely. Be clear, use simple language, and let others know exactly what you want and where you stand.
	Regularly seek information from those at different levels in your unit. Find out how clearly your orders are being communicated.
<b>Unit Discipline Problems</b>	Let others know what the course of action is and follow through on it.
	If dysfunction or distrustful behaviors occur within the unit, take immediate action to correct the behavior.
<b>Favoritism / Inconsistent Standards Within Unit</b>	Clarify the expectations of a job or task you assign. Be clear as to how and when you want to see progress on the responsibility you communicate to subordinates.
	Encourage frequent informal feedback on climate of the unit. Note: the values and tone you set as a leader will be modeled by others. Reward candid, informal feedback.
<b>Leaders Not Demonstrating Character or Not Leading by Example</b>	Describe unit values surrounding trust frequently. In your message, be clear about how you and all members of the unit will create a climate of trust. Make building trust an explicit goal.
	Observe your own behavior. Be as objective as you can. Assess if you treat others equitably and fairly. Determine whether you tend to have ‘favorites.’ Get feedback from others to support your assessment.
<b>Leaders Not Showing Care and Concern for Subordinates</b>	Help subordinates recover from failure by demonstrating understanding and empathy. Counsel subordinates by providing feedback on the course of action and the results, as well as alternatives.
	When developing others through actions such as mentoring, coaching, or counseling, create mutual agreement on performance change, goals, and specific follow-up for corrective actions.

Additionally, the MSAF program’s Virtual Improvement Center (VIC) is an online portal that offers numerous interactive media instruction (IMI). A module titled “Building Trust” was specifically designed to improve leaders’ ability to build and sustain trust in units (Center for Army Leadership, 2012a). The instruction describes important concepts related to trust and provides practical exercises that allow learners to evaluate their approach to build trust and to learn techniques for improving their approach.

**Reciprocal Trust.** A majority of AC leaders (82%) agree or strongly agree with the statement ‘my immediate superior demonstrates trust in my abilities.’ Only 9% of AC leaders disagree or strongly disagree. Here, leaders show the strongest levels of agreement among trust-related

items in the survey, which is positive. However, while demonstrating trust in others is an important component of building trust in organizations, these favorable ratings also reflect participants' bias toward their own 'trustworthiness' that is not necessarily attributable to their immediate superior. Therefore, the high level of agreement to this statement may mask the true level of trust that Army leaders have in their immediate superiors and is therefore interpreted cautiously.

**Confidence in Life-or-Death Situations.** An aspect of trust assessed by CASAL over the past several years is the level of confidence leaders have in their immediate superior relating to life-or-death situations. In 2012, more than two-thirds of leaders (70% AC; 69% RC) agree or strongly agree with the statement 'I feel confident following my immediate superior into life-or-death situations' while 16% (AC and RC) disagree. Overall levels of agreement with this statement have remained at about two-thirds favorability with less than one-fifth of leaders indicating disagreement (66% to 70% agreement; 16% to 19% disagreement). Results of past CASAL indicated that confidence following one's immediate superior into life-or-death situations is not as widely applicable to all Army jobs or contexts (i.e., some leaders do not work in fields where life-or-death situations are common or expected). 2012 CASAL results indicate:

- 74% of leaders currently serving in Maneuver, Fires & Effects (MFE) TOE assignments agree or strongly agree they are confident following their immediate superior into life-or-death situations; 14% disagree or strongly disagree.
- 64% of leaders currently serving on a deployment agree, compared to 71% of leaders not currently deployed.
- 62% of leaders currently deployed to Afghanistan and serving in TOE assignments agree, though 24% disagree.


**Trust and Effective Leadership.** A composite scale score<sup>7</sup> was used to examine the relationship between trust building behavior, effective leadership, and important outcomes. Notably, most Army leaders are viewed favorably in demonstrating the six behaviors that comprise the

---

<sup>7</sup> Six items that reflect behaviors associated with immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating trust were combined into a single scale composite variable. The composite variable included the items presented in Figure 24, minus 'I am confident following my immediate superior into life-or-death situations' as this item is not directly applicable to all Army work settings. Values across these six items were summed and then divided by six to produce a single score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of '5' indicate a respondent's average rating across all six items = 5 (highest rating that immediate superior demonstrates trust behaviors). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all six trust items. A reliability analysis showed that this set of items demonstrated very strong internal consistency ( $\alpha = .95$ ). Reliability indices above .80 are generally considered acceptable for a measurement scale while values greater than .90 are considered very strong (Guion, 1998).

composite measure of trust (see Figure 26). Perceptions of leader effectiveness in demonstrating trust building behaviors (as rated by subordinates) increase with rank.

**Figure 26. Ratings of Trust Building Behavior by Immediate Superior Rank.**



Further, analysis of the composite score for leader trust confirmed several assumptions. First, demonstration of these six trust building behaviors is positively associated with effective leadership. Leaders who rate their immediate superior favorably across the six behaviors (the trust composite scale) also rate their immediate superior effective in demonstrating the core leader competencies ( $r = .91, p < .001$ ), the leader attributes ( $r = .86, p < .001$ ), and indicate agreement that their immediate superior is 'an effective leader' ( $r = .86, p < .001$ ). The trust building behaviors were also found to be positively associated with subordinate assessments that their immediate superiors are 'best or among the best' leaders at that rank or in that position ( $r = .84, p < .001$ ).

Second, trust building behaviors are positively associated with favorable Soldier and organizational outcomes that impact mission accomplishment. Findings show a strong positive relationship between Army leader's assessment of their immediate superior exhibiting positive trust building behavior (i.e., the favorable end of the leader trust composite scale) and their assessment of their immediate superior's effect on unit cohesion, unit discipline, getting results, and an overall assessment of trust within the unit (see Table 11). Similarly, favorable assessments of immediate superiors in building trust are positively associated with superiors' impact on subordinate work quality, motivation, commitment, morale, and to a lesser extent their career satisfaction (see Table 12). These findings demonstrate the importance of building trust within the Army, as leaders who are effective in building trust have a positive effect on their followers and on mission accomplishment.

**Table 11. Correlations of Leader Trust with Organizational Outcomes.**

Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Trust and the Effect on Unit or Organizational Outcomes		
	AC (n=6,819)	RC (n=6,000)
Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion	.828**	.833**
Effect on Unit or Team Discipline	.812**	.824**
Immediate Superior effectiveness in getting results to accomplish the mission successfully	.751**	.769**
Agreement Members of unit/organization trust one another	.472**	.465**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Table 12. Correlations of Leader Trust with Soldier Outcomes.**

Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Trust and the Effect on Subordinate Outcomes		
	AC (n=6,819)	RC (n=6,000)
Effect on Subordinate Work Quality	.778**	.784**
Effect on Subordinate Motivation	.838**	.834**
Effect on Subordinate Commitment to the Army	.765**	.770**
Current level of morale	.504**	.489**
Satisfaction with Army career	.350**	.355**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Favorable assessments of immediate superiors in building trust are also positively associated with subordinate psychological well-being. This was examined through a proxy measure of well-being comprised of subordinate ratings for the following: perceived autonomy in current job, current morale, satisfaction with Army career, ability to maintain work/family balance, and belief their contributions directly impact their unit's mission. Ratings across these five items were summed together and divided by five. This produced a new variable with scores ranging

from 1.0 indicating low well-being to 5.0 indicating high well-being. Well-being scores were only produced for leaders who provided ratings for each of the five items. A reliability analysis for these items showed moderate internal consistency ( $\alpha = .79$ ). Leaders who rate their immediate superior high in demonstrating trust building behaviors also rate high on their own well-being ( $r = .51$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

### ***Summary of Survey Findings Regarding Trust in the Army***

Army doctrine and psychological and military research identify trust as an important component to building and sustaining effective organizations. This is confirmed by CASAL findings through numerous linkages between effective leadership, trust, and organizational and Soldier outcomes. Leaders who build trust are perceived as effective, and positively impact subordinate work quality, motivation, commitment, and morale. Trust building behaviors are also associated with positive effects on unit discipline, unit cohesion, trust among unit members, and getting results to accomplish the mission.

The Army should continue developing leaders to set a personal example, take direct action to build trust, and sustain a climate of trust. CASAL findings underscore the importance of these actions through the strong relationships observed between leader effectiveness in building trust and their effectiveness in leading by example, building effective teams, communicating effectively, creating a positive environment, and creating a climate that supports learning.

Unit leaders must remain mindful of the factors that affect trust in their organizations, as working environments with strong bonds of trust achieve mission objectives. Unit climate surveys are an appropriate tool for commanders and organizational leaders to use to identify any areas in need of improvement.

Individual leaders build trust in organizations by demonstrating character, leading by example, showing care and support for others, communicating effectively with followers, empowering others, and holding others accountable. The Army MSAF program offers numerous developmental resources that help leaders improve their leadership, including activities specifically designed to improve leader skills in building trust.

#### **1.3.5 Negative Leadership**

In recent years, there has been increased attention on negative leadership in the Army and the effects on Soldier and mission outcomes (Reed, 2004; Steele, 2011; Ulmer, 2012). Toxic leaders

promote themselves at the expense of their underlings, and usually do so without considering long-term ramifications to their subordinates, their unit, and the Army profession.

### Prevalence of Negative Leadership Behaviors in the Army

For the past three years, CASAL has assessed the prevalence of negative leadership behaviors. Findings are based on subordinate ratings of their immediate superior in demonstrating negative behaviors that are associated with toxic leadership. **Notably, the term ‘toxic leadership’ did not appear anywhere in the survey for two reasons.** First, past CASAL studies have found that the term is not consistently understood in the Army. Second, omitting the term prevented participants from making holistic assessments about their immediate superior based on the term, and focused ratings on the observable behaviors known to be associated with toxic leadership. A favorable finding in the 2012 CASAL is that the occurrence of negative leadership in the Army remains limited.

- Results show no change in the prevalence of several negative leadership behaviors from 2010 to 2012.
- Perceptions of negative leadership continue to be more prevalent among junior leaders and are less pronounced at senior levels.
- The detrimental impact that negative leadership has on organizational and Soldier outcomes is strong.

Major findings on negative leadership behaviors identified in the 2011 CASAL are further supported by results from 2012. The proportion of Army leaders who express agreement that

The proportion of leaders who express agreement that their superior demonstrates any specific negative behavior is one-fifth or less.

their immediate superior demonstrates any specific negative behavior is one-fifth or less (see Table 13). The most commonly displayed negative leadership behaviors are setting misplaced priorities that interfere with accomplishing goals and doing little to help teams be more cohesive. Alone, these behaviors do not constitute toxic leadership.

**Table 13. Ratings of Immediate Superior Demonstration of Negative Leadership Behaviors.**

AC Leader Perceptions of their Immediate Superior’s Exhibition of Negative Leadership Behaviors	
My immediate superior...	(% Agree/Strongly Agree)
Sets misplace priorities that interfere with accomplishing goals	19%
Does little to help his/her team be more cohesive	18%
Blames other people to save himself/herself embarrassment	16%
Berates subordinates for small mistakes	16%

The 2012 CASAL also assessed leader behaviors that provide evidence for the absence of negative leadership. Results show that indicators of positive leadership behaviors related to ethics, selfless service and communication are common in the Army:

- 81% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior enforces ethical standards (6% disagree).
- 80% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior puts the needs of the unit/organization and mission ahead of self (9% disagree).
- 72% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior promotes good communication among team members (13% disagree).
- Agreement that immediate superiors demonstrate these three positive behaviors shows no change since 2010.

Finally, as a broad assessment, 73% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior is an effective leader (13% disagree).


A normative approach was used to examine the distribution of a scaled composite score<sup>8</sup> for negative leadership behavior. Figure 27 displays the distribution of scores on the composite scale where most leaders fall across the continuum of values. Results show that a small frequency of AC leaders rates their immediate superior as demonstrating most of the negative leadership behaviors in the composite. The high frequency of scores at 5.00 is very encouraging, as it indicates strong disagreement that superiors are demonstrating negative leadership behaviors. The average score of 3.00 serves as the neutral mid-point, indicating subordinates neither agree nor disagree that their superior demonstrates the behaviors, or are balanced between demonstrating some negative and some positive behaviors.

CASAL findings indicate that perceptions of effective leadership are negatively associated with the demonstration of negative leadership behaviors. Specifically, subordinate ratings show strong positive relationships between perceptions that an immediate superior does not demonstrate negative leadership behavior and agreement that the superior is an effective

---

<sup>8</sup> The eight items that reflect behaviors associated with negative leadership were combined into a single scale composite variable. The four negatively worded behavior items (i.e., presented in Table 13), were reverse coded to assign negative behaviors with a small response value (i.e., strong agreement that a leader engages in a negative behavior is coded '1'). Conversely, positive behaviors are represented by higher response values (i.e., strong agreement that a leader engages in a positive behavior is coded '5'). After recoding responses, values across all eight items were summed and then divided by eight. This procedure created a single scale composite score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of '1' indicate a respondent's average rating across all eight items = 1 (the strongest agreement that one's immediate superior engages in all eight negative leadership behaviors). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all eight items. A reliability analysis was conducted on the eight items comprising this composite variable and was found to demonstrate strong internal consistency ( $\alpha = .92$ ).

**Figure 27. Frequency of Composite Score for Eight Negative Leadership Behaviors.**



leader ( $r = .837, p < .001$ ) and ratings for that superior as ‘best or among the best’ compared to other leaders in a comparable rank or position ( $r = .774, p < .001$ ). Table 14 displays the average computed scale score for negative leadership behavior for each category on the measures of effective leadership. These findings are supported by recent literature that demonstrate leaders

**Table 14. Negative Leadership Behavior Scale Scores by Ratings of Immediate Superior Effectiveness.**


Average Negative Leadership Behavior Scale Score by Ratings of Effective Leadership				
'My immediate superior is an effective leader'				
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
2.00	2.63	3.15	3.93	4.66
'Rating of immediate superior's leadership abilities compared to others at that rank or position'				
Worst or among the worst	A marginal performer	Middle of the road	A high performer	Best or among the best
2.07	2.68	3.43	4.18	4.65

who engage in self-serving behaviors are perceived to be ineffective, though some may still achieve mission requirements and meet organizational goals (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2010; Steele, 2011).

#### Negative Leadership by Rank and Position

Examination of negative leadership behaviors by rank shows slight differences across the levels of leadership (see Figure 28). Again, an average score of 3.00 serves as the neutral mid-point (indicating subordinates neither agree nor disagree that negative behaviors are being demonstrated, or are balanced between demonstrating some negative behaviors and some positive behaviors). Overall, the lowest average composite scores are found among NCOs, indicating a more prevalent occurrence of negative behaviors by these leaders. Staff sergeants (E-6) and sergeants first class (E-7) are rated least favorably across the negative leadership behaviors by their subordinates, a finding consistent with results of the 2011 CASAL. Average scores for senior officers (LTC, COL, and GO) and sergeants major (E-9) indicate they are less often viewed by their subordinates as exhibiting behaviors associated with negative leadership. As mentioned previously in this report, less favorable ratings for superiors at lower ranks is a consistent pattern observed across CASAL data.


**Figure 28. Perceptions of Negative Leadership by Rank.**



Examination of negative leadership behavior at key leadership positions shows some relation to the previously mentioned findings on rank (see Figure 29).

- Brigade and battalion commanders are generally viewed as demonstrating positive leadership behavior. Average scores for command sergeants major at these levels are only slightly less favorable than commanders.
- Junior officer positions (company commanders and platoon leaders) are rated less favorably by subordinates in terms of negative behaviors (associated with negative leadership).
- Platoon sergeants and squad/section team leaders have the lowest average scores on the negative leadership behavior composite scale based on ratings by their subordinates.

**Figure 29. Perceptions of Negative Leadership by Position.**



### Impact of Negative Leadership

The computed single assessment of negative leadership behavior was correlated with organizational and Soldier outcomes that impact mission accomplishment. Findings show a strong positive relationship between a leader's assessment of their immediate superior exhibiting positive leadership behavior (i.e., the favorable end of the negative leadership behavior composite score) and their assessment of their immediate superior's effect on the organizational outcomes presented in Table 15. Thus, the presence of negative leadership behaviors is associated with detrimental effects on unit discipline, unit cohesion, and on the level of trust among unit members of units. Leaders who exhibit negative leadership behaviors are also not viewed as effective in getting results to accomplish the mission successfully.

**Table 15. Correlations of Negative Leadership Behaviors with Organizational Outcomes.**

Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Negative Leadership Behaviors and the Effect on Unit or Organizational Outcomes		
	AC (n=7,096)	RC (n=6,194)
Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion	.767**	.765**
Effect on Unit or Team Discipline	.747**	.757**
Immediate Superior effectiveness in getting results to accomplish the mission successfully	.669**	.681**
Agreement Members of unit/organization trust one another	.406**	.408**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The demonstration of negative leadership behaviors has similar detrimental effects on Soldier outcomes (see Table 16). Leaders who perceive their immediate superior as exhibiting negative leadership indicate a larger detrimental effect on their work quality, motivation and commitment to the Army, as well as lower morale. Of importance, subordinates of leaders who display negative behaviors do not trust their superior to handle issues important to their professional well-being and do not feel confident following their superior into life-or-death situations. Notably, findings also indicate that Army leaders who demonstrate negative leadership behaviors do not demonstrate trust in the abilities of their subordinates. This is evidenced in the strong relationship between subordinate ratings for negative leadership behaviors in their immediate superiors and disagreement their superior demonstrates trust in their abilities ( $r = .67, p < .001$ ).

In summary, small percentages of leaders (one-fifth or less) are viewed as demonstrating specific behaviors associated with negative leadership. The prevalence of these negative behaviors remains unchanged over the past three years. More importantly, the percentage of Army leaders demonstrating a combination of negative behaviors to the degree they would be

**Table 16. Correlations of Negative Leadership Behaviors with Soldier Outcomes.**

Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Negative Leadership Behaviors and the Effect on Subordinate Outcomes		
	AC (n=7,096)	RC (n=6,194)
Effect on Subordinate Work Quality	.687**	.697**
Effect on Subordinate Motivation	.742**	.743**
Effect on Subordinate Commitment to the Army	.667**	.673**
Current level of morale	.434**	.415**
Satisfaction with Army career	.307**	.307**
I trust superior to handle issues important to my professional well-being	.777**	.783**
I feel confident following superior into life-or-death situations	.748**	.746**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

deemed toxic continues to be low. However, subordinate ratings indicate that leaders who demonstrate numerous negative leadership behaviors are directly harmful to organizational outcomes and have a detrimental impact on their subordinates. Negative leaders reduce the motivation, commitment, work quality, and morale of their subordinates, and have negative effects on unit cohesion and discipline. Subordinates do not show trust in leaders they perceive to demonstrate negative leadership. Thus, negative leadership is detrimental to a unit's ability to accomplish its mission.

### ***Summary on Quality of Leadership***

CASAL findings show that the quality of leadership in the Army continues to be viewed favorably. Leaders perceive their subordinates, peers, and to a lesser extent their superiors to be effective leaders. Additionally, a majority of leaders are perceived to be proficient, high-performing, or exceptional at demonstrating leadership, while smaller percentages are viewed as low-performing (learning, and in need of development) or non-performing (with questionable potential). Demonstration of effective leadership through the core leader competencies and leader attributes continues to be generally strong. *Gets Results, Prepares Self, Stewards the Profession*, and all of the attributes are consistently rated as strengths of Army leaders. The competency *Develops Others* remains an area for improvement at all levels.

Career satisfaction continues to be high among Army leaders, as does commitment and feelings of personal loyalty. Army leaders show confidence in the ability of their unit or organization to perform its mission and strong agreement that their contributions directly impact mission success. Of leaders not currently eligible to retire, about two-thirds intend to remain in the Army until retirement or beyond 20 years. Over the past several years, fewer and fewer leaders have reported stress from high workload as 'not a problem,' which indicates an increase in work demands. The impact of this stress is perceived to have the greatest effect on leader well-being, followed by leader motivation and work quality. More leaders are now agreeing that seeking help for stress-related issues is accepted and encouraged in their unit or organization.

Findings show a clear relationship between effective leadership and positive effects on unit and subordinate outcomes. Leaders who effectively demonstrate the core leader competencies and attributes are also perceived as having a positive impact on subordinate morale, work quality, motivation and commitment, and on unit cohesion and discipline. The prevalence of negative leadership behaviors in the Army continues to be limited, and leaders who demonstrate these negative behaviors have an adverse effect on both Soldier and unit outcomes.

Trust is an important component to building and sustaining effective organizations. CASAL findings show clear linkages between effective leadership, trust, and positive outcomes on subordinates and units. Leaders that are viewed as effective in building trust are also perceived as positively impacting the motivation and well-being of their followers. Social cohesion, open lines of communication, and effective leadership behaviors such as demonstrating character, leading by example, and showing care and support for others are positively associated with trust in Army organizations. Likewise, negative leadership behaviors, including favoritism or unequal treatment, and demonstrating negative leadership behaviors, are associated with distrust among unit members.

## **2. Quality of Leader Development**

One of two major goals of CASAL is to assess the quality of leader development in the Army. The essential findings on leader development are organized by the following topics:

- Army Leader Development
- Subordinate Development
- Leader Development Practices and Initiatives
- The Personnel Management System
- Institutional Education
- Unit-based Training

The key findings that relate to each of these areas provide an assessment of the current quality, effectiveness, role, and level of support for leader development in the Army.


### **2.1 Army Leader Development**

Leader development is a continuous and progressive process, and spans a leader's entire career. As presented in ADRP 7-0, the Army's leader development model comprises training, education, and experience gained through three mutually supporting domains: operational, self-development, and institutional. By design, a majority of leader development occurs in operational assignments and through self-development, as limited time is allotted for schoolhouse learning (Department of the Army, 2012d).


Since 2008, the CASAL has tracked the effectiveness and relative positive impact of the three leader development domains in preparing Army leaders for increased leadership responsibility. Consistent with the model's intent, operational experience and self development are rated effective by large percentages of Army leaders in preparing them for new levels of leadership responsibility. Favorable perceptions of institutional education have consistently lagged behind

the operational and self development domains in this regard. However, the most recent findings show an equal percentage of reserve component leaders (69%) rate self development and institutional education as effective for preparing them for leadership. Although there is more equity in RC assessments of the three domains, ratings from active duty leaders on the effectiveness of self-development and institutional education have declined. Effectiveness ratings of the three domains over the past five years are presented in Figures 30 and 31.

**Figure 30. Active Duty Leader Ratings of the Army Leader Development Domains (2008-2012).**



**Figure 31. RC Leader Ratings about the Army Leader Development Domains (2008-2012).**



## Operational Experience

The value of operational (work) experience in developing Army leaders cannot be understated. Leaders prepare for future roles and responsibilities through opportunities to lead in their current role. Thus, the value of ‘learning by doing’ is reflected in the high percentage of leaders at all levels (consistent between active and reserve components) who indicate operational work experience has been effective or very effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility:

- Field Grade Officers – 89%
- Company Grade Officers – 78%
- Warrant Officers – 84%
- Sr NCOs – 88%
- Jr NCOs – 73%

Findings across recent years support two trends. First, larger percentages of senior-level leaders (field grade officers and Sr NCOs) rate their operational experiences as effective compared to junior-level leaders (company grade officers and Jr NCOs) and, second, leaders at all levels consistently rate operational experience more favorably than self development and institutional education (Keller-Glaze, Riley, Steele, Harvey, Hatfield, & Bryson, 2010; Riley et. al, 2012; Riley, Hatfield, Nicely, Keller-Glaze, & Steele, 2011)

Development within operational assignments occurs on an ongoing basis. This is evidenced in the large percentages of Army leaders who reported ‘frequently’ or ‘very frequently’ engaging in opportunities to lead others and to train on-the-job (as reported in the 2011 CASAL). Further, these opportunities have consistently been rated among the most favorable in terms of their large or great positive impact on leader development (77% AC and RC in 2012).

Notably, the most favorably rated development practice within the operational domain is ‘deployment operations,’ as 79% of leaders report that deployment operations have had a large or great positive impact on their development as a leader. As CASAL has reported in previous years, leaders indicate several factors positively affect their development during deployments, including increased opportunities to lead in higher level positions; increased opportunities to take on new responsibilities; more time to interact with superiors, peers and subordinates; and opportunities to operate in conditions that impose stress, test one’s physical and mental toughness, and put training into real world perspective.

## Self Development

Self development is the continuous, life-long process that is used to supplement and enhance knowledge and skills Army leaders gain through their operational experiences and institutional education and training (Day, Harrison, & Halpin, 2009). Most Army leaders view self development as an effective method for preparing for new levels of leadership and responsibility. However, a steady decline in the percentage of effective ratings has been observed in recent years. In 2012, 69% of AC and RC leaders rate self development as effective or very effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility, compared to 78% in 2011 and 85% in 2010 (see Figure 30). Only 10% of leaders rate their self development as ineffective. Also consistent with past years is that the percentage of effective or very effective ratings by Jr NCOs lags behind the other cohorts, as only 58% rate self development as effective in 2012.

There are several potential reasons for the decline in leader attitudes toward self development. Though largely an activity at the discretion of the individual leader, there are now increased requirements for self development. Emphasis on mandatory training, structured self development, and prerequisite study for institutional education have increased. Therefore some leaders may view self development as an addition to their workload and downplay its contribution as a leader development domain. Notably, the decline in ratings between 2011 and 2012 may also be exacerbated by a slight change to the survey item presentation and methodology in 2012.

Self development activities are viewed by many as having a moderate to strong positive impact on development, a consistent finding across years. Half of leaders indicate self development has had a large or great positive impact on their development as a leader, while about one-third rate the impact as moderate. Though it was not assessed in the 2012 CASAL, past studies have found that perceptions about organizational support for self-development vary. In 2011, only about one-third (35%) of active duty leaders agreed their unit or organization made time available for self development, though more than half (59%) believed their organization expected them to participate in self development other than mandatory training (Riley et al., 2012). Notably, the level of agreement with both of these statements was about 5% higher in 2010 (Riley et al., 2011).


## Institutional Education

Findings on Army institutional education continue to reflect an attitude evident in previous years: that smaller percentages of Army leaders view course or school attendance as effective

in preparing them for leadership compared to operational work experience and self development activities. In 2012, 58% of active duty leaders rate institutional education effective or very effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility, while one in five (20%) rate it ineffective (see Figure 32). In comparison, 69% of reserve component leaders rate institutional education effective. Further, only half of AC leaders (52%) agree instruction from Army institutional education has provided a foundation that helps them get more learning out of everyday experiences, while one in five (21%) disagree. As expected, agreement with this statement is strongest among field grade officers (64%) and Sr NCOs (54%) whom have attended more courses and have had more learning experiences than leaders with less tenure.

As a leader development practice, course or school attendance is also not as widely viewed as impactful on development, though larger percentages of AC leaders indicate resident course attendance has had a large or great impact on their development (41%) than nonresident or distributed learning (DL) courses (26%). Resident and nonresident course attendance is rated as having a moderate impact on development by 29% and 26% of AC leaders, respectively. In comparison to the AC, a slightly larger percentage of RC leaders rate resident (53%) and nonresident/DL (29%) course attendance as having a large or great positive impact on their development. Overall, these findings represent consistent trends across years.

**Figure 32. Ratings of Effectiveness for Institutional Education from 2008-2012.**



The pattern of responses in Figure 32 shows that favorable ratings by rank groups tend to run parallel over time. Importantly, these data represent global assessments by leaders about the effectiveness of the institutional education domain as a whole, not about specific schools or courses they attended. A similar pattern is observed in ratings by rank group for the impact institutional education has had on leaders' development. A more in-depth discussion of Army education and the effectiveness of specific courses and schools and their contributions to leader development is presented in a later section of this report.

## 2.2. Subordinate Development


The leader development that occurs between Army superiors and their subordinates continues to be an area for improvement for leaders at all levels. CASAL results for several aspects of leader effectiveness in subordinate development are displayed in Figure 33. Ratings from the 2012 CASAL, along with trends from previous years continue to indicate *Develops Others* should remain an area of focus for improvement. As previously reported in CASAL findings, given the importance of preparing tomorrow's leaders for effective leadership, subordinate leader development requires the Army's focus and effort in both enabling superiors to do it well and holding them accountable for this leadership responsibility.

*Develops Others* continues to be an area for improvement. Many leaders recognize its importance though it is not perceived to be optimally occurring.

Senior leaders (in the ranks of COL, LTC, CW5, CSM and SGM) generally agree that leaders in their unit or organization understand the importance of developing the leadership skills of their subordinates (70% AC; 72% RC). However, when examining perceptions about subordinate development in practice, about two-thirds of all AC and RC leaders (64% and 66%, respectively) indicate leaders develop the leadership skills of their subordinates to a 'slight' or 'moderate' extent. About one-fourth of leaders report this occurs to a 'great' or 'very great' extent, while one-tenth say 'not at all.'

These CASAL findings are consistent with results observed in past years, which have also shown that the priority given to leader development is often moderate to low. Similar results were reported in a recent study on the Army profession (Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2011) which found that less than half of respondents (44%) agreed that leaders in their unit or organization invest their time and efforts to develop them. Together, these findings demonstrate that while leaders may recognize its importance, subordinate development is not perceived to occur at an optimal level.

**Figure 33. Indicators of Subordinate Leader Development in the Army.**



#### Ratings for Immediate Superiors

A consistent trend observed in CASAL data is the low relative ratings for the development that Army leaders receive from their immediate superiors. One measure that exemplifies this is that less than two-thirds of leaders (62%) rate their current immediate superior effective or very effective at developing their subordinates. Since 2008, the percentage of leaders rated effective or very effective on the competency *Develops Others* has ranged from 58% to 62% (about three in five), while the percentage of leaders rated ineffective has ranged from 19% to 22% (about one in five).


Part of effectively developing others is being able to create or call attention to leader development opportunities for subordinates. Leader effectiveness in these behaviors are especially important given the known contribution of operational work experience to leader development. Results of the 2012 CASAL confirm that only about half of Army leaders (48%) are rated effective or very effective in doing so, and favorable ratings have declined slightly over the past five years (from a high of 55% in 2009, to a low of 45% in 2011). Again, about one-fifth to one-fourth of leaders (20-24%) is consistently rated ineffective in this regard. CASAL findings are supported by results of the 2011 Survey on Officer Careers (SOC), which found that 57% of active duty officers and warrant officers rated their current rater as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ at providing leader development opportunities, while 19% indicated they were poor or very poor (U.S. Army Research Institute, 2011).

Past CASAL data have indicated that the quality and frequency of development that a subordinate receives depends heavily on the time and effort that his/her immediate superior is willing to put in to that development (Riley et al., 2012). The 2012 CASAL showed a notable decline in the level of leader agreement to the statement “my immediate superior shows genuine concern when it comes to developing my leadership skills.” Only 55% of AC leaders and 57% in the RC agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, down from 61% and 64% (respectively) in 2011. About one-fifth of leaders in both components disagree that their superiors have this concern about improving subordinate leadership skills.

A subordinate’s perception of being developed depends on the willingness of their superior to show interest and invest effort.

Figure 34 shows ratings for immediate superior effectiveness by superior rank group. These results demonstrate that at all levels, superior effectiveness in developing others consistently falls below a two-thirds threshold of favorability. Further, less than half of Jr NCOs are rated favorably (by their subordinates) in developing their subordinates. As evident in percentages associated with the red bars, leader effectiveness in creating or calling attention to developmental opportunities for subordinates in their assignments continues to be a weak area for many.

**Figure 34. Ratings for Active Duty Leaders in Developing Subordinates by Rank Group.**



### Counseling

Many Army leaders do not view the developmental counseling they receive from their immediate superior as having a large impact on their development. CASAL has consistently shown that counseling, as a leader development practice, is rated low by Army leaders in terms of its positive impact on their development. In 2012, less than one-third of leaders in both components (29% AC; 31% RC) rate developmental counseling from their immediate superior as having a large or great impact on their development; 27% rate the impact as moderate, while 44% rate it as having a small, very little, or no positive impact (for RC leaders, 26% moderate and 46% small, very little, or no impact).

The frequency with which Army leaders receive performance counseling has changed since it was assessed by CASAL in 2007, but change has not occurred in a uniform direction. First, the overall percentage of AC leaders saying they 'Never' receive performance counseling has

increased, from 19% in 2007 to 26% in 2012. This includes a 10% increase in field grade officers and Jr NCOs that are now saying they never receive performance counseling (which equates to one-fourth of Jr NCOs and one-third of field grade officers in 2012).

Secondly, counseling frequency has occurred on the positive end as well. A larger percentage of AC leaders are now saying they receive counseling “Monthly or more often” in 2012 (18%) compared to 2007 (13%) (see Tables 17 and 18). This includes an increase of 4% to 6% for each cohort with the exception of Jr NCOs (no change). However, the sum of these shifts in percentages should not be interpreted as favorable, as more leaders are now saying they ‘never’ receive counseling compared to 5 years ago (even though some leaders now report receiving counseling more frequently than before).

The frequency and quality of performance counseling shows room for improvement.

**Table 17. Frequency in which Active Duty Leaders Report Receiving Performance Counseling (2012).**

How Often do you Receive Performance Counseling? (2012 CASAL)					
Active Duty Leaders	Monthly or More Often	Quarterly	Semi-Annually	At Rating Time	Never
<b>MAJ-COL</b>	18%	16%	9%	24%	32%
<b>2LT-CPT</b>	22%	27%	7%	25%	19%
<b>WO1-CW5</b>	15%	23%	6%	27%	28%
<b>SFC-CSM</b>	19%	39%	3%	15%	25%
<b>SGT-SSG</b>	15%	32%	2%	25%	25%
<b>Total</b>	18%	28%	5%	23%	26%

**Table 18. Frequency in which Active Duty Leaders Report Receiving Performance Counseling (2007).**

How Often do you Receive Performance Counseling? (2007 LAS)					
Active Duty Leaders	Monthly or More Often	Quarterly	Semi-Annually	At Rating Time	Never
<b>MAJ-COL</b>	12%	20%	11%	35%	22%
<b>2LT-CPT</b>	16%	31%	7%	32%	14%
<b>WO1-CW5</b>	11%	27%	7%	33%	22%
<b>SFC-CSM</b>	14%	44%	4%	19%	19%
<b>SGT-SSG</b>	15%	38%	4%	28%	15%
<b>Total</b>	13%	32%	7%	29%	19%

DA PAM 623-3, Evaluation Reporting System, outlines the requirements for officer and NCO counseling during rating periods (Department of the Army, 2012e). As stated in this reference, the purpose of the Officer Evaluation Report Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1) is to promote a top-down emphasis on leadership communication, integrating rated officer participation in setting objectives and in the counseling and evaluation process. The form is utilized for lieutenants, captains, warrant officer one and chief warrant officer two. Specific counseling requirements associated with this form are as follows:

- Quarterly counseling is mandatory for lieutenants and warrant officer ones.
- The counseling goal for captains and chief warrant two is once around the midpoint (3-6 months into the reporting period).
- Follow-up counseling for field grade officers is to be done on an as-needed basis.

Similarly, the purpose of DA Form 2166-8-1, Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report and Support Form, is to improve performance counseling by providing structure and discipline to the process. Use of this form is mandatory for counseling all NCOs. Within the first 30 days of the rating period, a rater conducts the first counseling session with the rated NCO to discuss performance standards. Following this event, counseling sessions are to be conducted at least quarterly for active duty NCOs and focus on how well the rated NCO is performing.

As displayed in Table 19, the frequency with which leaders report receiving performance counseling falls short of Army guidance. Notably, less than half of SGT, SSG and SFC report receiving mandatory performance counseling as specified (quarterly), while percentages are also low for lieutenants, captains, and junior warrant officers.


Understandably, the true frequency with which formal performance counseling occurs could be measured through a paper trail of counseling forms, and thus, the self-report ratings of CASAL could be challenged. However, CASAL data better reflect the attitudes of Army leaders and their perceptions on the frequency and quality of the counseling they receive. That is to say, if it could be proven a leader did in fact receive counseling in the past year, but selected the response ‘never’ on CASAL, their response is telling of their attitudes about the quality and impact of the counseling they received.

**Table 19. Results of the Frequency of Performance Counseling by Rank Compared to the Requirement.**

Counseling Requirement by Rank as Specified in DA PAM 623-3 (2012)		Results of 2012 CASAL		
		Receive Counseling as Specified	Receive counseling 'At Rating Time'	'Never' Receive Counseling
As Needed	COL	38% Semi-annually or more often	24%	38%
	LTC	45% Semi-annually or more often	23%	32%
	MAJ	49% Semi-annually or more often	26%	25%
Once Around Midpoint (3-6 months)	CPT	53% Semi-annually or more often	26%	21%
	CW2	49% Semi-annually or more often	26%	25%
Quarterly	1LT	48% Quarterly	27%	18%
	2LT	54% Quarterly	21%	18%
	WO1	44% Quarterly	22%	28%
	CSM/SGM	70% Quarterly	9%	18%
	1SG/MSG	59% Quarterly	14%	24%
	SFC	48% Quarterly	20%	29%
	SSG	48% Quarterly	24%	26%
	SGT	46% Quarterly	27%	24%

Aside from the frequency of counseling, the quality and usefulness of counseling continues to show room for improvement. Only about half of Army leaders agree the feedback they received during their last performance counseling was useful in helping them set performance goals for improvement. Larger percentages of company grade officers and Sr NCOs agree the feedback was useful compared to other cohorts. Since 2008, favorable attitudes have declined slightly across all cohorts (see Figure 35). Ratings by RC leaders are generally similar to AC cohorts, though a larger percentage of RC Jr NCOs (56%) agree their counseling feedback was useful compared to AC Jr NCOs (46%).

**Figure 35. Ratings of Effectiveness for Performance Counseling (2008-2012).**




### Informal Leader Development

The 2012 CASAL sought to uncover new insights in subordinate development, namely in the frequency with which less formal developmental interactions are occurring between superiors and subordinates. As expected, results show that less formal leader discussions on job performance, performance improvement, and preparing for future roles appear to be more common in the Army than traditional performance counseling. However, these three types of interactions are not reportedly occurring in equal frequency.

- 62% of AC leaders (63% RC) agree their immediate superior takes time to talk to them about how they are doing in their work.
- 52% of AC leaders (55% RC) agree their immediate superior takes time to talk to them about how they could improve their duty performance.
- 48% of AC leaders (52% RC) agree their immediate superior takes time to talk to them about what they should do to prepare for future assignments.
- Figure 36 displays the levels of agreement for these types of informal interactions and are presented by immediate superior rank group (e.g., 59% of AC leaders agree that their immediate superior, a Sr NCO, takes time to talk to them about how they are doing in their work).

**Figure 36. Active Duty Leader Agreement about Developmental Interactions with their Immediate Superior.**



These day-to-day interactions are important, as they reflect Army leader propensity and ability to develop their subordinates. There is a positive relationship between the occurrence of these less formal developmental interactions and ratings for superior effectiveness in developing subordinates ( $r = .633$  to  $.643$ ) and agreement that one's superior shows genuine concern toward developing subordinates' leadership skills ( $r = .725$  to  $.727$ ). Thus, Army leaders who have informal discussions with their subordinates about subordinate job performance, what they can do to improve, and how they should prepare for future positions are more likely to be perceived as effective in developing others.

Further, results show that effective leaders use both formal and informal methods to counsel their subordinates. There is a positive relationship between the frequency with which AC leaders report receiving formal counseling and their level of agreement that their immediate superior takes time to talk with them about how they are doing in their work ( $r = .556$ ). There is

also a positive relationship between the quality of feedback received from formal and informal

Leaders who talk with  
subordinates about  
current and future jobs  
are perceived as effective  
in *Develops Others*.

counseling. AC leaders who agree their immediate superior takes time to talk with them about how they could improve duty performance also agree the feedback they received from their last performance counseling was useful in helping them set performance goals for improvement ( $r = .610$ ).

Results of the 2011 Survey on Officer Careers (SOC) support several findings by CASAL on formal and informal developmental interactions between superiors and subordinates (U.S. Army Research Institute, 2011).

- AC officers and warrant officers reported receiving informal feedback from their current rater much more frequently than formal feedback; 64% received informal feedback 'monthly or more often' compared to 20% receiving formal feedback that frequently.
- 43% of AC officers and warrant officers rated their immediate superior as 'good' or 'very good' at conducting quarterly counseling , while 34% rated them 'poor' or 'very poor.'
- A majority of AC officers and warrant officers indicated their immediate superior was 'good' or 'very good' at offering constructive criticism (62%), at evaluating subordinate performance fairly (69%), and at helping officers keep their careers on track (59%).

The 2012 CASAL also found that officers serving in command positions are generally engaged in the development of their direct-report subordinates. The frequency with which formal counseling occurs between commanders and their direct subordinates (see Table 20) does not differ greatly from results of other officers serving in similar ranks. Further, about two-thirds of leaders that report directly to commanders at the brigade (65%), battalion (70%) and company (65%) levels agree their superior takes time to talk with them about how they are doing in their work. Smaller percentages of these leaders report their commander takes time to talk with them about how they could improve their duty performance (53%, 60%, and 55%, respectively) and what they should do to prepare for future assignments (53%, 59%, and 50%, respectively).

**Table 20. Frequency in which Subordinates of Active Duty Commanders Report Receiving Performance Counseling (2012).**

How Often do you Receive Performance Counseling? (2012 CASAL)					
Immediate Superior Position	Monthly or More Often	Quarterly	Semi-Annually	At Rating Time	Never
<b>Brigade Commander (n = 324)</b>	20%	25%	10%	17%	28%
<b>Battalion Commander (n = 614)</b>	25%	30%	7%	19%	19%
<b>Company Commander (n = 1,152)</b>	19%	33%	4%	22%	22%

### ***Summary on Subordinate Development***

Leader effectiveness in the competency *Develops Others* continues to show room for improvement at all levels. One in five Army leaders is rated ineffective in developing their subordinates, in creating or calling attention to leader development opportunities for their subordinates, and in showing genuine concern toward developing subordinate leaders.

Many leaders report they are not receiving developmental counseling as outlined by Army guidance, and that the feedback received during counseling sessions is only marginally useful in setting performance goals for improvement. These are areas that show a slight decline in recent years.

While a small majority of leaders agree that their immediate superior takes time to talk with them about their job performance, fewer agree their superior talks with them about how they could improve their duty performance or what they should do to prepare for future assignments. About one-fourth of leaders disagree these informal developmental interactions are occurring with their superior, which is evidence of missed opportunities for day-to-day development, and represents an area for improvement.

### **2.3 Leader Development Practices and Initiatives**

Since 2005, CASAL has assessed and tracked trends on the relative contribution various practices have had on Army leader development. Given a list of 15 developmental practices, leaders rate the positive impact each has had on their development as a leader. As findings on the positive impact of these practices are integrated into results discussions throughout this report, a brief overview and summary is provided here.


First, it is important to understand how often Army leaders engage in these practices. The 2011 CASAL assessed the frequency with which active duty leaders engage in or receive development through the various practices. About half to two-thirds of AC leaders reported frequently or very frequently engaging in opportunities to lead others (66%), learning from peers (66%), on the job training (58%), and self development (49%). Smaller percentages of leaders reported frequently or very frequently learning from superiors (44%), engaging in formal leader development programs within the unit (35%), and receiving mentoring from someone outside their chain of command (33%). Receiving developmental counseling from one's immediate superior was reported to occur least often (26% frequently/very frequently, 55% rarely/occasionally) (Riley et al., 2012).

With regard to the positive impact that various practices have had on developing Army leaders, findings from past years have been consistent, and 2012 results continue to show consistent levels of impact. Findings are also generally consistent between active and reserve components. In general, the perceived positive impact of leader development practices fall within three tiers that were determined statistically through pair-wise comparison of means:

- Highest impact – practices include deployment operations, opportunities to lead others, on-the-job training, and learning from peers. Notably, three of these are practices that the largest percentage of leaders reported engaging in frequently or very frequently.
- Moderate impact – practices include learning from superiors, mentoring from outside the chain of command, civilian education, self development, broadening experiences, resident institutional education, and unit training activities.
- Lowest impact – practices include developmental counseling from immediate superior, formal leader development programs within units, nonresident or distributed learning (DL) education, and multisource 360 assessment feedback.

As noted, the trend in the relative ordering of these practices (lowest to highest impact) has remained fairly consistent across years. Full results of AC leader ratings in the 2012 CASAL are presented in Figure 37.

**Figure 37. The Impact of Various Practices on the Development of Active Duty Leaders.**



In addition to examining how broader practices contribute to the development of leaders, the 2012 CASAL also assessed recent Army initiatives that support leader development and training. These include the Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program (Army MSAF/360), and three web-based portals that the Army has fielded to serve as resources to leaders: the Virtual Improvement Center (VIC), Army Career Tracker (ACT), and the Army Training Network (ATN).

#### Army MSAF/360 Program

The Army MSAF/360 program provides uniformed and civilian leaders a validated 360-degree approach to garnering feedback from superiors, peers, and subordinates, and comparing that feedback to the leader's self-assessment on a variety of leadership behaviors based on the Army Leadership Requirements Model (ADRP 6-22). One of the major goals of the program is to increase leaders' self-awareness of their abilities and to help them improve their leadership. A few of the major features of the program include: individual and unit-level feedback reports; confidential and anonymous feedback from others; developmental resources available online; no cost to the user (other than time); and dedicated support staff. Additionally, the program is complemented by a professional coaching component whereby participants interact with an Army coach (in person, via telephone, or via e-mail) to receive assistance in interpreting their feedback report; in creating an individual development plan (IDP); and suggestions on resources and activities for developing their leadership skills.

CASAL captured modest ratings for the perceived effectiveness of the Army MSAF/360 Program. Of AC leaders who had participated in the program, 58% rate the program effective or very effective for making them more aware of their strengths and developmental needs (compared to 69% of RC leaders). NCOs view MSAF most favorably, as 79% of Sr NCOs and 71% of Jr NCOs rate the program effective or very effective for increasing their self-awareness (compared to a little over half of field grade officers, company grade officers, and warrant officers).

Forty-six percent of MSAF participants in the AC rate the program effective at improving their leadership capabilities (compared to 54% in the RC). Again, the perceived effect is viewed more favorably by NCOs, as two-thirds of Sr and Jr NCOs (69% and 64%, respectively) rate the program effective or very effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Smaller percentages of company grade officers (41%), warrant officers (45%) and field grade officers (38%) rate the program effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Finally, just over one-third of participants in the AC (36%) rates the MSAF program effective for improving their unit or organization, while nearly one-third (32%) rate it ineffective in doing so. In comparison,

a slightly larger percentage of RC participants indicate MSAF improves their unit or organization (43% effective, 24% ineffective).

Findings from recent MSAF program evaluation (Freeman, Foster & Brittain, 2012) provide a potential reason for the disparity in ratings between the uniformed cohorts. In this study, nearly half of NCOs (48%) indicated they initiated their MSAF assessment for their own self-development (i.e., to increase their personal insight). In comparison, more than half of officers and warrant officers (59% and 51%, respectively) participated in the program to fulfill the requirement (i.e., box check) on their OER. While the OER requirement for MSAF was implemented to increase leader self-development, the mandate may have inadvertently spurred a culture of resistance to its value as a developmental tool.

#### Virtual Improvement Center

A notable component of the Army 360/MSAF program is the Virtual Improvement Center (VIC), a web-based portal accessible through the MSAF website that offers resources for self development. The VIC enables leaders to target specific developmental needs (that are identified through their feedback interpretation) through the use of digital resources for development. Resources include videos, digital handbooks, training aides, and simulations and interactive media instruction (IMI) tailored to the Army Leadership Requirements Model (ADRP 6-22).

2012 CASAL results show that awareness and usage of the VIC is still growing among uniformed leaders. Nine percent of AC leaders (8% RC) report having accessed and used the VIC, while nearly one-third of AC and RC leaders (31%) have heard of it but have not accessed it. Usage varies slightly by rank group. AC warrant officers (14%) and Sr NCOs (10%) report the highest percentage of users, compared to smaller percentages of field grade officers (8%), company grade officers (6%) and Jr NCOs (6%). Recent program evaluation by Freeman, Foster & Brittain (2012) similarly found that the VIC is currently underutilized by MSAF participants.

Of the CASAL participants who report having accessed and used the VIC (AC, n = 545; RC, n = 368), about two-thirds (65% AC; 70% RC) rate it as effective or very effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Twenty-three percent in the AC rate the VIC as neither effective nor ineffective, while 11% rate it as ineffective (21% and 10%, respectively, for RC). Findings indicate that VIC resources are well received by the enlisted leaders who use them, as more than three-fourths of Sr NCO (76%) and Jr NCO (76%) users rate the VIC effective or very effective for improving their leadership capabilities. In comparison, smaller percentages of company grade officers (65%), warrant officers (68%) and less than half of field grade officers

(47%) rate the VIC effective or very effective for improving leadership capabilities. Together, these findings show room for opportunity. VIC resources are generally rated effective by the leaders who access and use them, though both the 2012 CASAL and recent MSAF program evaluation results show that the portal is currently being underutilized as a self-development resource by Army leaders.

### Army Career Tracker

The Army Career Tracker (ACT) is a web-based portal designed to change the way training, education and experiential learning support is provided to Army enlisted members, officers, civilians, and their leaders. Users can search multiple education and training resources, monitor career development and receive advice from their leadership. This portal allows users to track individual progress of Individualized Development Plan (IDP) goals; view skill and competency career progressions across multiple career maps; search training catalogs and educational resources; and connect with peers through My Journal knowledge collaboration. The system also provides an unofficial “lifelong learning transcript” that represents the accumulation of all assignment, training, and education accomplishments by the user (Army Career Tracker information paper, 2011).

Nearly three-fourths of active duty leaders (73%) are familiar with the Army Career Tracker, but only 34% report they have accessed and used the ACT (up from 20% in 2011). In comparison, an equal percentage of reserve component leaders (73%) report familiarity with ACT, though only 24% of RC leaders report using ACT (up from 13% in 2011). Usage of the ACT has increased the most among active duty NCOs. In 2012, more than half of AC Sr NCOs (56%) and Jr NCOs (52%) report having used the ACT, up from 37% and 33%, respectively, in 2011. Smaller percentages of field grade officers (16%), company grade officers (18%) and warrant officers (28%) report having accessed the ACT.

Of uniformed leaders who have accessed and used the ACT portal, more than half (57% AC, 55% RC) rate it as effective or very effective at providing a single point of access to career development information. Twenty-nine percent of active duty leaders rate the ACT as neither effective nor ineffective, while 14% rate it ineffective (31% and 15%, respectively, for RC). Larger percentages of Sr NCOs and Jr NCOs (64% and 63%, respectively) rate the ACT effective or very effective than do field grade officers (38%), company grade officers (47%) and warrant officers (49%). Overall, the percentage of effective ratings for the ACT decreased slightly in 2012, though not among NCOs, the primary users.

## Army Training Network

The Army Training Network (ATN) is a web-based portal of digital tools, and serves as the Army's single source for training management processes. Through ATN, Army leaders collaborate and share the most current training management doctrine, processes, and products. The portal relies on direct input from Soldiers and leaders to provide ATN the latest in training management best practices from the field. A few of the major features on ATN include:

- A data-based version of Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 7-0 (Training Units and Developing Leaders) that includes links to additional resources that expand and clarify the content of the manual in an easy to navigate format.
- Unit Training Management (UTM), that provides step-by-step guidance on how to plan, prepare, execute and assess Army training management. The content of ADP 7-0 and UTM are inextricably linked.
- A database of unit training products (e.g., training briefs, SOPs, checklists) for unit leaders to access and utilize as needed.
- Numerous collaborative tools that enable leaders to provide input on ATN content and share ideas across the Army training communities of practice.
- Mobility through ATN2GO, a digital application that makes training management features from the portal accessible through Soldiers' mobile devices (Army Training Network information paper, 2012).

The 2012 CASAL found that about one-fourth of Army leaders (26% AC; 28% RC) have accessed and used the ATN, while more than one-third (35% AC; 37% RC) have heard of it but have never used it. Usage is highest among senior leaders, to include about one-third of field grade officers (30% AC; 32% RC) and Sr NCOs (36% AC; 34% RC) in both components. In comparison, reported usage is lower among company grade officers (26% AC; 29% RC), warrant officers (18% AC; 20% RC), and Jr NCOs (19% AC; 22% RC).

Ratings for the ATN's effectiveness in providing leaders with relevant resources are moderately favorable. Of AC leaders who have accessed and used the portal:

- 68% rate ATN effective at providing resources for planning and executing self development.
- 66% rate ATN effective at providing resources for planning and executing unit training.
- 60% rate ATN effective at providing resources for planning and executing unit leader development.
- Larger percentages of Sr NCOs rate the ATN favorably in supporting each of these activities than do field grade officers.

In comparison to the AC, larger percentages of RC leaders rate the ATN as an effective resource for supporting these training and development activities (self development – 72%; unit training – 71%; unit leader development 63%). These findings are encouraging given the time constraints in which reserve units and leaders traditionally operate and the increased need for readily available tools and resources for training development and execution. However, a notable gap in the results for both components is the lower relative ratings of ATN in supporting unit leader development compared to the other training activities. This presents an opportunity for improvement, as more than one-fourth of AC and RC leaders (both 27%) rate ATN as ‘neither effective nor ineffective’ at providing resources for planning and executing unit leader development.

## **2.4 The Personnel Management System**

The 2012 CASAL addresses the effectiveness of Army personnel management systems through examination of leader attitudes on assignment practices, evaluations and promotions, and the Army’s support for leader development.

### Assignment Practices

As discussed earlier in this report, operational work experience is extremely valuable for developing leadership skills and for preparing leaders for increased leadership responsibility. Army assignment practices are, then, an important component in the leader development process, to ensure that leaders receive operational experiences through an appropriate mix of assignments and also to improve their knowledge and skills as a result.

As would be expected, active duty leader attitudes about their personal assignment histories (assignment predictability, input into assignments, knowledge and skills improvement) positively relate to rank and tenure. That is, leaders in senior ranks view their assignment histories more favorably than leaders in lower ranks.

- Most leaders agree their knowledge and skills have improved due to a favorable series of assignments. Agreement is generally high among field grade officers (81%), warrant officers (71%) and Sr NCOs (69%). Leaders with less tenure show less agreement, namely company grade officers (63%) and Jr NCOs (52%).
- 70% of field grade officers agree they have had sufficient input into the selection of their assignments; compared to 60% of warrant officers, and 49% of company grade officers.
- Less than half of Sr NCOs and Jr NCOs (46% and 38%, respectively) agree they have had sufficient input into the selection of their assignments; 39% of Sr NCOs and 43% of Jr NCOs disagree they have had sufficient input.

- Two-thirds of field grade officers (66%) agree they have had sufficient predictability in their series of assignments; compared to about half of company grade officers (50%), warrant officers (56%), and Sr NCOs (51%). Only about one-third of Jr NCOs (36%) agree their series of assignments have been sufficiently predictable while about an equal percentage disagree (35%).

Overall, these findings are not unexpected, as leaders at more junior levels have served in fewer assignments and thus have less to base their attitudes on than do leaders with longer tenure and more extensive assignment histories.

While most leaders perceive their assignment histories as developmental, there are indications that deliberate planning and sequencing of assignments is not currently optimal for leaders to fully benefit from the experiences. This is evidenced through leader ratings that suggest the Army's support for leader development through assignment practices shows room for

Leaders view their assignments as developmental, though more deliberate planning and sequencing of assignments may enhance the benefits that accrue from experience.

improvement. About half of active duty leaders rate the Army effective or very effective at supporting the development of leaders through providing adequate time in key assignments (55% effective; 24% ineffective) and providing an appropriate mix of assignments (51% effective; 24% ineffective). Though again, perceptions vary by cohort:

- Nearly two-thirds of field grade officers rate the Army effective in supporting leader development through these assignment practices (66% and 62%, respectively); less than one in five rate the Army ineffective (18%).
- Just over half of company grade officers, warrant officers, and Sr NCOs rate the Army effective at supporting leader development through providing adequate time and the right mix of assignments. About one-fourth of these leaders rate the Army ineffective.
- Smaller percentages of Jr NCOs rate the Army effective at providing adequate time in key assignments (43%) and providing the right mix of assignments (37%) to support development. Nearly one-third rate the Army ineffective (30-31%).

Additionally, the 2011 Survey on Officer Careers (SOC) found moderately favorable attitudes about assignments and assignment practices among active duty officers and warrant officers (U.S. Army Research Institute, 2011):

- 65% indicated satisfaction with their current assignment, while 77% indicated satisfaction with past assignments.
- 71% were satisfied or very satisfied with the appropriateness of assignments for career development.

- Only about half of AC officers and warrant officers indicated their current assignment permitted them sufficient time to ‘extensively’ learn their job (50%) and to gain experience necessary to progress to the next level (53%), and provided sufficient leader development opportunities to prepare for future assignments (46%). Almost an equal percentage of leaders indicated these occurred to a ‘moderate extent.’

### Evaluations and Promotions

CASAL findings continue to indicate that Army leaders do not hold overwhelmingly positive views about the fairness and accuracy of personnel management actions, findings that were first reported in the 2011 CASAL. In 2012:

- About half of leaders (51% AC; 57% RC) agree personnel evaluations are accurate, while about one-fourth disagree (28% AC; 23% RC). More than one-third of AC Jr NCOs (36%) disagree personnel evaluations are accurate. Ratings show no change from 2011.
- Regarding promotions, 38% of AC leaders agree that the most capable personnel are promoted, while nearly an equal percentage (37%) disagrees. Similarly, only about half of leaders (47%) agree that members of their unit or organization who are promoted are prepared to lead in their new assignment, while almost one-fourth (23%) disagree. Comparable levels of agreement are found among RC leaders, and overall ratings in both components show stability over the past three years.
- About half of Jr NCOs in both components disagree that the most capable personnel are promoted (52% AC and 46% RC disagree) while more than one-third disagree that unit members who are promoted are prepared to lead in their new assignment (37% AC and 34% RC disagree).

It is reasonable to acknowledge that leaders who receive promotions will hold more favorable views of evaluation and promotion systems than will leaders who are passed over for promotions. Further examination of CASAL data supports this bias. Results show that on average, leaders who were promoted within the past 3 years (in any rank) tend to hold more favorable views about the accuracy of personnel evaluations than leaders who have been at their current rank for more than 8 years.

- Notably, only 26% of leaders in the newly promoted group (3 or fewer years ago) disagree personnel evaluations are accurate, compared to 33% of leaders who have been in their rank for more than 8 years.
- Similarly, a larger percentage of leaders who have been at their current rank for 8 or more years (46%) disagree that the most capable personnel are promoted, compared to leaders promoted in the past three years (35%).

Finally, only 38% of AC leaders agree duty assignments effectively balance force needs with individual Soldier needs and capabilities; more than one-third (36%) disagree. And while half of AC field grade officers (50%) believe duty assignments effectively meet this balance, only 37% of company grade officers and 28% of Jr NCOs agree. There is only slightly more support for this notion among RC leaders (46% agree; 27% disagree), and notably, differences between RC cohorts are much smaller. Levels of agreement in both components show a very slight decline from those observed in 2011.


#### Army Support for Leader Development

Leaders in both components feel the Army could do more to support the development of leaders through various practices and policies. First, only 39% of active duty senior leaders (in the ranks of COL, LTC, CW5, CSM and SGM) agree or strongly agree the Army successfully provides leaders with an individualized approach to their development, while almost an equal percentage (37%) disagrees. Here, unfavorable ratings indicate a perception by some that the Army conducts leader development or career development through a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Ratings by reserve component senior leaders are only slightly more favorable (46% agree; 33% disagree).

Second, leaders do not show a lot of positivity toward the Army’s effectiveness in supporting development through various actions (see Figure 38). Only about half of AC leaders rate the Army effective in setting appropriate selection or qualification policies for schools (52%); supporting development through personnel management practices (e.g., evaluations, promotions, assignments) (47%); and making sufficient resources (e.g., time, materials, experts) available for self-development. More than one-fourth of leaders rate the Army ineffective in supporting development through personnel management practices and policies for schools, while nearly one-third feels more self-development resources should be made available.

Granted, these indicators assess a rather holistic aspect of support for leader development, and do not pinpoint what, specifically, Army leaders would like more or less of from the Army. However, these results do show that gaps exist between the level of support that more than one-fourth of leaders expect and what they perceive is being offered by the Army.

**Figure 38. Leader Perceptions about the Army's Support for Leader Development.**



#### ***Summary of Attitudes toward the Personnel Management System***

Army leaders at higher ranks (field grade officers and Sr NCOs) acknowledge that a favorable series of assignments have improved their knowledge and skills. Further, field grade officers generally agree they have had sufficient predictability and input into the selection of their assignments, though agreement is very low among NCOs.

Overall, Army leader views on personnel management actions continue to fall short of a two-thirds favorability threshold. Only about half of leaders view personnel evaluations as accurate, while fewer believe that duty assignments effectively balance force needs with individual Soldier needs and capabilities. Moreover, there are moderate to low levels of agreement that the most capable people are being promoted, and that those who are promoted are prepared to lead in their new assignments.

Views on the Army's support for leader development through personnel management practices and policies are only moderately favorable. Few senior leaders agree the Army successfully provides leaders with an individualized approach to their leader development. Regarding assignment practices, half of leaders see the Army as effective in providing leaders adequate time in key assignments and in providing an appropriate mix of assignments, though again, levels of agreement differ based on rank/tenure. About half of leaders rate the Army effective in supporting leader development through selection or qualification policies for schools,

personnel management practices (e.g., evaluations, promotions, assignments), and making self development resources available.

In sum, leader attitudes do not overwhelming indicate that Army personnel management systems are ‘broken’ or in need of immediate improvement. Rather, ratings reflect that personnel actions (e.g., assignments, evaluations, promotions) are not perceived to be optimally tuned to developing leaders at all levels, although these processes are viewed favorably, in many cases, by half or more of leaders. However, one-fourth to one-third of leaders rates the Army unfavorably in supporting leader development in these ways.

## **2.5 Institutional Education**

The following points summarize the quality of Army education, how well courses and schools are meeting the expectations of graduates, and the contribution and effectiveness of education systems in developing Army leaders.

### ***Quality of Army Education***

- 58% of active duty leaders and 69% in the reserve component rate institutional education as effective for preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility.
- About two-thirds of senior leaders agree that recent OES and NCOES graduates are gaining the appropriate knowledge, skills and abilities in their courses that are needed to be successful in their next jobs.
- Recent graduates agree course instruction was focused so learners could apply what was taught, and rate instructors favorably in helping them meet learning objectives.
- Perceptions of course effectiveness in preparing leaders for various outcomes have declined slightly compared to past years. Less than half of recent graduates rate their course effective for improving their leadership capabilities while nearly one-fourth rate their course ineffective in this regard.
- Course content is viewed as up to date with the current operating environment by two-thirds of recent graduates. While only half of recent graduates agree course content was relevant to their next jobs, the intent of Army courses is to improve leaders’ knowledge and skills through education rather than to provide job training for their next position (see Table 21).

**Table 21. Metrics for the Quality of Army Courses and Schools.**

Qualities of Army Courses/Schools	Metric – Ratings by Recent Graduates (2008-2012)	Change from 2011 CASAL	Change from 2010 CASAL
Course improved leadership capabilities	46% Effective or Very effective	-3%	-5%
Content relevant to leadership responsibilities in next job	53% Agree or Strongly agree	-1%	+2%
Course content was current with COE	65% Agree or Strongly agree	-2%	+4%

### **Course Expectations**

- Army courses/schools are meeting or exceeding the expectations of most Army leaders who attend.
- Common reasons why courses/schools fall short of expectations include a lack of rigor or challenge, inadequate emphasis on leadership skills, a lack of practical experiences or exercises, and content that was either not relevant to their next jobs or was not current.

### **Education Systems**

- Consistent with past years, ratings for the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B and Captains Career Course (CCC) show room for improvement in effectively improving leadership capabilities, specifically in preparing leaders to develop subordinates. These courses are not meeting expectations for about one-third of leaders who attend, and the most frequently cited reasons relate to a lack of challenge in the course and inadequate level of emphasis on leadership skills (see Table 22).
- Warrant Officer courses are not viewed by most recent graduates as effective in improving leadership capabilities; larger percentages of warrant officers rate the courses effective in preparing learners to understand the complexity of the operational environment.
- The Warrior Leader Course (WLC), Advanced Leader Course (ALC), and Senior Leader Course (SLC) show room for improvement with regard to the perceived level of rigor or challenge offered at the courses. Many leaders did not feel the courses challenged them to perform at a higher level.

**Table 22. Metrics for Education System Quality by Rank Cohort.**

Qualities of Army Education Systems	Metric – Ratings by Recent Course Graduates (2008-2012)	Officer	Warrant Officer	NCO
Learner expectations for the course	Met, Exceeded, or Greatly exceeded	71%	62%	66%
Quality of education received	Good or Very Good	72%	65%	65%
Improving leadership capabilities	Effective or Very effective	48%	37%	46%
Preparing to develop leadership skills of subordinates	Effective or Very effective	35%	32%	45%

## **2.5.1 Quality of Army Education**

### Perceptions of Senior Leaders

Senior leaders' (in the ranks of COL, LTC, CW5, CSM, & SGM) perceptions of the quality of the product they see from OES and NCOES institutions are moderately favorable. Overall, most senior leaders (68%) agree that graduates of OES courses as gaining the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities in their courses needed to be successful in their next job. However, slightly smaller percentages of senior leaders (63%) agree that graduates of NCOES courses are gaining the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to be successful in their next jobs. Small percentages of senior leaders indicate disagreement (11% and 16%, respectively).

Compared to findings of the 2011 CASAL, senior leaders show a slight positive shift in their views about the preparedness of both OES graduates (+10%) and NCOES graduates (+3%). The 2011 CASAL had also found three-fourths or more of senior leaders reported that recent OES and NCOES graduates met or exceeded their expectations with regard to their abilities to work with other leaders, to demonstrate the technical knowledge and skills of their jobs, and to lead subordinates. However, of the senior leaders who disagreed that education systems appropriately prepared officers and NCOs for their next jobs, the areas most frequently cited as lacking were their abilities in developing and mentoring subordinates and communicating effectively, and their skills in planning and time or resource management (Riley et al., 2012).


### Course Instruction and Content

At a broad level, ratings on the quality of education that leaders receive at Army courses and schools are generally favorable but show room for improvement. A large percentage of field grade officers (85%) rate the quality of the education they received in their most recent course as 'good' or 'very good' while only 4% indicate it was 'poor' or 'very poor.' In comparison, about two-thirds of leaders in other rank groups rate the quality of the education received as 'good'

Overall, 68% of leaders rate the quality of the education they receive at courses and schools as good or very good.

or 'very good', while about one-fifth indicate it was 'neither good nor poor' (see Figure 39). Past CASAL surveys assessed the quality of the leader development received at Army courses and schools and found a similar pattern in ratings by rank group (item wording was changed in 2012; notably, leaders rate the quality of the 'education' received more favorably than 'leader development').

**Figure 39. Perceptions of Recent Graduates about the Quality of Education Received at Courses/Schools.**




Several characteristics of Army courses and schools show favorability, while others show room for improvement. On a positive note, Army leaders generally perceive the quality of course instructors favorably. Nearly three-fourths of recent graduates rate their instructors effective or very effective at helping learners meet or surpass the learning objectives of the course. This finding is consistent with results of the 2011 CASAL, which found that 78% of recent graduates rated the quality of their instructors as ‘good’ or ‘very good.’ Also positive in 2012 is the finding that nearly two-thirds of recent graduates agree course instruction was focused on ensuring students could apply what was taught, and that the course content was up to date with the current operating environment at the time they attended (see Figure 40).

An area that shows less favorability is the level of rigor or challenge within Army courses and schools. Specifically, only about half of leaders agree their most recent course challenged them to perform at a higher level, or that course activities and activity assessments were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students.

Courses are not challenging enough for many Army leaders to encourage improvement nor to distinguish among capability levels.

**Figure 40. Ratings for the Content of Courses and Schools by Recent Graduates (2008-2012).**



#### Course Effectiveness in Preparing Leaders


According to AR 350-1, the role of the Army institutional training and education system is to provide Soldiers and leaders with the appropriate KSAs to operate successfully in any operational environment (Department of the Army, 2009). At an overall level, recent graduates provide mixed perceptions with regard to the effectiveness of their most recent course in preparing them for leadership responsibility. Figure 41 displays the perceived effectiveness of Army courses in preparing leaders for various leadership outcomes. Notably, these percentages represent broad indicators of course and school effectiveness across the Army.

- Overall, 61% of leaders rate their most recent course effective in preparing them to understand the complexities of the operational environment, the most favorable of the course outcomes assessed by CASAL.
- About half of recent graduates agree their most recent course or school increased their awareness of their own leadership strengths and weaknesses, and effectively prepared them to address ethical challenges they may face in the Army.
- Less than half of recent graduates rate their most recent course effective for improving their leadership capabilities and for preparing them to build and sustain a positive

command climate. An even smaller percentage of leaders rate their most recent course effective at preparing them to develop the leadership skills of their subordinate leaders.

- Results of the 2011 Survey on Officer Careers (SOC) support these findings; 36% of graduates from years 2008-2010 rated their most recent course or school as preparing them to perform leadership duties to a ‘great extent’ or ‘very great extent’ (35% ‘moderate extent’ and 10% ‘not at all’).
- Overall, CASAL ratings show a slight decline when compared to results observed in 2011. However, direct, year-to-year comparisons of results on courses are tenuous, as the analyses require that a range of data points based on course completion year (i.e., 2008-12 for the 2012 CASAL; 2007-11 for 2011 CASAL) be included to sufficiently represent each course.

**Figure 41. Army Course Effectiveness in Preparing Gradates for Leadership Responsibilities.**



A closer examination of the effectiveness of Army courses in preparing leaders shows both consistency and differences between rank groups (see Table 23). The most favorable outcome among this list is the effectiveness in which courses are preparing leaders to understand the complexity of the operational environment, particularly among field grade officers. Other areas of leadership preparation such as building and sustaining a positive command climate, developing subordinate leadership skills, and preparing to address ethical challenges, show room for some degree of improvement across all levels. Again, these are indicators that provide

a snapshot of the perceived effectiveness of courses in preparing leaders. These education outcomes are discussed further in later sections on course-specific findings.

**Table 23. Perceptions by Recent Graduates about Effectiveness of Courses by Rank Cohort.**


Ratings for Army Courses/Schools in Preparing Recent Graduates (AC, % Effective/Very Effective)					
	SGT - SSG	SFC - CSM	WO1 – CW5	2LT-CPT	MAJ-COL
Preparing learner to understand the complexity of the operational environment	53%	60%	57%	61%	86%
Preparing learner to address ethical challenges in the Army	49%	55%	49%	46%	67%
Preparing learner to build and sustain a positive command climate	47%	50%	43%	43%	60%
Improving leadership capabilities	49%	41%	37%	44%	58%
Preparing learner to develop the leadership skills of subordinates	47%	43%	32%	31%	43%
Agreement course increased awareness of own leadership strengths and weaknesses	53%	51%	42%	51%	63%

### Course Expectations

The 2011 CASAL assessed the expectations Army leaders had for their most recent courses prior to their attendance, and found that only about half expected the course to increase or improve their leadership skills and abilities to a ‘great’ or ‘very great’ extent. Large percentages of leaders expected courses to have a ‘slight’ or ‘moderate’ impact on their leadership ability or understanding. These are important considerations when assessing how well courses and schools are meeting expectations of leaders (after they attend the course).

The 2012 CASAL found that recent graduates’ reflection of their experiences at their most recent course or school were positive for a large percentage of field grade officers, but for smaller percentages of leaders in the other rank cohorts (see Figure 42). Eighty-four percent of field grade officers report their most recent course met, exceeded or greatly exceeded their expectations. About two-thirds of company grade officers and Jr NCOs also indicate the course met or exceeded expectations, though smaller percentages of Sr NCOs (64%) and warrant officers (62%) report the same. These findings are very similar to those observed in the 2011 CASAL.

**Figure 42. Course Effectiveness in Meeting or Exceeding the Expectations of Leaders Who Attend.**



Recent graduates who indicated their most recent course fell short or fell well short of their expectations selected from a list of reasons as to why their expectations were not met. Across education systems, the following reasons were most frequently given as to why course experiences did not meet expectations:

- Lack of rigor or challenge (e.g., felt like a check-the-box activity)
- Course did not have enough emphasis on leadership skills
- Content was not relevant to what I do
- Course was not up-to-date with current operating environment at the time I attended

Warrant officers and NCOs frequently indicated that the information taught in the course was not new to them (e.g., was covered in a previous course, learned through self-development, or through experiences); while officers indicated the course did not offer enough practical experiences or exercises. Notably, small percentages of leaders indicated that instructor engagement, motivation, knowledge or experience was a reason the course fell short of expectations. Leader expectations for courses are discussed in greater detail in later sections of this report on course-specific findings.

#### Utilization of Education

Ideally, the education leaders received at Army courses and schools should provide them with knowledge and skills that will help them perform successfully in their next jobs. However, less

than half of recent graduates (46%) rate their most recent course as ‘of considerable use’ or ‘extremely useful’ while 38% rate the course ‘of some use.’ In addition, about half of recent graduates agree the course was relevant to their current job, though more than one-fourth of leaders in most rank groups indicate disagreement. In comparison to other rank groups, ratings by field grade officers reflect more favorable perceptions about the usefulness and relevance of the courses they attend. Low ratings in the utility of courses and schools may reflect expectations by some leaders that courses should provide job training for their next position, though this is not the intent of Army education.

These findings are consistent with results observed in past CASAL surveys and with results of the 2011 SOC. Thirty-five percent of graduates from 2008-2010 rated the extent to which their most recent course or school prepared them to perform their current duties as ‘great’ or ‘very great’; 31% of these graduates rate the extent as ‘moderate’ while 15% indicated ‘not at all’ (U.S. Army Research Institute, 2011).

As stated in the Army Learning Concept for 2015 (ALC 2015, TRADOC PAM 525-8-2), courses need to provide learners with novel and appropriate content and provide experiences that allow leaders to reflect upon and develop their knowledge, skills and abilities (Department of the Army, 2011). Therefore it is important that Army units and organizations effectively leverage and support the leadership skills that leaders gain through course and school attendance. The percentage of leaders rating their unit or organization effective at utilizing or supporting the leadership skills gained through course attendance has consistently been low. In 2012, 42% of leaders rate their units effective or very effective while one-fifth (21%) rate them ineffective. However, there are differences in perceived unit support for leadership skills between leaders at different levels:

- Fifty-eight percent of field grade officers rate their unit or organization effective at utilizing or supporting the leadership skills they learned in their most recent course, compared to 43% of company grade officers; 13% and 21%, respectively, rate their organization ineffective.
- Forty-six percent of Sr NCOs rate their unit or organization effective at utilizing or supporting their leadership skills, which is considerably lower than ratings by field grade officers.
- One-third of Jr NCOs (34%) rate their unit or organization effective while 27% rate them ineffective.

## Army Learning Concepts for 2015


The Army learning model outlined in ALC 2015 identifies strategies for the development of a learner-centric learning environment (Department of the Army, 2011). A key component of this strategy is to enhance the methods in which content is taught during initial military training (IMT), professional military education (PME), and functional courses. ALC 2015 calls for the following immediate changes to the current institutional education system:

- “Convert most classroom experiences into collaborative problem-solving events led by facilitators who engage learners to think and understand the relevance and context of what they learn.
- Tailor learning to the individual learner’s experiences and competence level based on the results of pre-test and or assessment.
- Dramatically reduce or eliminate instructor-led slide presentation lectures and begin using a blended learning approach that incorporates virtual and constructive simulation, gaming technology, or other technology delivered instruction, (p. 9).”

Through the adoption of ALC 2015, the Army expects Soldiers and leaders to become adaptive, problem-solving, life-long learners.

Evaluation of institutional progress in meeting the changes called for in ALC 2015 is beyond the scope of CASAL. However, CASAL offers several data points that provide a snapshot on the Army’s movement toward these goals. Ratings by recent course graduates on several items related to Army Learning Concepts for 2015 are presented in Figure 43.

**Figure 43. Indicators of Army Progress in Implementing Army Learning Concepts for 2015.**



## **2.5.2 Course-Specific Findings**

The following sections summarize CASAL findings by individual courses. Interpretation of these results requires a note of caution. The intent of CASAL is to identify and track trends in the quality of Army education as it pertains to improving leadership skills and related knowledge, skills and abilities. CASAL's assessment of course characteristics and leadership outcomes is not tailored to the instruction or individual learning outcomes for any given course. Rather, data points offer a broad look at the quality of the education, the relevance and utility of what is learned, and the contribution of courses in improving the leadership skills of learners. Results are presented here for courses or schools where a sufficient number of recent graduates (i.e., > 100) provided ratings on the 2012 CASAL.

### **Officer Courses**

A pattern observed in the ratings of recent graduates of officer courses shows that early tenure courses are rated less favorably compared to later tenure courses. Smaller percentages of company grade officers generally rate BOLC B and CCC favorably compared to the percentage of field grade officers that rate ILE and the AWC favorably.

- BOLC B and CCC are meeting or exceeding the expectations of about two-thirds of graduates. Both courses are rated lowest in terms of the amount of rigor or challenge offered, and in the amount of emphasis on leadership skills. Ratings also reflect that some view BOLC B as not offering sufficient practical experiences or exercises; some graduates indicated CCC content was not up to date with the current operating environment.
- ILE is generally rated favorably, though smaller percentages of leaders who completed the nonresident course agree that it increased their awareness of their leadership strengths and weaknesses, and rate the course effective in challenging them to perform at a higher level.
- Most graduates of ILE resident (81%), ILE nonresident (74%) and the CCC (69%) rate the course as effective or very effective at preparing them to perform staff functions.
- Officer courses show room for improvement in their effectiveness in preparing learners to build and sustain a positive command climate. About two-thirds of graduates (65%) rate ILE resident as effective in preparing them to do so, compared to less than half of graduates from CCC (41%) and BOLC B (44%).
- Only about half of recent graduates for BOLC B (51%), CCC (50%), ILE resident (56%) and ILE nonresident (49%) agree that the course was sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students.


- The AWC is rated favorably by large percentages of recent graduates, though less than two-thirds agree AWC increased their awareness of their leadership strengths and weaknesses.

Ratings for officer course experiences are presented in Table 24. Ratings for course effectiveness in developing leadership skills are presented in Figure 44.

**Table 24. Ratings for Officer Courses and Schools by Recent AC Graduates (2008-2012).**

	Course Met or Exceeded Expectations	Quality of Education Received (% Good or Very Good)	Effectiveness of course at challenging learner to perform at higher level	Agreement course content was up to date	Agreement course increased student's awareness of strengths and weaknesses	Agreement course content is relevant
<b>Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) B</b>	65%	65%	52%	65%	52%	52%
<b>Captains Career Course (CCC)</b>	69%	66%	49%	65%	48%	54%
<b>Intermediate Level Education (ILE) resident</b>	81%	84%	68%	82%	67%	65%
<b>Intermediate Level Education (ILE) DL</b>	80%	76%	56%	74%	52%	43%
<b>Army War College (AWC) or other SSC</b>	91%	95%	88%	90%	64%	77%

**Figure 44. Ratings for Officer Course Effectiveness in Preparing Leaders (2008-2012).**



Most officers report that their most recent course or school met, exceeded or greatly exceeded their expectations. One-tenth of recent AWC graduates, and about one in five recent ILE graduates report that course/school fell short or fell well short of their expectations. However, about one-third of recent graduates of BOLC B (35%) and CCC (31%) indicate their respective course fell short or fell well short of their expectations. These findings are slightly more favorable than results observed in 2011 (40% and 36%, respectively). Table 25 displays the most frequent reasons that recent graduates of three officer courses (BOLC B, CCC, ILE resident) gave as to why the course fell short or fell well short of expectations. Across the board, 'a lack of rigor or challenge' surfaced as the most frequent response selected by leaders in this subgroup.

**Table 25. Reasons why Expectations were Not Met by a Subset (28%) of Recent Officer Course Graduates who Indicated Their Most Recent Course Did Not Meet Expectations.**

9 Top Reasons Selected by AC Officer Course Graduates	BOLC B	CCC	ILE resident
Lack of rigor or challenge (e.g., felt like a check-the-box activity) (66%)	Most frequent (67%)	Most frequent (69%)	Most frequent (58%)
Course did not have enough emphasis on leadership skills (46%)	3rd Most frequent (51%)	3rd Most frequent (46%)	
Course did not offer enough practical experiences or exercises (45%)	2nd Most frequent (55%)		
Content was not relevant to what I do (43%)			3rd Most frequent (38%)
Content was not up-to-date with current operating environment (37%)		2nd Most frequent (47%)	
Information was covered too quickly (37%)	4th Most frequent (47%)		
Information was not new (e.g., covered in previous course, learned through SD, or my experiences) (32%)		4th Most frequent (44%)	2nd Most frequent (51%)
Instructors were not engaged/motivated (24%)			
Instructors were not knowledgeable or experienced (16%)			4th Most frequent (30%)

### Warrant Officer Courses

Ratings by recent graduates of warrant officer courses show less favorability compared to officer and NCO courses, a trend also observed in past CASAL results. Overall, ratings for the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) or BOLC B tend to be more positive than for the Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) or Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC).

- There is low agreement across graduates of warrant officer courses that the course increased learner awareness of their leadership strengths and weaknesses.
- Many WOBC/BOLC B graduates rate the quality of the education received as good or very good (73%), and agree the course content was relevant to their jobs (75%).
- The course content of WOSC is viewed by most as being up to date (80% agreement), though a much smaller percentage found the content relevant to their next jobs (37%).
- Less than half of WOAC and WOSC graduates rate the courses effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level; only 43% and 42%, respectively, agree the course was sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students; 'a lack of rigor or challenge' was a key reason given as to why these courses fell short or fell well short of the expectations of over 40% of recent graduates.


Ratings for warrant officer course experiences are presented in Table 26. Ratings for course effectiveness in developing leadership skills are presented in Figure 45. Common reasons why warrant officer courses are not meeting the expectations of recent graduates are presented in Table 27.

**Table 26. Ratings for Warrant Officer Courses by Recent AC Graduates (2008-2012).**

	Course Met or Exceeded Expectations	Quality of Education Received (% Good or Very Good)	Effectiveness of course at challenging learner to perform at higher level	Agreement course content was up to date	Agreement course increased student's awareness of strengths and weaknesses	Agreement course content is relevant
<b>Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) or BOLC B</b>	68%	73%	57%	66%	46%	75%
<b>Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC)</b>	57%	55%	43%	52%	38%	45%
<b>Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC)</b>	58%	66%	40%	80%	39%	37%

Warrant officers have been, and will increasingly be, utilized in roles beyond their traditional technical expertise. These include formal and informal leadership positions, to include serving as commanders, and as members of staffs. Thus, it is important that warrant officers receive the appropriate preparation for these roles at the courses they attend. Currently, less than half of warrant officer graduates rate their most recent course as effective in improving their leadership capabilities. Even smaller percentages of warrant officers rate the courses effective in preparing them to develop the leadership skills of subordinates (25% to 38%). Just over half of WOSC graduates (54%) rate the course effective at preparing them to perform staff functions; compared to 45% of WOAC graduates and 43% of WOBC graduates.

**Figure 45. Ratings for Warrant Officer Course Effectiveness in Preparing Leaders (2008-2012).**



**Table 27. Reasons why Expectations were Not Met by a Subset (38%) of Recent Warrant Officer Course Graduates who Indicated Their Most Recent Course Did Not Meet Expectations.**

9 Top Reasons Selected by AC Warrant Officer Course Graduates	WOBC or BOLC B	WOAC	WOSC
Lack of rigor or challenge (e.g., felt like a check-the-box activity) (65%)	Most frequent (58%)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Most frequent (63%)	3 <sup>rd</sup> Most frequent (44%)
Information was not new to me (e.g., covered in previous course, learned through self-development, or my experiences) (58%)	3 <sup>rd</sup> Most frequent (50%)	Most frequent (74%)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Most frequent (50%)
Course did not have enough emphasis on leadership skills (54%)	4 <sup>th</sup> Most frequent (39%)		
Content was not relevant to what I do (41%)		3 <sup>rd</sup> Most frequent (62%)	Most frequent (63%)
Content was not up-to-date with current operating environment (41%)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Most frequent (52%)	4 <sup>th</sup> Most frequent (59%)	
Course did not offer enough practical experiences or exercises (33%)			
Information was covered too quickly (29%)			4 <sup>th</sup> Most frequent (37%)
Instructors were not engaged/motivated (23%)			
Instructors were not knowledgeable or experienced (19%)			

## Noncommissioned Officer Courses

With the exception of the Sergeants Major Course (SMC), two-thirds or less of NCOs rate their most recent course favorably across the areas assessed by CASAL.

- About half of recent Warrior Leader Course (WLC) graduates rate the course effective in preparing them for various aspects of leadership. Ratings for the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) and Senior Leader Course (SLC) are slightly less favorable.
- Across NCO courses, there are low levels of agreement that course content is relevant to graduates next jobs (40% to 51%). Only about one-third of WLC, ALC and SLC graduates rate their unit or organization effective at utilizing or supporting the leadership skills they learned in their course.
- Ratings show that strengths of the SMC are in preparing learners to understand the complexity of the operational environment (76% effective); preparing learners to address ethical challenges they face in the Army (69%); and in preparing learners to perform staff functions (67%). Smaller percentages of recent graduates rate the SMC effective for improving their leadership capabilities (50%) and for preparing them to develop subordinates' leadership skills (49%).
- About two-thirds of recent graduates from WLC (70%), ALC (65%) and SLC (68%) rate the course instructors as effective or very effective in helping them meet or surpass learning objectives, though a slightly smaller percentage agree course instruction was focused on ensuring students could apply what was taught (60% to 63% agree).
- A common theme observed in the ratings across NCO courses is that the level of challenge is not viewed as optimal. Overall, about half of recent graduates rate their course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level (48%) and agree activities and activity assessments separated high performing students from low (49%). These attitudes are strongest among recent graduates of WLC, ALC and SLC.

Ratings for NCO course experiences are presented in Table 28; Ratings for course effectiveness in developing leadership skills are presented in Figure 46. Common reasons why NCO courses are not meeting the expectations of recent graduates are presented in Table 29.

Ratings for NCO courses show a common theme. Namely, that the level of challenge in WLC, ALC, and SLC is not at an optimal level.


- Less than half of leaders in these three courses (50%, 46%, and 45%, respectively) rate the course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level. About one-fourth rate the course ineffective.

- Similarly, only about half agree that course activities and activity assessments were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students (50%, 48%, and 48%, respectively). Nearly one-third (28% to 31%) disagree this was the case.
- One-third of NCOs from these three courses indicate the course fell short or fell well short of their expectations, and the most frequent reason cited as to why expectations were not met is ‘a lack of rigor or challenge (e.g., the course felt like a check-the-box activity)’ – a response given by about two-thirds of this sub-group. The second most frequent reason for unmet expectations was that information presented in courses was not new to the learner (e.g., covered in previous course, learned through self-development, or through experiences), a condition that certainly would contribute to a lack of perceived challenge in the courses.

**Table 28. Ratings for Noncommissioned Officer Courses by Recent AC Graduates (2008-2012).**

	Course Met or Exceeded Expectations	Quality of Education Received (% Good or Very Good)	Effectiveness of course at challenging learner to perform at higher level	Agreement course content was up to date	Agreement course increased awareness of strengths and weaknesses	Agreement course content is relevant
Warrior Leader Course (WLC)	68%	66%	50%	68%	60%	40%
Advanced Leader Course (ALC) common core	66%	62%	46%	56%	49%	54%
Senior Leader Course (SLC)	62%	65%	45%	55%	47%	51%
Sergeants Major Course (SMC)	72%	75%	61%	65%	63%	51%

**Figure 46. Ratings for NCO Course Effectiveness in Preparing Leaders (2008-2012).**



**Table 29. Reasons why Expectations were Not Met by a Subset (34%) of Recent NCO Course Graduates who Indicated Their Most Recent Course Did Not Meet Expectations.**

9 Top Reasons Selected by AC NCO Course Graduates	WLC	ALC com-mon core	SLC	SMC
Lack of rigor or challenge (e.g., felt like a check-the-box activity) (65%)	Most freq. (67%)	Most freq. (61%)	Most freq. (69%)	Most freq. (62%)
Information was not new (e.g., covered in previous course, learned through SD, or my experiences) (58%)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Most freq. (64%)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Most freq. (58%)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Most freq. (60%)	4 <sup>th</sup> Most freq. (38%)
Course did not have enough emphasis on leadership skills (54%)	3 <sup>rd</sup> Most freq. (56%)	3 <sup>rd</sup> Most freq. (52%)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Most freq. (60%)	3 <sup>rd</sup> Most freq. (39%)
Content was not relevant to what I do (41%)	4 <sup>th</sup> Most freq. (40%)			2 <sup>nd</sup> Most freq. (61%)
Content was not up-to-date with current operating environment (41%)		4 <sup>th</sup> Most freq. (46%)	4 <sup>th</sup> Most freq. (46%)	
Course did not offer enough practical experience or exercises (33%)				
Information was covered too quickly (29%)				
Instructors were not engaged/motivated (23%)				
Instructors were not knowledgeable (19%)				

### ***Summary of Institutional Education***

For most Army courses, moderate to strong percentages of recent graduates rate the quality of the education they received as ‘Good’ or ‘Very good.’ The most favorably rated courses (in terms of quality education) are AWC, ILE resident, ILE nonresident, and SMC; the least favorably rated courses are WOAC and ALC.

Courses continue to be rated relatively low with regard to perceived effectiveness in improving graduates’ leadership capabilities and show a slight decline since 2011. More specifically, course effectiveness in preparing leaders to develop the leadership skills of their subordinates continues to be very low across the board. As a precursor to skill improvement, it is notable that there are moderate to low levels of agreement that courses increase learners’ awareness of their own leadership strengths and weaknesses. The Army’s Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) program was designed specifically to increase leader self-awareness, so greater emphasis on using MSAF by Army schools and their students could improve outcomes on this indicator.

On a positive note, a new insight that shows some favorability is the relative high percentage of recent graduates rating officer courses as effective in preparing them to understand the complexity of the operational environment. Instructors at Army courses/schools are generally viewed favorably, as evidenced by the high percentage of recent graduates that rate instructors effective in helping them to meet or surpass learning objectives and in the high level of agreement that course instruction focused on ensuring students could apply what was taught.

The level of challenge or rigor associated with course content surfaced as an area for improvement for several courses. Specifically, half or fewer of recent graduates at CCC, WOAC, WOSC, WLC, ALC, and SLC report the course effectively challenged them to perform at a higher level; in many cases, course content is not viewed as sufficiently challenging to separate high performing students from low. A lack of challenge (i.e., course felt like a check-the-box activity) was a commonly cited reason as to why courses/schools were not meeting leader expectations.

### **2.6 Unit-Based Training**

Operational training is one of the domains of leader development and includes training activities organizations undertake while at home station, at maneuver combat training centers, during joint exercises, at mobilization centers, and while operationally deployed (ADP 7-0, 2012). Unit training is dual purposed; to both prepare units for operations and to exercise and improve individual skills of leading and developing units. This section summarizes CASAL results

on unit-level training, pre-deployment training, and combat training centers and presents findings on improving unit effectiveness and their contributions to leader development.

### Unit-Level Training

The use of challenging and realistic unit-based training shows room for improvement. Of Army leaders currently serving in TOE units, less than two-thirds (61% AC and RC) agree or strongly agree that unit training is sufficiently challenging to prepare their unit for successful mission performance. Only half of Jr NCOs (51% AC; 53% RC) agree that training consists of sufficient challenge, while one in four disagrees (27% AC; 24% RC).

Further, only a slightly larger percentage of AC and RC leaders (66% and 67%, respectively) agree or strongly agree that unit exercises use realistic scenarios to prepare their unit for successful mission performance. Again, one in four Jr NCOs disagree that this aspect of training is adequate. When examining these training indicators by TOE unit type, larger percentages of active duty leaders in Maneuver, Fires & Effects (MFE) and Special Branches (SP) units indicate agreement that training is sufficiently challenging and consists of realistic scenarios than do leaders in Operational Support (OS) and Force Sustainment (FS) units (see Table 30).

Overall, unit training activities or events are rated toward the bottom in a list of 15 developmental practices in terms of positive impact on leader development. Less than half of AC and RC leaders (41% & 45%, respectively) indicate unit training activities or events have had a large or great positive impact on their development as leaders. More than one-fourth of leaders (30% AC; 25% RC) indicate unit training has had a small, very little or no positive impact on their development, including 37% of AC Jr NCOs. Again, leaders in MFE and SP units rate unit training activities and events as having a larger impact on their development than do leaders in other types of TOE units. CASAL had not assessed leader attitudes on the effectiveness of these types of unit-based training activities prior to the 2012 survey.

**Table 30. Ratings for Unit-Based Training by Unit Type.**

Active Component (RC in parentheses) Percent Agree/Strongly Agree	TOE Assignment Type			
	Maneuver Fires & Effects	Operational Support	Force Sustainment	Special Branches
Unit Training is sufficiently challenging to prepare my unit for successful mission performance	65% (67%)	56% (59%)	54% (58%)	71% (62%)
Unit Training exercises use realistic scenarios to prepare my unit for successful mission performance	69% (72%)	61% (66%)	60% (64%)	76% (66%)

Broader indications of training effectiveness and unit readiness were reported by the 2012 Status of the Forces Survey (SOFS) (Human Resources Strategic Assessment Program, 2012). It was found that a majority of Army officers (77%) and enlisted members (70%) felt that training had well prepared them to perform their wartime jobs. However, smaller percentages of Soldiers (66% of officers and 56% of enlisted) believed their unit was well prepared to perform its wartime mission. Thus, individual job preparation for wartime operations was rated favorably by more Army personnel than was unit preparation.

### Pre-Deployment Training

After a decade of persistent conflict, the Army has advanced its methods for pre-deployment preparation and training of units and leaders by leaps and bounds. This has been an iterative undertaking that has involved integrating lessons learned, ever evolving technology, updated doctrine, and a wealth of leader experiences. These are factors that must be considered when assessing the current quality of pre-deployment training.

Of leaders who were currently deployed or had redeployed within the past 36 months (at the time of the survey), just under two-thirds report satisfaction with the preparation leaders receive for deployed operations (64% AC; 63% RC), and rate collective training (e.g., company and higher training events) effective or very effective (64% AC; 62% RC).

- Larger percentages of senior leaders (field grade officers and Sr NCOs) rate pre-deployment preparation favorably than do leaders at more junior levels (company grade officers and Jr NCOs).
- Less than one-fifth of AC and RC leaders report dissatisfaction with the preparation leaders receive for deployed operations (18%) and rate collective training as ineffective (17%).
- Since 2009, favorable ratings for the pre-deployment preparation that leaders receive have remained stable for AC leaders (62% to 64% satisfied or very satisfied), but show improvement for RC leaders (55% to 63% satisfied or very satisfied).
- Similarly, favorable ratings for collective training have been stable since 2009 for AC leaders (62% to 64% effective or very effective) and have improved for RC leaders (52% to 62% effective or very effective).
- Company grade officers and Jr NCOs report the highest percentages of unfavorable ratings related to pre-deployment preparation. About one-fourth of company grade officers and Jr NCOs indicate dissatisfaction with the preparation leaders receive (22-25%) and rate pre-deployment collective training as ineffective (21-22%).

Overall, these findings are not new, and constitute steady trends in CASAL data (see Figure 47). Senior leaders rate pre-deployment preparation moderately strong, while company grade officers and Jr NCOs in both components consistently rate pre-deployment training less favorably than other rank groups. Notably, reserve component leader ratings for pre-deployment training have improved since 2009.


### Combat Training Centers

Combat training center (CTC) attendance continues to be fairly stable over the past several years. That is, the percentage of active and reserve component leaders reporting they have trained at a CTC at some point in their career has not significantly changed. In 2012, 58% of AC leaders report having participated as part of the training audience at a CTC in their career (compared to 59% in 2011, 61% in 2010, and 58% in 2009). Smaller percentages of RC leaders report having participated at a CTC during their career (44% in 2012, 44% in 2011, 47% in 2010, and 39% in 2009).

AR 350-50, Combat Training Center Program, states the key components of the CTC mission are to provide commanders, staffs, and Soldiers an operational experience focused on leader development, and to increase unit readiness for deployment and warfighting (Department of the Army, 2003). Overall, CASAL ratings on the effectiveness of CTCs in developing leaders remain moderate to strong, and are consistent across the past four years. With respect to leaders who had trained at a CTC within the past 12 months (at the time of the survey):

- 71% of leaders rate the CTC experience as effective or very effective for improving their leadership skills.
- 75% of leaders rate the CTC experience as effective or very effective for improving their unit's mission readiness.
- Two-thirds of leaders (67%) rate the feedback about their leadership they received at the CTC as effective or very effective.
- Ratings of CTC effectiveness for leadership improvement and effective leadership feedback remain unchanged since 2009 (66% to 71% effective or very effective). CTC effectiveness in improving unit mission readiness was not previously assessed by CASAL.

**Figure 47. Army Leader Perceptions about the Quality of Unit-Based Training.**



### ***Summary of Unit-Based Training***

Army leaders view the effectiveness of unit-based training as moderately favorable. Most indicators center around two-thirds favorability and show room for improvement. Of active duty and reserve component leaders currently serving in TOE units, two-thirds or fewer rate the training their unit conducts as sufficiently challenging and inclusive of realistic scenarios. Further, most leaders view unit training activities and events as having a smaller impact on their development compared to other methods of development. Combat training centers offer unique environments to develop leaders and increase unit mission readiness, though only two out of three leaders rate the experience as effective for improving their leadership skills.

### **3. The Army Profession**

The Army Profession Campaign is an initiative designed to engage Soldiers and Army Civilians by establishing a framework and common language to inspire a dialogue around strengthening the Army profession. The campaign is centered on promoting in Army leaders, the development of five essential characteristics of the profession: Trust, Military Expertise, Esprit de Corps, Honorable Service, and Stewardship of the Profession. The campaign also works to maintain the profession's expert knowledge, unique culture, identity and ethics. The 2012 CASAL contributes to the understanding of the Army as a profession through assessment of Army leader level of awareness of and engagement in the Army Profession Campaign and attitudes about characteristics and concepts related to the Army profession.

#### Attitudes about the Army as a Profession

Results from the 2012 CASAL strongly confirm that Army leaders view the Army as a profession. A large majority of active duty and reserve component leaders agree or strongly agree 'the Army absolutely is a profession' (89% and 91%, respectively). Additionally, more than three-fourths of leaders hold strong personal identification with the Army as a profession, attitudes


A large majority of leaders agree the Army absolutely is a profession.

that are reflected in the high level of agreement to the statements 'it is important to me that I am referred to as a professional' and 'it is important to me that the Army is referred to as a profession.' Very small percentages of leaders indicate disagreement with these three statements (3% to 6%), meaning the attitudes keeping more leaders

from agreeing about the importance of the Army as a profession are uncertainty or indifference, not disagreement.

CASAL findings also indicate that a majority of leaders do not agree that being a member of the Army (alone) constitutes being a professional. Said another way, there is more to being an Army professional than being accessed into the force. More than half of leaders in both components (59% AC; 53% RC) disagree that 'all members of the Army are professionals' or that 'everyone who has completed initial training is an Army professional.' Notably, about 25% of active duty leaders and 29% in the reserve component do agree that completion of initial training and/or membership in the Army makes one an Army professional, though this is a minority viewpoint. Further, it is worth mentioning that differences are small in the level of agreement between rank groups for these statements. The levels of agreement to these statements by component are presented in Figure 48.

**Figure 48. Army Leader Attitudes about the Army as a Profession.**



#### Engagement in the Army Profession Campaign

One challenge for the Army Profession Campaign is that awareness of the initiative is still growing. Less than half of AC leaders (44%) and less than one-third of RC leaders (30%) indicate they are aware of the initiative. Those that reported they have heard of the Army Profession Campaign became aware through various sources. Around one-third or less identified that they had received communication through their chain-of-command (38% AC; 29% RC), through Army communications (37% AC; 37% RC), through a speech or presentation from a senior leader (31% AC; 23% RC), from colleagues (29% AC; 25% RC), or at a conference or event involving the Army profession (38% AC; 29% RC).

Small percentages of leaders (13% AC; 6% RC) indicated their unit or organization had sponsored or conducted training on the Army profession, although about one-third (35% AC; 39% RC) did not know or were not sure if this had been done. For those indicating that training had been sponsored or conducted in their unit, leaders identified that training was typically delivered through professional development activities (27%) or was briefed or presented in a meeting or incorporated into a speech on the Army profession (13%). Additionally, 13% of this

subgroup indicated they had received training on the Army profession during attendance at institutional education. The specific topics addressed through these various presentations and sessions typically included discussion on the importance of Stewardship of the Army Profession (18%), discussions on the Profession at Arms campaign (5%), and dialogue on Honorable Service and the Army Ethic (3%).

When asked about whether they had used Army profession materials available from the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), very small percentages of leaders indicated that they had (10% AC; 5% RC). Of those that had used CAPE materials, the most commonly cited materials used were video or written case studies (48% AC; 42% RC), training support packages (47% AC; 50% RC), and video simulations (35% AC; 37% RC). Fewer leaders reported having utilized the Master Army Profession and Ethic Trainer (18% AC; 11% RC). Taken together, these results show that the various CAPE materials are being used by between 2% to 5% of AC leaders in the Army, and less than 3% of RC leaders. Notably, while the usage of CAPE products was not reported to be strong among participants, more than four-fifths (80% AC; 84% RC) of those who have used them indicated that the materials were effective or very effective in helping to achieve training objectives.

#### Essential Characteristics and Concepts of the Army Profession

Army leaders report moderate levels of understanding of the essential characteristics of the Army profession (i.e., Trust, Military Expertise, Esprit de Corps, Honorable Service, Stewardship). About two-thirds of leaders believe they could either teach these characteristics to others (42% AC; 38% RC) or that they have a basic understanding of them (21% AC; 22% RC). However, about one-third of leaders indicated they had no basis to assess this question (31% AC; 36% RC) while a small percentage indicated they were still trying to make sense of the essential characteristics (4% AC; 3% RC). More favorably, leader attitudes indicate the essential characteristics of the Army profession are in fact valuable in helping the Army meet current and future challenges, as about three-fourths of leaders (71% AC; 77% RC) rate them as being considerably or extremely valuable for this purpose.

One current and future challenge related to these characteristics is the Army's effectiveness in certifying and assessing leaders. Only about half of active duty leaders rate the Army effective or very effective in the following:

- Certifying an individual's *competence* (ability to perform assigned duties to standard) – 53% (61% RC)
- Assessing an individual's *character* (adherence to Army Values and in accordance with the law) – 46% (51% RC)

- Assessing an individual's *commitment* (resolve to serve the Army and the Nation) – 45% (51% RC)
- Overall, about one-fourth of leaders rate the Army ineffective or very ineffective in these three areas.

#### Practices, Procedures and Programs integrating Army Profession Concepts

Very small percentages of active and reserve component leaders (9% and 7%, respectively) indicated their unit or organization has implemented new practices, procedures or programs integrating Army profession concepts. Of those responding positively, professional development sessions (19% AC; 11% RC) were the most prominently cited method of delivery, followed by incorporation into mandatory training and team-building events (7% AC; 7% RC). Leaders most frequently cited Stewardship of the Profession (15% AC; 11% RC), resiliency concepts (7% AC, 12% RC), and 'going back to basics' or returning to standards (7% AC, 5% RC) as the topics or content areas of the newly implemented practices, procedures or programs. Though very small in frequency, more than half of leaders (54% AC; 57% RC) who indicated Army profession-inspired practices, procedures, or programs were being conducted in their unit or organization also rate the impact of said programs as 'large or great' on their unit or organization.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

Findings from the 2012 CASAL provide the Army with several new insights on the quality of leadership and leader development within the Army. The following points highlight new insights, important trends observed across multiple years, and areas that warrant further consideration.

### **New Findings and Insights**

- Leaders view a majority of their fellow leaders as proficient, high-performing, or exceptional leaders. On average, smaller percentages of leaders are viewed as low-performing or non-performing.
- Leader behaviors have a stronger association with effective leadership than do leader traits. The relative importance of the core leader competencies is greater than the leader attributes in contributing to perceptions of overall leader effectiveness.
- There are moderate levels of trust among members of units and organizations, and thus the overall trust climate in the Army shows room for improvement. Unit dynamics positively associated with trust among members include social cohesion, open lines of communication, positive unit climate, and shared experiences. Leader characteristics that contribute to trust in units include demonstrating character, leading by example, showing care and concern for others, communicating effectively, empowering others, and holding others accountable for their actions.
- The overall percentage of leaders rating their immediate superior effective in demonstrating trust building behaviors hovers around a two-thirds threshold, and favorable perceptions increase with rank. Leaders who effectively build trust are viewed as positively impacting unit cohesion and discipline, and subordinate morale, motivation, commitment and well-being.
- The frequency and quality of performance counseling shows slight decline in recent years. Informal discussions between superiors and subordinates on current and future jobs occur more frequently than formal performance counseling, though there is room for improvement.
- Two-thirds of recent graduates of Army courses and schools rate the quality of the education they received as good or very good. Larger percentages of field grade officers rate the education they received favorably compared to smaller percentages of Jr NCOs.
- With the exception of senior officer schools, perceptions on the level of rigor or challenge in Army courses shows room for improvement. Only half of recent graduates agree course activities and activity assessments were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students.

- Perceptions of the Army's support for leader development through policies, practices, and resources are less than optimal. Only about half of uniformed leaders view current personnel management practices as effective in developing leaders.

#### ***Key Findings across Years (Trends)***

- Army leaders continue to be rated favorably in demonstrating all leader attributes. The competencies *Gets Results*, *Prepares Self*, and *Stewards the Profession* also continue to be leader strengths.
- The competency *Develops Others* requires continued focus and attention. About half of leaders agree their immediate superior shows genuine concern about developing subordinates and effectively creates or calls attention to leader development opportunities.
- Overall, the level of morale in the Army is moderate, and results are largely unchanged in recent years. However, leaders report very strong commitment to their teams or immediate work groups, and the level of these positive attitudes show an increase over the past three years.
- Intentions to remain in the Army remain at high levels for leaders not currently eligible for retirement. Half of active duty captains report they plan to stay in the Army until retirement or beyond 20 years, which is the highest percentage observed since 2000.
- The Army's leader development model continues to be well supported, and the perceived relative contribution of the three domains remains unchanged. Operational experience is the favored method for preparing for new levels of leadership or responsibility, followed by self development and institutional education. Notably, ratings for the effectiveness of self development show a steady decline in recent years.
- More leaders report stress from a high workload is a moderate to serious problem compared to past years. Those who experience stress from high workloads indicate it has a negative impact on their well-being, motivation, and work quality. Positively, more leaders now agree that seeking help for stress-related issues is accepted and encouraged in their unit or organization.
- Small percentages of leaders are perceived as demonstrating negative leadership behaviors associated with toxic leadership and this has remained unchanged since 2010. Individual negative behaviors are reported in low frequency at brigade, battalion and company command levels; Jr NCOs more frequently report their immediate superior demonstrates negative leadership behaviors.

### ***Considerations for Improvement***

The 2012 CASAL identified numerous areas where the Army is strong, and, where improvements could be made. The following considerations identify areas where the Army can take actionable steps to improve the quality of leadership and leader development.

#### **1. Increase emphasis on leadership skills.**

The Army would benefit from increased emphasis on improving leadership skills across all leader development domains. Findings have consistently shown over years that developing others and interpersonal tact are the lowest rated core leader competency and the lowest rated leader attribute, respectively. Only 44% of active duty leaders report education has a large or great impact on their development as a leader (see Figure 37), and PME courses are perceived as effective in improving leadership capabilities for only 37% of warrant officers, 41-49% of NCOs, and 44-58% of officers (see Table 23). Of reasons cited by recent graduates as to why courses do not meet their expectations, 54% of warrant officers and NCO's selected not enough emphasis on leadership skills, and 46% of officers selected not enough emphasis on leadership skills.

While the Army has an on-going campaign of education and emphasis on the Army profession, most leaders (90%) already recognize the Army as a profession, identify with the Army as a profession (75%), effectively demonstrate character, Army values, stewardship, trust, and enforce ethical standards (among the highest rated of all leader attributes and competencies). In contrast, there is no such emphasis on improving leadership in the Army.

A secondary source on leader development found that the competencies of Leading by Example, Establishing Trusting Relationships, Leading and influencing subordinates, and Communicating were chosen by officers as having the most impact on leadership effectiveness (25%, 23%, 17%, and 14%, respectively). These findings identify competencies that should be prioritized in education and training.

Taken together, these findings point to a need for special emphasis on improving leadership skills. It is recommended that an independent review of PME leadership learning objectives and content be conducted, as well as a review of training objectives in CTCs. In any curriculum or training changes, emphasis on leadership skills should be added over leadership theories and styles. Examples include areas supportive of mission command including delegation and empowerment, trust, team-building, and shared understanding or sense-making. Junior leaders want to know what is expected of them as leaders and the extent of what leadership in practice involves. Skills that address the contemporary

operating environment include techniques for indirect influence, broad approaches to negotiation and extending influence, restoring a developmental emphasis in units (how to develop, coach, counsel, and mentor others), and addressing negative leadership. Reinforce this increased emphasis on leadership skills by making self-development materials and unit professional development materials available for use in operational assignments.

**2. Emphasize ways to help leaders develop their subordinate leaders.**

- a. Continue to reinforce the collection and use of common leadership tools like those in the leadership Virtual Improvement Center (VIC) and available through the MSAF website. Continue to advertise and endorse the VIC as a resource for leader development through strategic communications to the force (e.g., “Stand-To” messages, AKO announcements).
- b. Develop and pilot the use of an observation guideline of leadership skills (based on ADRP 6-22) that can be used to rapidly evaluate subordinate leadership strengths and weaknesses. The graded list shall differentiate performance of behaviors at three levels for each core leader competency: strengths, meeting the standard and developmental needs. The existing list of behavioral indicators for the Leadership Requirements Model (as featured in the appendix of *Developing Leadership during Unit Training Exercises* handbook) should be leveraged to develop this tool. Create behavioral indicators for the new competencies *Builds Trust and Stewards the Profession*. Create a brief support package that highlights the value and intended use of the tool and offer this resource as a take-away at schoolhouses (e.g., Pre-Command Course) and for use by CTC cadre.
- c. Develop a hip-pocket guide or handbook for small-unit leaders that covers leadership responsibilities. The resource should also provide leadership tactics, techniques and procedures and other visually appealing graphics and tools. Content should address effective ways to develop subordinate leaders, including graded checklists for observing subordinate performance and tips for providing effective feedback, nested within other useful content. Topics identified as developmental needs of small unit leaders include planning, time management, and building teams. The handbook would serve as a useful takeaway resource for graduates of BOLC B, WOBC, and WLC and/or ALC.

**3. Ensure Army education effectively prepares leaders to build trust.**

Increase the emphasis of trust building in course curricula. Findings show several indications that leaders, especially NCOs, would benefit from skill improvement in building trust. At the unit level, nearly one-third of Jr NCOs (29%) disagree that trust exists among members of their unit or organization, while less than half agree (42%). Most Jr NCOs report directly to an NCO senior to them, yet only 62% rate their superior effective at building trust. Among the lowest ratings are Jr NCO agreement that they trust their superior to handle issues important to their well-being (60%) and agreement that their superior corrects conditions in the unit that hinder trust (54%). Furthermore, when considering their current unit or organization, 30% disagree that standards are upheld (e.g., professional bearing, adherence to regulations) and 34% agree there is a discipline problem. Open-ended comments suggest these are issues that hinder trust. Thus there is a basis to emphasize improving NCO skills in building trust and identifying and correcting conditions that hinder trust.

Trust building behaviors stem from both leader attributes and competencies. It is important to consider four factors cited by experts that relate to a leader's ability to demonstrate trustworthiness and to build trust with others: communication, competence, caring, and character. First, leaders build trust through *communication*, specifically the behaviors of communicating clearly, openly and often, and creating norms for a climate of communication (Allert & Chatterjee, 1997; Balasvicius, 2008; Horn, 2008; Kile, 2008; Webber, 2002). Leader *competence* is also important for building trust, demonstrated through tactical, operational and/or strategic competence; specific duties and responsibilities; demonstrating intellect; encouraging competence development among all group members; and striving for self-improvement (Beardsley, 2008; Sweeney et al., 2009; Wildman et al., 2011). *Caring* is a factor leaders demonstrate by showing concern for followers' well-being, acting with the best interests of followers, and providing essential resources (see ADRP 6-22, para 6-42-6-44). Finally, literature indicates leaders build trust through demonstrating *character* and living the Army Values, with specific attention on integrity, sense of duty, and loyalty to others, and advocating for Soldiers (Beardsley, 2008). Course curricula that integrate content related to these factors will impart the knowledge and skills needed to build trust. Training exercises will reinforce the skills in team environments.

Additionally, any developed curriculum should include information pertaining to the broad organizational benefits of unit trust and problems that occur when trust is low. Imparting an understanding of these costs and benefits will increase Jr NCOs' belief that trust is important. Curricula should leverage multimedia presentations and analysis of critical incidents where trust (or lack thereof) was a major contributor to observed outcomes. To

further encourage self-development of trustworthy leadership behavior, external resources available for leadership development should be advocated (e.g., MSAF VIC, CAPE materials).

To identify areas where such trust curricula would be appropriate, schoolhouses and/or CoE are encouraged to conduct internal reviews to confirm the current inclusion of course content on building trust, and to integrate and/or tailor new content that addresses the concepts outlined above.

**4. Evaluate and enhance the level of challenge at Army courses and schools.**

Have Army schools conduct an internal review to evaluate the level of rigor or challenge in courses. Identify opportunities to improve ways that course activities and activity assessments can separate high performers from low performing students. Both resident and DL phases of NCOES (prior to SMC) and junior officer courses (prior to ILE) show room for improvement, as reflected by recent graduate assessments stating the courses lack rigor or challenge. For many graduates, course content is not viewed as sufficiently challenging to separate high performing students from low. A lack of challenge (i.e., ‘course felt like a check-the-box activity’) was a commonly cited reason as to why courses or schools were not meeting leader expectations.

Assess course content for the inclusion of approaches (i.e., cognitive, experiential, and motivational) associated with deep learning, which is the acquisition of higher order skills by relating concepts to existing experience, distinguishing between new ideas and existing knowledge, and critically evaluating and determining key themes and concepts (Entwistle & Ramsden, 1983; Ramsden, 1992). Deep learning principles can be applied by incorporating higher levels of Bloom’s taxonomy and encouraging students to analyze, evaluate, and create (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). Consider advanced learning principles for deep learning, including experience-based learning, frequent feedback, maintaining learner motivation, maintaining learner attention, making learning active, and maintaining a learner-centric approach (Curnow et al., 2006). Combined, these approaches will help identify gaps in current instruction and prepare institutions for the challenges outlined in the Army Learning Concept for 2015 (TRADOC PAM 525-8-2).

Conduct an integrated effort that begins with QAO evaluation of courses through assessment of the pass/fail rate and end-of-course student feedback on the perceived ease or difficulty of course characteristics. If the pass rate for a course is high and student feedback suggests the perceived rigor or challenge is low, course methods could be enhanced to better differentiate student performance levels, and could be done without disrupting fulfillment of course learning objectives.

Encourage schools to have course instructors share best practices on ways to challenge students and enhance the learning that occurs. Progress will be assessed through the decreased frequency of feedback from graduates indicating the course experience lacked challenge or felt like a ‘check the box’ activity.

**5. Enhance the preparation of leaders to learn from experience.**

Leaders have consistently rated experiential learning opportunities as the most favorable and effective of all leader development practices. Leaders and the Army could take advantage of this by covering how to approach experiential learning with purpose and as an explicit activity. Develop course curriculum that addresses ways leaders can maximize learning on-the-job in their next assignments. Include TTPs on how leaders can identify opportunities to develop themselves and actively learn from their experiences. One method is through promoting deliberate self-reflection or a ‘personal AAR.’ The action-observation-reflection model (Kolb, 1984) posits that people will learn more from experiences when time is spent thinking about their experiences. The *Commander’s Handbook for Unit Leader Development* offers a sampling of self-reflective questions that leaders should ask themselves after training events or other experiences (e.g., what happened; how were my actions supposed to influence the situation; what were the results of my actions on unit mission accomplishment; what did I learn?). The use of a journal can help leaders track and record the occurrence, actions, and outcomes of experiences and what they learned.

The benefits of self-reflection can be enhanced by leveraging peer learning. Leaders can solicit feedback from NCO or officer counterparts and from other trusted agents to augment or start self-reflection. CASAL findings have consistently shown that leaders value the learning that occurs through interaction with their peers (both on-the-job and during resident PME attendance) and view peer learning as having a large or great impact on their development. Leaders can further enhance their learning from experience through peer discussions whereby they share the results of their self-reflection (i.e., lessons learned) with one another. Additionally, subordinates are a good source to provide unique insight as to what a leader does well and where they could use improvement. Commanders and leaders can foster and promote the practice of self-reflection by others through actively encouraging it, citing lessons learned while referring to personal journal entries, and providing time for subordinates to reflect on their own leadership immediately following unit or team -level AARs. Integrate these and similar concepts into curriculum on learning from experience.

**6. Enhance one-on-one interactions between superiors and subordinates on individual duty performance and career progression.**

- a. Develop guidelines for conducting ‘assignment AAR sessions’ for knowledge sharing between experienced leaders and aspiring leaders. Specifically, leaders in positions one or two steps beyond more junior, aspiring leaders share knowledge and lessons learned from their assignment experiences. For example, a half dozen majors from battalion level and higher conduct an AAR on their company command experience with first lieutenants and captains nearing their opportunity to command. A team of battalion commanders discuss nominative assignment alternatives and what they learned from their experiences with senior captains in company command that are contemplating a non-branch broadening assignment. Guidelines and TTP for conducting these sessions shall be developed and made available to leaders on ATN, the VIC, MilSuite, and/or distributed as a take-away item at schoolhouses (e.g., pre-command course). These sessions shall then be implemented by commanders as periodic events within their existing unit OPD or NCOPD programs.
- b. Initiate talent management sessions within units whereby leaders provide feedback to their direct reports on their demonstrated competency and readiness for future assignments. For NCOs, this would look like ‘development boards’ rather than ‘promotion boards.’ For officers, these could be termed ‘Leader Transition Readiness’ sessions and provide feedback at key points of transition and readiness (e.g., transition from lieutenant to company commander; from company grade to field grade). For example, a 1LT would receive a readiness assessment for company command, whereby the leader would provide feedback on their current performance level and any gaps to address to prepare for the next assignment.

**7. Enhance assignment practices to increase the developmental benefits accrued through the timing and sequencing of assignments.**

Determine how the deliberate sequencing of assignments can be improved to capitalize on development through experience. Operational experience is consistently found through CASAL as the leader development opportunity that has the most favorable impact on development, yet there has been no apparent study of how different assignment patterns differentially contribute to growth. Conduct data calls with HRC to find the average time in job or position for key assignments of cohorts who report ‘adequate time’ as an issue. Consider what the trend has been over the past few years (e.g., is time in position for company command, field grade branch qualifying positions, etc., trending down?). Consider the impact of broadening experiences and their timing on overall growth. Identify and compare different patterns and assess what impact each has on the rate of development.

The resulting information about the effect of assignment patterns will be useful for assignment practices at Army and unit levels and can be useful for Green Pages, a web-based talent management tool that is being piloted for the Army.

- 8. Provide assistance to units to maximize leader development during operational assignments and unit experiences.**
  - a. Establish a small cadre of leader development experts to advise brigade and battalion commanders. The team, when requested, would provide commanders with techniques and programs tailored to a unit's leader development needs. Commanders and the team of experts can identify unit deficiencies or weaknesses through existing metrics such as the unit MSAF roll-up reports, command climate surveys, and organizational inspections. Assistance can be focused in areas where improvement is most needed (e.g., team building, subordinate development). The cadre will be prepared to advise commanders in areas such as emerging methods of informal leader development, providing career path advice, and tracking mechanisms for leader development. Over time trends in assistance can be rolled back into leadership doctrine, PME curricula, and training publications.
  - b. Within brigade-level units, designate an enlisted member of the command team, such as the CSM or Ops SGM, as a unit leader development advisor to the commander. This individual shall assist the commander in planning and implementing his/her intent for leader development throughout the brigade. Train and certify this individual to serve in this role and award an additional skill identifier (ASI) as a unit leader development specialist.
  - c. Commanders should focus energy on checking subordinate unit leader development programs. Increase visibility and awareness of how units are effectively implementing leader development programs at the unit level. This should include wider dissemination of best practices, innovative approaches and exemplar models of unit leader development that can be adapted and tailored to specific organizations. Several tools currently exist (including the MSAF Program's Virtual Improvement Center, the Army Training Network, and MilSuite), though findings continue to indicate many leaders (including commanders) are not aware of what resources are available. Develop a mechanism in which schoolhouses (NCO Education System, Officer Education System, School for Command Preparation, Army War College, etc.) can promote the existence of these resources in some form of student take-away.

## References

- Allert, J. R. & Chatterjee, S. R. (1997). Corporate communication and trust in leadership. *Corporate Communications*, 2, 1, 14-21.
- Anderson, L.W., & Krathwohl, D.R. (Eds.) (2001). *A taxonomy of learning, teaching, and assessment: A revision of Bloom's taxonomy of educational objectives*. New York: Longman.
- Army Career Tracker information paper. (2011). *U.S. Army Posture Statement 2011*. Retrieved from [https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS\\_ArmyPostureStatement/2011/](https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2011/)
- Army Personnel Survey Office, Army Research Institute (2011). Survey report: Spring 2011 sample survey of military personnel (SSMP). Report No. 2011-11. Arlington, VA: Author.
- Army Training Network information paper. (2012). *U.S. Army Posture Statement 2012*. Retrieved from [https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS\\_ArmyPostureStatement/2012/](https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2012/)
- Balasvicius, T. (2008). Confronting reality: A case study of building trust at the company level. In J. Stouffer and C. L. Mantle (Eds.), *In Harm's Way: Leveraging Trust: A Force Multiplier for Today*. Kingston, Ontario. Canadian Defence Academy Press.
- Beardsley, B. (2008). Building trust in a multi-national team during combat or near-combat operations. In J. Stouffer and C. L. Mantle (Eds.), *In Harm's Way: Leveraging Trust: A Force Multiplier for Today*. Kingston, Ontario. Canadian Defence Academy Press.
- Burns. R. (Jan 31, 2013). U.S. deaths in afghan war drop to 4-year low. *Navy Times*. Retrieved from: <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2013/01/ap-us-deaths-afghanistan-war-drop-4-year-low-013113>.
- Center for Army Leadership (2012a). *Building Trust*. Retrieved from <https://msaf.army.mil/My360/VIC/Default.aspx>
- Center for Army Leadership (2012b). *Leader Development Improvement Guide*. Retrieved from <https://msaf.army.mil/My360/VIC/Default.aspx>
- Center for the Army Profession and Ethic. (2011). *United States Army profession of arms campaign 2011: interim report*. West Point, NY.
- Cianciolo, A. T., Evans, K. M., DeCostanza, A. H., & Pierce, L. G. (2011). Trust in distributed operations. In N. Stanton (Ed), *Trust in Military Teams*, Ashgate, Burlington, VT.

Covey, S. M. R. (2009). *How the best leaders build trust*. Taken from <http://www.leadershipnow.com/CoveyOnTrust.html>.

Curnow, C., Mulvaney, R., Calderon, R., Weingart, E., Nicely, K., Keller-Glaze, H., & Fallesen, J. (2006). *Advanced learning theories final report*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Leadership.

Day, D. V., Harrison, M. M., and Halpin, S. M. (2009). *An integrative approach to leader development: Connecting adult development, identity, and expertise*. New York: Psychology Press.

Department of the Army. (2003). *Army Regulation 350-50, Combat training center program*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Department of the Army. (2009). *Army Regulation 350-1, Army training and leader development*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Department of the Army. (2011). *Army Pamphlet 525-8-2, The U.S. Army learning concept for 2015*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Department of the Army. (2012a). *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Department of the Army. (2012b). *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, Mission Command*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Department of the Army. (2012c). *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, Army Leadership*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Department of the Army. (2012d). *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 7- 0, Training units and developing leaders*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Department of the Army. (2012e). *Army Pamphlet 623-3, Personnel evaluation: Evaluation reporting system*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Entwistle, N., & Ramsden, R. (1983). *Understanding student learning*. London: Croom Helm.

Fallesen, J., Keller-Glaze, H., Aude, S., Mitchell, D., Horey, J., Gramlich, A., & Morath, J. (2005). *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report: Consolidation Phase*. U.S. Army Research Institute Technical Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Freeman, T.E., Foster, B.F., & Brittain, M. (2012). *Multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) 360 program: Program evaluation report 2012*. Unpublished manuscript.

- Guion, R. M. (1998). *Assessment, measurement and prediction for personnel decisions*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah: New Jersey.
- Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D., & Platow, M.J. (2010). *The new psychology of leadership: Identify, influence and power*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Horey J., Harvey, J., Curtin, P., Keller-Glaze, H., Morath, R., & Fallesen, J. (2007). *A criterion-related validation study of the Army core leader competency model*. Arlington, VA: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
- Horn, B. (2008). Trust: The crucible of success. In J. Stouffer and C. L. Mantle (Eds.), *In Harm's Way: Leveraging Trust: A Force Multiplier for Today*. Kingston, Ontario. Canadian Defence Academy Press.
- Human Resources Strategic Assessment Program, Defense Manpower Data Center (2012). February 2012 status of forces survey of active duty members: Leading indicators Briefing. Arlington, VA: Author.
- Keller-Glaze, H., Riley, R., Steele, J.P., Harvey, J., Hatfield, J., & Bryson, J. (2010). *2009 Center for Army Leadership annual survey of Army leadership (CASAL): Main findings*. (CAL Technical Report 2010-1) Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Leadership.
- Kile, J. (2008). Trust in the sandstorms of Afghanistan: Operation Athena rotation 3. In J. Stouffer and C. L. Mantle (Eds.), *In Harm's Way: Leveraging Trust: A Force Multiplier for Today*. Kingston, Ontario. Canadian Defence Academy Press.
- Kolb, D. (1984). *Experiential learning: Experiences as the source of learning and development*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Locke, E.A. (1976). The nature and causes of job satisfaction. In M.D. Dunnette (Ed.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology* (1293-1349). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
- Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. *Academy of Management Review*, 20, 709-722.
- Pinder, C.C. (1998). *Work motivation in organizational behavior*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Ramsden, P. (1992). *Learning to teach in higher education*. Routledge.
- Reed, G. E. (2004, July). Toxic Leadership. *Military Review*, 67-71.

- Riley, R., Conrad, T., Hatfield, J., Keller-Glaze, H., & Fallesen, J. (2012). *The 2011 Center for Army Leadership annual survey of leadership (CASAL): Main findings*. (CAL Technical Report 2012-1). Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Leadership.
- Riley, R., Hatfield, J., Nicely, K., Keller-Glaze, H., & Steele, J. (2011). *2010 Center for Army Leadership annual survey of Army leadership (CASAL): Main findings*. (CAL Technical Report 2011-1, Volume 2) Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Leadership.
- Steele, J. P. (2011). *Antecedents and consequences of toxic leadership in the U.S. Army: A two year review and recommended solutions*. (CAL Technical Report 2011-3). Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Leadership.
- Sweeney, P. J., Thompson, V., & Blanton, H. (2009). Trust and influence in combat: An interdependence model. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 39, 1, 235-264.
- Ulmer, W. F., Jr. (2012, June). Toxic leadership: What are we talking about? *Army Times*, 47-52
- U.S. Army Research Institute. (2011). [Survey on Officer Careers]. Unpublished raw data.
- Webber, S. S. (2002). Leadership and trust facilitating cross-functional team success. *Journal of Management Development*, 21(3), 201-214.
- Wildman, J. L., Fiore, S. M., Burke, S., Salas, E., & Garven, S. (2011). Trust in swift starting action teams. In N. Stanton (Ed), *Trust in Military Teams*, Ashgate, Burlington, VT.
- Yukl, G. (2002). *Leadership in organizations*. (5<sup>th</sup> edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.